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ABSTRACT 
This study is about the emergence of academic earmarking and its effect on the 
distribution of federal research funding. The study examines four basic research 
questions. First, does receiving earmarks improve the ability of an institution to receive 
other types of federal funding? Second, how does awarding earmarks affect the 
geographical distribution of federal research funding? Third, are earmarks additive, or do 
they come at the expense of peer reviewed funding? Finally, is there much difference 
between the institutions which garner the most earmarked funding and those which 
receive the most peer reviewed funding? 
There are six major findings of the study: 
1. Receiving earmarks generally does not improve the ability of 
institutions to receive other types of federal funding although in a few 
instances it does; 
2. Earmarking has had somewhat of a redistributive effect on the 
geographical distribution of federal research funding by sending some 
funding to places where it would otherwise not go; 
3. Earmarked funding is such a small part of total federal research funding 
that it makes little difference in the overall general geographical 
distribution of federal research funds; 
4. When peer reviewed and total funding levels per state are figured on a 
per institution basis there are some notable exceptions to the long held 
Vll 
belief that peer reviewed funding goes mostly to institutions in the 
northeast Atlantic and west coast regions of the United States; 
5. In general earmarks appear to be an additive feature of the federal 
research funding scheme although within individual programs 
earmarking activity may consume funds which historically have been 
and could otherwise be awarded in peer reviewed competitions; 
6. With earmarking and peer reviewed funding both now firmly 
established as different but acceptable forms of awarding federal 
research funding, the difference between the institutions doing the best 
at receiving earmarks and the institutions doing the best at receiving 
peer reviewed funding is lessening and a rising tide of earmarking 
activity is most likely preferentially lifting the boats of those 
institutions which do the best at receiving peer reviewed funding. 
Vlll 
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CHAPTERl 
THE EFFECT OF ACADEMIC EARMARKING ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
FEDERAL RESEARCH FUNDING 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1977 President Jean Mayer of Tufts University secured $10 million for a new 
College of Veterinary Medicine at his institution through what at that time was a novel 
method of funding. Mayer did not raise the money from donors. He did not secure it 
from the State of Massachusetts in which Tufts University is located, nor did he secure 
the funding by applying for it in a grant process administered by some agency of the 
federal government. Mayer hired two Washington lobbyists, Kenneth Schlossberg and 
Gerald Cassidy, to plead his case directly to Congressional appropriators. Schlossberg 
and Cassidy were successful in getting the $10 million for Tufts' s College of Veterinary 
Medicine inserted directly into the 1977 fiscal year appropriation for the Department of 
Agriculture. Thus, the practice of academic earmarking was born. (Savage 1999) 
Academic earmarking refers to appropriations Congress makes directly to 
academic institutions in the appropriations bills for the various units of the federal 
government. Sometimes these appropriations are not included in the actual 
appropriations bills but are rather specified in non-binding report language that 
accompanies the bills. This non-binding report language has proven to be as effective a 
way for Congress to direct funds as specifying the institutions to receive funding in the 
bill. Federal agencies are loathe to anger their Congressional benefactors by not spending 
money appropriated to the agency in the way that Congress wishes for it to be spent. 
Earmarks are not requested by the agencies funded in appropriations bills, nor are they 
1 
usually authorized by the Congressional committees that hold hearings and authorize 
agency requests for funding. Earmarks are a creature of the appropriations process. 
In the federal budget process, the President proposes a budget to Congress. 
Congress divides the President's budget request among various committees which have 
jurisdiction over different areas of the federal budget. These committees authorize 
spending in the areas in which they specialize. The House and Senate Appropriations 
Committees then work up 13 different spending bills each year that are supposed to 
include the spending authorized by the authorizing committees. In order for the federal 
government to spend money, both houses of Congress must pass these appropriations 
bills and the President must sign them. When the budget process takes more time or is 
more protracted, these 13 spending bills are lumped into omnibus spending bills that 
incorporate into one bill what would normally be taken up in separate bills. Also, when 
Congress is not able to complete appropriations bills before the fiscal year starts, a 
continuing resolution is passed by Congress and signed by the President which allows the 
government to function at the previous year's funding levels until the appropriations 
process can be completed. The point is that spending cannot take place without 
Congressional action and the President signing that action into law. Appropriations is the 
part of the process in which actual spending is approved. 
Academic earmarks are usually added during what is called the "markup" of one 
of the 13 appropriations bills. Each of the 13 appropriations bills is handled by a sub­
committee of the House or Senate Appropriations Committee. These sub-committees are 
headed by a chair chosen from the party holding the majority in the chamber. The chairs 
of the appropriations sub-committees are very powerful and have been referred to 
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collectively as the "College of Cardinals" in budgeting literature. Each Cardinal is given 
a certain amount of budgeting authority by the Chair of the full appropriations committee 
to use in developing his appropriations bill. Individual members of Congress request 
earmarks of the different subcommittee chairmen. Subcommittee chairs take these 
requests, as well as other budget requests, into account during the markup of the 
appropriations bill. During this markup, which is done in private and zealously lorded 
over by the Cardinal of the subcommittee, the specifics for how all of the budget 
authority allocated for the appropriations bill will be used are written into the bill. If a 
member's earmark is not included in the markup, it is very difficult to get it approved. 
Including an earmark that was excluded during markup would require the removal of 
something included in the bill to make funds available to pay for the excluded earmark. 
(Savage 1999) 
The House of Representatives and Senate act separately on appropriations bills. 
When the bills approved by the House and Senate are different, the House and Senate 
must work out their differences in conference and develop a conference bill that both 
chambers can pass. If different earmarks are approved by the House and Senate, the 
conference has to decide which earmarks get funded. Conference committees have 
seldom reduced the earmarks passed by either chamber. More often, the committees 
have chosen to fund both sets of earmarks. Earmarks left out during one chamber's 
process have sometimes been added into the conference bill. (Savage 1999) 
Academic earmarks are a means by which individual members of Congress can 
direct federal funds to institutions in their states or districts. Since their arrival on the 
scene in 1977, they have grown to the point that they comprised 7.55% of all federal 
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science and engineering funding for academic institutions and amounted to $2.012 billion 
in fiscal year 2003 (Brainard and Borrego 2003, National Science Foundation 2006). 
Despite the fact that college and university Presidents and their surrogates lobby 
members of Congress for academic earmarks all the time, these earmarks have been 
controversial within the academic community and have been seen as a major challenge to 
the predominant practice of allocating federal funding for academic research through 
competitive merit review processes. The merit review process is presided over by 
leading experts in the academic disciplines for which research awards are allocated. 
Because the reviewers are drawn from the discipline in which the awards are made, the 
competitive merit review process is often referred to as the peer review process. A high 
pitched battle has been waged between proponents of earmarking and advocates of peer 
review about the propriety of earmarking and the distributional effects of the peer review 
method of distributing federal research money. This policy battle has been well covered 
in the Chronicle of Higher Education and other media sources, but very little attention 
has been paid to the phenomena of academic earmarking in academic lite�ature. 
This study builds upon the few good studies of academic earmarking that precede 
it by following in the tradition of a policy study. It focuses on federal research funding 
policy as a case in which Congress's universalistic distributive impulses, as exemplified 
by academic earmarks, run headlong into a dominant policy regime, represented by the 
peer review funding method. The study's central task is to examine the emergence of 
academic earmarking and its effect on the distribution of federal research funds. The 
study will examine four principal questions about the distribution of federal research 
funds. First among these questions is whether receiving earmarks improves the ability of 
4 
an institution to receive other types of federal research funds. Second, this study will 
attempt to discern how the awarding of earmarks affects the geographical distribution of 
federal research funding. Thirdly, this study will delve into the question of whether 
academic earmarks are additive or come at the expense of peer reviewed funding. 
Finally, this study will look at the important question of whether there is much difference, 
particularly now that both academic earmarking and peer review funding methods seem 
firmly established, in the institutions that secure the most funding from academic 
earmarking and the institutions that secure the most funding in peer reviewed 
competitions. 
It is important to study these questions and the subject of academic earmarking 
because, since World War II, the federal government has been the largest source of 
academic research funding (Drew 1985, Geiger 1993, Kleinaman 1995). The federal 
investment in academic research has paid off for Americans in producing the finest 
medical care system and most technologically advanced society in the history of the 
world. During the majority of the time the federal government has been involved in 
funding academic research, peer review methods of allocating funds have dominated. 
Science and scientists have been able to dictate their own agenda. For the most part, 
lawmakers have deferred to scientists on allocation questions even though the desire to 
distribute funds so that local constituents are advantaged has been strong ever since forms 
of government based on geographical representation were created. Academic earmarking 
is a relatively new entry into the federal research funding arena. It represents a measure 
of second guessing of the scientific establishment by members of Congress on allocation 
questions; an assertion by Congress of its ability to understand scientific issues well 
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enough to make at least some allocation decisions; and a recognition by Congress that 
some secondary effects, like regional economic development, seemingly ignored when 
the scientists were making all of the allocation decisions, go along with the funding of 
research. Because academic earmarking changes the federal research funding landscape, 
it is important that we look into its role. The stakes are very high, particularly when one 
considers the potential advancements in medicine and technology that new knowledge, 
properly nurtured and supported by effective federal funding, could bring to light. 
(Ruscio 1994) 
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to discussing eight studies in the 
academic literature that touch on academic earmarking in some way. Chapter 2 will 
present a narrative history of academic earmarking and the policy debate that has 
surrounded it since its onset in 1977. Chapter 3 will discuss the data and methods which 
will be employed to answer this study's research questions. Chapter 4 will present and 
analyze the findings derived from examining these questions. Chapter 5 will present 
some conclusions and recommendations for further study. 
THE ACADEMIC EARMARKING LITERATURE 
Scott A. Frisch provides a rather interesting look at earmarks in general (not just 
academic earmarks) through the lens of the distributive theory of Congressional 
budgeting. Frisch makes much of the difference between things Congress funds through 
formulas and items about which Congress actually makes a distributive decision. He 
holds that a very small minority of decisions about where to send funds are actually 
determined directly by Congress. Earmarks are within this small minority of decisions. 
6 
They operate at the margins. He offers that academic earmarks may bring an element of 
geographical equity to federal research funding by sending money where it would not 
otherwise go. By increasing this geographical equity, earmarks make federal research 
funding more �iversalistic and thus make a system, in which a very few select 
institutions gamer most of the funds available, palatable to a broader coalition. Frisch 
characterizes academic earmarks as the sweetener that makes the whole system digestible 
and the pressure valve that keeps those who are not the largest recipients in the peer 
review system from rebelling. His argument is similar to arguments about the role social 
welfare programs have played in modem capitalistic systems in tempering the extremes 
of market competition so that those with lower socio-economic status do not grow so 
tired of those at the top of the socio-economic pyramid that they fight to overthrow the 
. system. Frisch also deals with electoral connection theory, or how lawmaker's reelection 
desires are connected to the pursuit of earmarks and whether securing earmarks is 
connected to election victories. He finds considerable reasons to question whether 
legislators are single-minded reelection seekers. (Frisch 1998) 
Constance Cook discusses earmarks as one of several factors that caused the 
image of higher education to suffer in the early 1990' s in her book Lobbying for Higher 
Education: How Colleges and Universities Influence Federal Policy. She discusses 
some of the arguments for and against earmarks, and the higher education association's 
efforts to fight earmarking. These topics will be discussed in Chapter 2. Cook's 
narrative is negative towards earmarking. She characterizes earmarks as being pitted 
against peer review funding methods, pitting individual institutions against the higher 
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education associations, and lowering the high prestige higher education had previously 
enjoyed by making it look like any other special interest. (Cook 1998) 
Gary J. Andres uses academic earmarks in a graph he includes with an article that 
argues that earmarks in general are higher during times when Congress and the 
Presidency are under the control of different parties. Andres maintains that whether one 
party controls both branches is what affects earmarking the most. He characterizes 
earmarks as a statutory way for Congress to lock in its distributive intent. In times when 
the same party controls both the Executive and Legislative branches, Congress does not 
have to earmark as much because what it wants is more often included in the budget 
requests of the Executive. (Andres 1995) 
Steven J. Balla, Eric D. Lawrence, Forrest Maltzman, and Lee Sigelman use 
academic earmarking data to show that the majority party allows the minority party some 
earmarks to inoculate itself from charges of wasteful spending but reserves the most 
valuable earmarking awards for its own members. (Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman, and 
Sigelman 2002) 
A. Abigail Payne examines the effect of earmarks and set aside programs on the 
quality and quantity of the publications of the institutions that receive them. Set aside 
programs are peer reviewed programs administered by federal agencies in which the 
states allowed to compete for the awards are limited. The Experimental Program to 
Stimulate Competitive Research, a program of the National Science Foundation, is 
probably the most famous set aside program. Payne finds very modest changes in 
research funding distribution since 1990 as a result of earmarking and set aside programs. 
She finds that earmarks increase the quantity of publications but not the quality, while set 
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aside programs increase the quality of publications but not the quantity. She measures 
the quality of publications by the number of times a publication is cited. (Payne 2003) 
John M. de Figueiredo and Brian S. Silverman model earmarking in a study 
focused on calculating the returns to lobbying. Their study uses data on earmarking and 
lobbying from fiscal years 1997 through 1999. They find that the size of an earmark is a 
function of institutional ranking. Higher ranking institutions are less likely to receive 
earmarks. Presence of a Ph.D. program, presence of a medical school, representation of 
an institution's legislative delegation on either the House or Senate appropriations 
committee, and amount of lobbying done by the institution are significant variables in 
their model. As far as their central question about the returns of lobbying, they find 
universities not represented on either the House or Senate appropriations committees get 
virtually no return for their lobbying expenditures. Those with Senate appropriations 
representation get between $11 and $17 for each dollar they spend on lobbying. Those 
with House representation get between $20 and $36 for each dollar spent. They also find 
that most universities which could benefit from lobbying do not do so, and that the 
universities which do lobby may be lobbying up to the marginal benefit point beyond 
which further lobbying would not be rewarded. ( de Figueiredo and Silverman 2002) 
James D. Savage uses academic earmarking data to show that "Saintly Cardinals", 
those appropriations sub-committee chairmen against pork-barrel spending and for 
general benefits, can limit earmarking in the appropriations bills under their control. This 
notion of the Saintly Cardinal effect on earmarking runs contrary to distributive theory 
which holds that these saints will be few in number, ineffective in their pursuits, and 
punished for their efforts. Savage points to saintly Cardinals like Representative Edward 
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Boland of Massachusetts, Representative William Natcher of Kentucky, Senator William 
Proxmire of Wisconsin, and Senator Jake Garn of Utah who kept academic earmarks out 
of their bills. These Saintly Cardinals were able to keep earmarks out of the budgets of 
peer review programs like the National Institutes of Health and National Science 
Foundation. As chairs of their subcommittees they had control of the initial markup of 
their appropriation bill, release of that markup to the rest of the sub-committee, and 
committee staff to use as resources to oppose academic earmarking. Savage maintains 
that the existence of Saintly Cardinals and their effect on academic earmarking shows 
that individual preference outliers do have influence in Congress. (Savage 1991) 
Savage also writes the most complete study of academic earmarking published to 
date. In his Funding Science in America: Congress, Universities, and the Politics of the 
Academic Pork Barrel, Savage discusses peer review as a Kuhnian paradigm or dominant 
policy regime with all of its cultural and normative facets. He characterizes academic 
earmarking as a small revolution afoot within the dominant policy regime. He also 
discusses earmarking in the terms of a collective action problem. Institutions benefiting 
from earmarks are in effect free riding and double dipping from both the peer review and 
earmarking systems. Many of the common solutions to collective action dilemmas, like 
sanctions, do not seem to apply to earmarking. Finally, he frames earmarking as a 
function of the roles that college presidents and appropriations Cardinals have due to 
their positions and preferences. He maintains the motivations that spring from these roles 
explain much about earmarking. (Savage 1999) 
Savage discusses in detail the incentives institutions have to earmark, the reasons 
for opposition to earmarking, the Association of American Universities futile fight 
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against earmarking, the shortage of federal facilities funding that has made the pressure 
for earmarking more intense, the role of the paid lobbyist in the pursuit of earmarks, and 
the efforts of certain members of Congress to fight earmarks (Savage 1999). These 
issues will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
Savage also presents data on the distribution of academic earmarks between 1980 
and 1996 by state, institution, and region. He discusses the effectiveness of academic 
earmarks by assessing how states and institutions fiscal year 1994 rank in total research 
funding differs from their rank in the first year they received an earmark. If an institution 
or state has gained rank, Savage deems the earmarking to have been effective. If the 
institution or state has lost rank, he states that the earmarking was not effective. The 
results of this analysis are mixed. (Savage 1999) 
Savage also delves into whether certain types of earmarks are more productive 
than others. He maintains that the source of an earmark has a great deal to do with 
whether an institution has an opportunity to improve its total research funding ranking. 
For example, earmarks which increase an institution's capacity to compete for biomedical 
research funding have the potential to increase the institution's overall research funding 
rank. These earmarks are often found in the Department of Health and Human Services 
appropriation but also may be found in the appropriation for the Department of Defense, 
the Department of Energy, and even other appropriation bills. Biomedical research, 
particularly that funded by the National Institutes of Health, is by far the largest area that 
peer reviewed funding is directed towards. Agriculture earmarks, which accounted for 
25.1 % of all earmarked funding in Savage's study, however, do not generally increase 
overall research funding ranking because there are less peer review funds available for 
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agriculture. (Savage 1 999) Savage's data differs from the data presented in this study in 
that it is drawn from different sources and different time periods. Savage used his own 
database for earmarks. This study uses a database of academic earmarks drawn from the 
Chronicle of Higher Education for its analysis. Different methods are also used in the 
analysis of data in this study. 
In his 1 999 book, Savage concludes that the incentives for earmarking made it 
proliferate; that earmarking has remained a small revolution in the peer review dominated 
policy regime because it has yet to challenge peer review funding in an institutionalized, 
routinized, regular way; and that the higher education community's opposition to 
earmarking has been ineffective because higher education leaders contradict themselves 
by criticizing earmarks on the one hand and seeking them on the other (Savage 1 999). 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has introduced the topic of this study and the research questions the 
study will address. The topic of this study is the emergence of academic earmarking and 
its effect on the distribution of federal research funds. The study will examine four 
principal questions about the distribution of federal research funds. First among these 
questions is whether receiving earmarks improve the ability of an institution to receive 
other types of federal research funds. Second, this study will attempt to discern how the 
awarding of earmarks affects the geographical distribution of federal research funding. 
Thirdly, this study will delve into the question of whether academic earmarks are additive 
or come at the expense of peer reviewed funding. Finally, this study will look at the 
important question of whether there is much difference, particularly now that both 
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academic earmarking and peer review funding methods seem firmly established, in the 
institutions that secure the most funding from academic earmarking and the institutions 
that secure the most funding in peer reviewed competitions. 
The chapter has also defined academic earmarking and discussed the 
appropriations process in which earmarks are made. Academic earmarks are 
appropriations Congress makes directly to academic institutions in the appropriations 
bills for the various units of the federal government or specifies in non-binding report 
language accompanying these appropriations bills. They are creatures of the 
appropriations process and are generally added to appropriations bills when those bills 
are "marked up" by appropriations subcommittee chairmen in the markup phase of the 
appropriations process. 
Finally, this chapter has discussed the importance of studying this issue and the 
scholarly literature produced thus far which addresses academic earmarking. It is 
important to study academic earmarking's effect on the distribution of federal research 
funding because the federal government's investment in academic research has paid large 
dividends for American society and has the potential to pay even larger dividends in the 
future. The method by which federal research funds are allocated and how they are 
distributed could dramatically affect potential breakthroughs in medicine and science 
which could transform the future. There have been eight studies which have addressed 
issues related to academic earmarking. This study builds upon these earlier studies and 
attempts to elucidate the policy effects of academic earmarking by addressing the study 
research questions. 
1 3  
In Chapter 2, a narrative history of academic earmarking and the policy debate 
that has swirled around it since its onset in 1977 is presented. Chapter 3 discusses the 
data and methods which will be employed to answer this study's research questions. 
Chapter 4 presents and analyzes the findings derived from examining these questions. 
Chapter 5 presents some conclusions and recommendations for further study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE STORY OF ACADEMIC EARMARKS 
INTRODUCTION 
The federal government was not a major player in academic research until World 
War II. The war effort pumped a lot of funding into weapons systems, biomedical 
research, the atomic bomb, training programs, and other research areas. Congress relied 
on the War Department and scientists to determine how funds for research should best be 
spent. Following the war, the federal role in research funding continued, and Congress 
continued to take the word of scientists, almost on faith, about what was needed. By the 
mid-1960's, however, members of Congress began to gain some science expertise of their 
own, became less deferential, and began to question whether federal research funds were 
being distributed properly. In 1966, 68% of all federal research funds were going to just 
25 of over 2,000 academic institutions in the United States. Congress began to take 
notice that where research funds were sent, economic development seemed to follow. 
( Greenberg 1966) 
A decade later, academic earmarking began with the 1977 grant of $10 million to 
Tufts for their College of Veterinary Medicine (Savage 1999). Academic earmarking 
really burst on the scene in 1983 when Catholic University of America and Columbia 
University both received $5 million earmarks. Both Catholic Univ�rsity and Columbia 
were then, and are today, members of the prestigious Association of American 
Universities. (Budiansky 1983, David 1983, Savage 1999) 
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This chapter chronicles the rise of academic earmarking. It discusses the early 
years of academic earmarking from 1983 to about 1990, the trends in academic 
earmarking from 1990 to 2003, and more recent trends in academic earmarking since 
2003. The arguments that the proponents and opponents of academic earmarking have 
made against and in support of academic earmarking are also discussed. Efforts by the 
higher education associations and by individual members of Congress and the President 
to fight the practice of academic earmarking are detailed. Finally, a section on the role of 
paid lobbyists and the reporting of lobbying expenses and a chapter summary conclude 
the chapter. 
THE EARLY YEARS OF ACADEMIC EARMARKING 
As mentioned in the introduction above, the age of academic earmarking really 
came into being when two $5 million earmarks were awarded to Catholic University and 
Columbia University in 1983. Catholic University received its earmark for a new 
materials facility. The earmark was reported to have come from funds which would have 
gone for materials research at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory at the University of 
California, Berkeley. The Speaker of the House, Tip O'Neill of Massachusetts, was 
reported to have been a key player in getting the earmark for Catholic University. 
Representative Norman Mineta of California did Speaker O'Neill's bidding in committee 
and on the floor of the House. The speculation, advanced at the time, was that Mineta 
would be paid off for his effort with future funding for the Lawrence Berkeley 
Laboratory. (Budiansky 1983, David 1983, Savage 1999) 
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Columbia's earmark was for a National Center for Chemical Research. It was 
reported to have come from funds which would have been spent for accelerator upgrades 
at laboratories run by Yale University and the University of Washington. (Budiansky 
1983, David 1983, Savage 1999) 
Both the Catholic and Columbia projects did not go through any review by the 
federal science bureaucracy or science authorizing committees of the House or Senate. 
This made many University Presidents angry and was a big issue at the fall 1983 AAU 
meeting. Catholic and Columbia pointed out at the meeting that the money they received 
was for buildings not programs. (Budiansky 1983, David 1983, Savage 1999) 
Making this matter all the more murky, a National Center for Advanced Materials 
had been proposed for the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory in the President's budget, but 
was cut during the Congressional appropriations process from $26 million to $3 million 
because it did not go through peer review. (Budiansky 1983, David 1983, Savage 1999) 
The Association of American Universities, the National Academy of Sciences, 
and the National Science Board all condemned the practice of academic earmarking after 
the Catholic and Columbia earmarks. Earmarking, however, continued unabated. In 
fiscal year 1985 appropriations, Senator Warren Rudman of New Hampshire was able to 
direct $5 million for engineering facilities to Dartmouth University. Senator Robert 
Packwood of Oregon was able to direct $10 million to Oregon Health Sciences 
University. Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah was able to direct $6 million for two Utah 
projects - one a cancer research project the other an energy project - through the bill 
funding the Head Start program. Senator Robert Dole of Kansas was able to send 
$200,000 for remote sensing research to the University of Kansas. Senator Edward 
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Kennedy of Massachusetts earmarked $500,000 for a China/United States exchange 
program at Tufts University. Senator Alphonse D'Amato of New York directed $1  
million for computer research to Syracuse University. The Syracuse earmark was 
reported to have come from a $25 million pot of money in the Department of Defense bill 
that was to be used for investigator-initiated, peer-reviewed basic research grants. 
(Budiansky 1985) 
Beginning in 1983 and throughout 1984 and 1985, an earmark sought by 
Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. provoked great controversy. The earmark 
was for a coal gasification project. Georgetown had no engineering school, and most 
observers thought it really just wanted its own power plant. To get its power plant, its 
earmarking proposal to Congress promised to build three other coal burning power plants 
in Alaska, Pennsylvania, and Texas. The University of Alaska, the University of 
Scranton, and the University of Texas El Paso would operate the power plants in their 
states. The proposal had a cost of over $160 million spread over 5 years and was to come 
from the Army Research Office budget in the Department of Defense appropriation. 
Critics of the proposal maintained that the funds used for the project would otherwise be 
available to support peer-reviewed basic research. (Tenzer 1985) 
The project fell apart, temporarily at least, when the University of Alaska, the 
University of Scranton, and University of Texas El Paso denied knowing they were 
included and declined participation. The Army also told Congress it did not need the 
power plants, and the Association of American Universities and the National Association 
of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges publicly opposed the project and lobbied 
Congress against it. The project was defeated in 1984. Georgetown, however, came 
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back in 1985 with a $160 million request that did not include Alaska, Pennsylvania, and 
Texas. The University also requested from Congress $19.4 million to fund an addition to 
its law library in 1985. Both 1985 requests were funded. (Tenzer 1985) 
In 1989, James Savage did a study of academic earmarks for the University of 
California. Savage was working at the time in federal relations for the University. 
Savage found that many institutions and states double dip taking advantage of both peer 
review and academic earmarking opportunities. His study showed that five states 
received 42% of the money earmarked between fiscal year 1980 and fiscal year 1989. 
Massachusetts, New York, and Illinois were among those five and also among the top 10 
in overall research funding received during the same period. Oregon and Florida were 
the other two members of the top five for academic earmarking during the study period. 
Ten states in Savage's study received 63% of the academic earmarking funding doled out 
in the 1980's. Only West Virginia was among the top ten in receiving earmarks and the 
bottom ten in overall research funding. The bottom ten in overall research funding 
received less than 8% of the academic earmarks given away during that period. 
Association of American Universities member institutions claimed about 30% of the 
academic earmark funding distributed. Several critics of Savage's study questioned 
whether agricultural earmarks should be included in the study. Agriculture has a long 
tradition of dispersing its money through earmarking. (Cordes 1989a) 
Savage concluded that states that do poorly in winning peer review funds 
probably have less scientists and engineers and thus less research activity. These factors 
may create less of a need for earmarked funds in these states. Savage thought set aside 
programs, which limit peer review competition to those states underperforming in the 
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winning of peer review funds, might be a more effective way than earmarking to break 
low ranking states out of the cycle that keeps them low. Set aside programs provide a 
sort of sheltered form of competition and are designed to increase the research capacity of 
low performing states and make them more able to compete in peer review competitions. 
Savage maintained that breaking the cycle of low performance would have to happen 
before a more equitable geographic distribution would occur. (Cordes 1989a) 
Later on in 1989, alarms were sounded about agriculture earmarks. Many 
institutions were receiving academic earmarks in the agriculture appropriations bill to 
plan or start facilities projects. There was some concern that Congress was assuming 
some contingent liability to continue funding the facilities it was issuing earmarks to 
start. The alternative to a continuation of funding would be to leave an institution with an 
unfinished facility. The real concern was that the extent of the liability Congress was 
taking on was a big unknown. (Cordes 1989c) 
Another concern was that some agriculture earmarks were going for non­
agricultural purposes. Institutions were lobbying Congress for agriculture earmarks to 
pay for facilities already funded through private donations, state support, and debt. The 
most egregious example of this was the University of Texas Southwestern Medical 
Center which had used nutrition as a doorway to lobby Congress for $20 million in 
agriculture earmarks to retire bonds secured to pay for equipment in one of its hospitals. 
(Cordes 1989c) 
Early in 1990, Colleen Cordes reported that earmarks for research facilities had 
helped some universities recruit scientists and relieve crowding problems in their 
research facilities. She also reported that some universities had struggled to do the work 
20 
associated with the earmarks they had received and that earmarks seemed to get less 
scrutiny than other forms of funding. This lack of scrutiny gave universities a freer hand 
in how they spent the money. In some cases, Cordes reported earmarks had enabled 
innovative risky cutting-edge research that peer review methods of funding would never 
have funded. In other cases, waste and scandal had been the result. Cordes also reported 
that many institutions return to Congress for more money after receiving earmarks for 
facilities in order to keep researchers busy in the buildings built for them. (Cordes 
1990a) 
Cordes reported some success stories. Oregon doubled its federal grant money 
after making improvements to its research facilities upon receiving $45 million directed 
to it through the efforts of Senator Mark Hatfield. The $45 million funded 2/3 of the cost 
of the facilities upgrades. Columbia, however, received earmarks for a National Center 
for Chemical Research, but did not really use the money to create a national center. 
Instead Columbia used the funding to build a new facility for its chemistry department. 
Also, LSU had been unable to spend earmarked money it had received from the 
Department of Defense for nutrition studies because it had not been able to create any 
nutrition programs useful to the military. (Cordes 1990a) 
In the early years of academic earmarking, prominent institutions pioneered the 
practice, but concerns about the efficacy of academic earmarking and its effect on peer 
reviewed funding were heard in the academic community. There were also concerns 
about whether Congress was creating contingent liability for itself by starting to fund 
projects that would continue to need funding in future years and whether earmarks were 
being used for the purposes for which they were awarded. At the end of this early era, 
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the results from academic earmarking were mixed with some accounts of waste and 
scandal balanced by some notable success stories. 
TRENDS IN ACADEMIC EARMARKING - 1990 THROUGH 2003 
The early years of academic earmarking gave way to a period of exponential 
growth from 1990 through 2003 with the exception of a short period of time clustered 
around the transfer of the Congressional majority from the Democrats to the Republicans 
in 1994. Academic earmarking dipped briefly following the Republican takeover of both 
Houses of Congress but rebounded after reaching a low in fiscal year 1996 to rise to 
record heights by the end of this period. Figure 1 is a bar graph representation of the 
value of all earmarks awarded to institutions of higher learning in each year of the period 
from 1990 to 2003. Figure 2 is a bar graph representation of the number of higher 
learning institutions receiving earmarks in each year of the same period. Figure 3 is a bar 
graph representation of the number of earmarks awarded to institutions of higher learning 
in each year of this period. 1 
At the beginning of this period in fiscal year 1990, $270 million in academic 
earmarks were handed out to 1 1  7 institutions. These totals were down from an estimated 
$3 15 million given to fewer institutions in fiscal year 1989. West Virginia was one of the 
larger recipients of academic earmarks in 1990 largely due to the influence of senior 
Senator Robert Byrd who chaired the Senate Appropriations Committee. During 1990, a 
hybrid of earmarking became prevalent on the scene. This hybrid directed an earmark to 
a consortium. The consortium then handed out grants to participating institutions based 
1 All figures and tables are located in the Appendix. 
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on some merit review process. Earmarking in 1990 not only went for facilities but also 
was directed towards research. It was noted in 1990, that individual investigators were 
sometimes going to Congress on their own for earmarks rather than taking a stab at the 
peer review process. Members of Congress were also approaching institutions and 
initiating earmarks. (Cordes 1990b) 
In fiscal year 1991, $493 million in academic earmarks was awarded to 124 
institutions. The lack of a technology policy by the Bush administration and the lack of a 
funding program for research facilities were cited as factors that drove Congress to fund 
research on campuses in their states and districts. The contingent liability problem 
Congress had assumed by funding a large number of agriculture earmarks to start 
agriculture facilities was dealt with in 1991 budget process. An agriculture facilities 
program was funded in the agriculture appropriation. Iowa State University, one of the 
leaders in securing agriculture earmarks, announced that it would not seek agriculture 
earmarks for facilities but would instead seek to have more funding appropriated to the 
agriculture facilities program. ( Cordes 1991 a) 
Iowa State was one of the larger recipients of academic earmarks in 1991 
garnering $24 million for 20 projects from six different agencies. Iowa State received 
over $100 million in earmarks between 1986 and 1991. University officials stated the 
earmarks were part of an effort to make Iowa State the number one agricultural research 
institution in the country. Iowa State's number of peer-reviewed proposals went up 25% 
from 1986 to 1991, and its NSF support doubled during the same period. (Cordes 1991b) 
In mid-199 1 ,  a report entitled "Federally -Funded Research: Decisions for a 
Decade" was disseminated by the United States Congress Office of Technology 
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Assessment. The report claimed earmarking distorts the budgets of federal agencies and 
benefits only a few states and institutions. It reported that $270 million was earmarked to 
academic institutions in fiscal year 1990 and that $900 million for 300 projects was 
earmarked to academic institutions from 1980 through 1989. The report noted that critics 
of earmarking say it promotes bad science, while its proponents say it produces a better 
distribution of federal research funding and provides much needed money for research 
facilities. The report stated that since major facilities money was not likely to be on the 
way, earmarking was likely to remain an important source of facilities funding. 
However, the report found earmarking fared worse in addressing the distribution 
problem. According to the report, from 1980 to 1989, 40% of earmarked funds went to 5 
states and 40% went to 10 universities. The report concluded that earmarking hurts 
agency budgets by forcing agencies to pull money away from their other programs in 
order to fund earmarks. (Myers 1991) 
In June 1991, the chairs of both the House and Senate appropriations 
subcommittees, with jurisdiction over the General Services Administration, announced 
that earmarks would not be funded in the fiscal year 1992 appropriation for the GSA. 
They cited budget constraints as the reason for the denial of earmarks. This agreement 
would only be for one year. ("Ways & Means: GSA Money for Higher Education Dries 
Up." 1991) 
In fiscal year 1992, $684 million in academic earmarks was given to 208 
recipients. The lack of a federal technology program and research facilities funding 
program was cited again as causes for the escalation of academic earmarks. Once again, 
West Virginia was a large recipient of academic earmarks. Delaware was the only state 
24 
that did not receive an earmark. Five states comprised 35% of the 1992 academic 
earmark total. Ten states comprised 52%. Seven of the top ten in 1992 academic 
earmarks ranked also in the top ten in total research funding. For the first time, some 
institutions complained that, because they received earmarks, they were labeled and 
discriminated against in peer review competitions. (Cordes and Goodman 1992) 
West Virginia, which was the largest recipient of 1992 academic earmarks, was 
consistently a large recipient of earmarks throughout the late 1980' s and early 1990' s. 
By their own estimates, West Virginia University and Wheeling Jesuit University 
received $120 million in academic earmarks from fiscal year 1987 through fiscal year 
1992. Senator Robert Byrd and Representative Allan Mollohan steered most of these 
earmarks West Virginia's  way. (Cordes 1992c) 
West Virginia University focused its earmarking effort during this period on 
projects that benefited West Virginia industries and people. Earmarks for West Virginia 
University did not fund bad science or increase the University's  capacity to win peer 
reviewed funds. The University sometimes put faculty with National Science Foundation 
and other grants up for academic earmarks and felt during this time that the location of 
Morgantown made it hard to market new technologies. (Cordes 1992c) 
Wheeling Jesuit University, primarily an undergraduate institution with about 
1,400 students and only $60,000 in research grants in 1992, was, and is, the home of the 
National Technology Transfer Center and the Classroom of the Future. Both the 
technology center and classroom were funded with academic earmarks from the National 
Aeronautical and Space Administration's budget. The technology center's mission was, 
and is, to transfer new knowledge from federal laboratories to the market. The 
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Classroom of the Future sought, and seeks, to develop new technology which schools and 
colleges can use to improve science and math education. Wheeling Jesuit's campus was 
wracked with concerns during this period about the cultural changes its earmarked 
projects would bring to the campus and about the sustainability of funding for the 
projects. Wheeling Jesuit's operating budget in 1992 was about $23 million, but its two 
NASA projects were funded at about $30 million in fiscal year 1992. NASA provided $9 
million of the $30 million for 1992, and Congress earmarked the remaining $21 million. 
Wheeling Jesuit officials admitted the technology center got off to a slow start but 
insisted that small institutions have the advantage of not being distracted when they try to 
do big things. (Cordes 1992c) 
In fiscal year 1993, $763 million in academic earmarks for 212 institutions were 
approved. Election year politics, a belief by some members of Congress that support for 
research and training would help certain industries, and the lack of a research facilities 
funding program were all cited as reasons for the continuing escalation in earmarking. 
Tight spending limits and a growing deficit in 1993 did not seem to affect earmarking. 
(Cordes and Mccarron 1993) 
Representative William Natcher of Kentucky took over as chair of the House 
Appropriations.Committee in fiscal year 1993. He was known to oppose most forms of 
earmarking. Natcher's ascension to chair, the fact that Congressional Democrats should 
not have to resort to earmarking because they could get what they want for their 
constituents from Democrats in the Executive Branch, a tight budget situation, and the 
beginning of some hearings on academic earmarking by the House Science Committee all 
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seemed to indicate that the environment for earmarking would not be as hospitable in the 
future. (Cordes and McCarron 1993) 
One of the largest recipients of academic earmarks in 1993 was the Consortium 
for International Earth Science Information Network or CIESIN (pronounced season). 
CIESIN received $73 million in earmarks in fiscal year 1993 thanks largely to 
Representative Robert Traxler of Michigan. (Cordes and McCarron 1993) Between 
fiscal year 1990 and 1993, Traxler was able to direct $111 million in earmarks to the 
consortium. CIESIN, a consortium composed largely of Michigan institutions, supported 
a research program on earth science issues like global warming. The University of 
Michigan, Saginaw Valley State University, and Michigan State were all original 
members of the consortium. Saginaw Valley State, in Traxler' s district, was the 
headquarters for CIESIN. Polytechnic University in the state of New York, Utah State 
University, and the University of Maryland were added to the consortium by Traxler to 
broaden its appeal. Maryland was a particularly strategic addition, because its Senator, 
Barbara Mikulski, chaired the Senate appropriations sub-committee that had jurisdiction 
over CIESIN's funding. (Cordes 1993g) 
Traxler retired from Congress in 1993. Mikulski did not tum out to be a supporter 
of CIESIN. Congress took back $7 million from CIESIN's 1993 earmarks at the request 
of NASA. The Michigan Senators salvaged $59 million in earmarks for CIESIN, but 
earmarks for a $3 7 million building for CIESIN were cut. CIESIN was also put on notice 
that, in the future, it would have to compete for funds in National Science Foundation 
administered processes. The CIESIN episode pointed out some of the dangers of being 
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dependent on earmarks. Earmarking is political, and, if you live by politics, you can die 
by politics, especially if you lose your patron. (Cordes 1993g) 
As fiscal year 1994 got underway, academic earmarking appeared to be on the 
wane. Spending pressures were leading some appropriations "Cardinals" to make 
accords that projects not be funded unless they were first authorized by an authorizing 
committee. The House Appropriations Committee's authority appeared to be declining 
as it was under attack within the institution of Congress. The House Science Committee 
hearings were shedding negative light on academic earmarking. Some thought a major 
research facilities funding program was on the horizon. (Speicher 1994) The Lawrence 
Berkeley Laboratory, run by the University of California, turned down a $10 million 
earmark in the Office of Naval Research budget after a letter went out from ONR that 
blamed cuts for peer-reviewed grants to individual scientists on earmarks (Ornstein 
1994a). 
In fiscal year 1994, $650.8 million in academic earmarks for 196 institutions were 
approved. This total was about 15% less than the total in fiscal year 1993. Budget 
constraints and the negative light shed on earmarking by the House Science Committee 
hearings were cited as reasons for the decrease. (Cordes and Ornstein 1994) 
Pennsylvania led all states in earmarks received in 1994, and the University of 
Pittsburgh was at the top in earmarks among Pennsylvania institutions. Concurrent 
Technologies Corporation, a corporation owned by the University of Pittsburgh and 
located in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, received most of the University of Pittsburgh's 
earmarked money. Johnstown is in the heart of Representative John Murtha's district. 
( Cordes and Ornstein 1994) 
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The practice of soft earmarking was first noted in 1994. Soft earmarking is when 
Congress suggests in the reports accompanying appropriations that certain proposals be 
examined or sets up funding criteria without specifically mentioning an institution to 
receive the funds. In practice, soft earmarks often have the same effect as explicit 
earmarks. Agencies often contact members of Congress to find out where the money was 
intended to go. (Cordes and Ornstein 1994) 
In early fiscal year 1995 activity, Simpson College received an earmark of $1.5 
million for a science building in a Senate bill authorizing $65 million for the restoration 
of historic facilities at Historically Black Colleges and Universities. In 1994, 3% of 
Simpson's students were black. (Jaschik 1994c) 
The downward trend in academic earmarking continued in fiscal year 1995. $600 
million in academic earmarks for 202 institutions were approved for that year. That total 
was $51 million and 8% less than the fiscal year 1994 total. (Cordes and Rivera 1995) 
The Republicans took control of Congress in fiscal year 1995 but did not go after 
earmarks in their 1995 budget rescission efforts. The Congressional Republicans vowed 
to balance the budget in seven years without raising taxes. It was unclear in 1995 what 
this would mean for earmarking. On the one hand, this effort would perhaps restrict the 
money available for earmarks. On the other hand, cuts made elsewhere in the budget 
might compel more institutions to go directly to their representatives in Congress for the 
money they needed. (Cordes and Rivera 1995) 
In fiscal year 1996, academic earmarks dropped 50% to $296 million. This was 
the lowest total for academic earmarks since 1990. Only 128 institutions received an 
earmark in 1996. The new Republican freshman members of Congress apparently did 
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not know how to use incumbency to their advantage. There was also a great battle over 
the budget between President Clinton and Congress in fiscal year 1996. This battle 
delayed progress on the appropriations bills until the last minute and left little time for 
earmarking. (Cordes and Gorman 1996) 
The University of Hawaii, with Senator Daniel K. Inouye's help, was one of the 
largest recipients of academic earmarks in fiscal year 1996. Hawaii received a $45 
million earmark for an oceanographic research vessel in fiscal year 1996. Such vessels 
are usually funded by the Navy and the National Science Foundation and awarded in a 
peer review competition. The Scripps Institution of Oceanography, Woods Hole 
Oceanographic Institute, and the University of Washington had previously won ships in 
earlier competitions. These institutions expressed concern that the University of Hawaii 
ship would compete with their ships for operating funds. (Gorman 1996) Because of 
their concerns, the Navy later elected to hold a peer review contest to award the $45 
million earmarked for the University of Hawaii ship. Hawaii won the contest. (Martin 
1997) 
Academic earmarks were on the rise again in fiscal year 1997. Earmarks totaled 
$440 million that year, 49% more than they had in fiscal year 1996. 150 institutions 
received an earmark in 1997. The budget process in 1997 was more orderly than the 
previous year, and the Republicans in Congress had become more comfortable being in 
the majority. (Cordes 1997) 
In fiscal year 1998, academic earmarks again rose, but at a much slower rate than 
in 1997. Earmarks totaled $528 million that year, 1 2% more than in 1997. 208 
institutions received an earmark in 1998. (Cordes 1998b) 
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The transportation appropriations bill in 1998 was loaded with earmarks. $ 13 1 .8 
million was earmarked by the bill to about two dozen campus research centers. The bill 
sent another $44 million to 11 other institutions for projects and included funds for the 
Salt Lake City Olympics, which benefited the University of Utah. {Lederman 1998a) 
Shepherd College in West Virginia received $3.22 million in earmarks in the 
· 1998 appropriation for the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Economic 
Development Initiative. The Economic Development Initiative is a program that is 
supposed to spur economic development in distressed areas. Shepherd College used its 
earmark to enlarge and update its library. Shepherdstown, West Virginia, where the 
college is located, is 60 miles southeast of Washington, D.C. In 1998, it had the lowest 
unemployment rate in the state of West Virginia and was also doing well by other 
economic indicators. (Ramage 1998) 
In fiscal year 1999, $797 million in academic earmarks to 305 institutions were 
awarded. At that time, the 1999 total was the largest ever and was 51 % larger than the 
previous year's total. A budget surplus, a budget process in which most of the 
appropriations bills were combined into a large omnibus bill passed late in the year, and 
fading opposition to the practice of earmarking were all cited as reasons for the large 
increase in 1999. 45 of the 62 American members of the Association of American 
Universities received academic earmarks in 1999. Practically all of the states that 
received the most earmarked money had representatives on the House or Senate 
appropriations committees. Four of the ten states that received the least money in 
earmarks did not have representation on an appropriations committee. Nine of the top ten 
states in earmarks were represented by either the chair or ranking member of an 
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appropriations sub-committee. Only three of the bottom ten states had such 
representation. (Brainard and Cordes 1 999) 
Loma Linda University received a $30 million earmark in the 1 999 Federal 
Emergency Management Agency appropriation to use to earthquake retrofit its hospital. 
Representative Jerry Lewis of California represented the district in which Loma Linda 
was located and chaired the House appropriations sub-committee with jurisdiction over 
FEMA's budget. FEMA had a competitive program for earthquake retrofitting. The 
winners in the competitive program had to provide some funds of their own towards their 
earthquake retrofitting needs; Loma Linda did not. Loma Linda's earmark was supposed 
to fund a novel way of retrofitting that could perhaps be duplicated if successful. The 
National Science Foundation's total budget for earthquake research in 1 999 was $29.2 
million. Representative Lewis had also steered earmarks for proton radiation cancer 
treatment research to Loma Linda in previous years. (Brainard 1 999b) 
In late 1 999, Jeffrey Brainard reported that biomedical research and development 
and the budget of the National Institutes of Health were on track to double between 1 998 
and 2003 . Congress and President Clinton had settled on this strategy and embarked 
upon it in the late 1 990's when budget surpluses started to appear. The strategy enjoyed 
broad bipartisan support. The National Institutes of Health is by far the largest federal 
source of peer-reviewed competitive grants to individual investigators for research. 
(Brainard 1 999e) 
Brainard reported that virtually none of the additional funds allocated to 
accomplish this doubling were to go for research facilities. A research space crunch 
seemed to be looming. Congress had passed two major facilities bills in the past - one in 
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the 1 960's and one in 1 988.  The 1 988 bill authorized the National Science Foundation to 
spend $250 million a year. Congress never appropriated that much, however. The 
facilities program reached about $50 million in funding before being terminated in fiscal 
year 1 997. (Brainard 1 999e) 
A major factor hampering facilities funding seemed to be that some people 
thought facilities money would come at the expense of grant money. Lawmakers and 
those in the scientific community both seemed to favor grants over facilities. Grants 
actually funded the carrying out of research. Facilities seemed secondary by comparison 
and not as close to the action. Brainard also reported that there was some concern that 
the emphasis on biomedical research funding might be coming at the expense of other 
disciplines like engineering and physics (Brainard 1 999e ). 
In fiscal year 2000, academic earmarking rose 31 % and crossed the billion dollar 
mark. $ 1 .044 billion was earmarked to 386 institutions. The budget surplus was cited as 
the main reason for the increase. The budget surplus in fiscal year 1 999 was $ 124 billion. 
(Brainard and Southwick 2000) 
Neal F. Lane, President Clinton's science advisor in 2000 said the rise in 
earmarks, "threatens to undermine America's position as the world's leader in science 
and technology" and that the economy, "has grown by leaps and bounds, because of the 
rapid pace of discovery and innovation made possible by funding the highest quality 
research" (Brainard and Southwick 2000, A29). The average National Science 
Foundation grant was $95,000 in 2000. National Science Foundation grants were then, 
and are now, awarded in peer review competition. Academic earmarks in 2000 ranged up 
into the millions and in a few cases tens of millions of dollars. (Brainard and Southwick 
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2000) By 2000, academic earmarks appeared to some like Lane to be a way for 
institutions to secure larger than normal sums of money for projects not subjected to the 
same quality control scrutiny to which peer reviewed projects are subjected. 
In fiscal year 200 l ,  $1.668 billion was earmarked to 528 academic institutions. 
That total was $624 million more than in fiscal year 2000 and at that time represented the 
largest single year increase in funds earmarked and the largest number of institutions 
receiving an earmark in a single year. Among the institutions receiving earmarks in 
2001, the University of Idaho received $700,000 to study historic jazz, and the University 
of Alaska at Fairbanks received $645,000 to make a machine that can de-bone wild 
salmon. The budget surplus and election year pressures were cited as reasons for the rise 
in earmarking activity. The federal government had a budget surplus of $236 billion in 
fiscal year 2000. President Bush and Senator John McCain vowed to fight earmarks in 
2001 but were largely unsuccessful. (Brainard and Southwick 2001 b) 
Congress earmarked $345 million for 118 building projects in 2001. The 
National Institutes of Health had $75 million, to be competed for by all institutions, in its 
facilities funding program in fiscal year 2001. Of the $345 million Congress earmarked 
for facilities, $168.3 million for 58 projects was in the Department of Health and Human 
Services appropriation. The Department of Health and Human Services appropriation 
includes the National Institutes of Health budget. In some budgets, like NASA's, funds 
for peer-reviewed awards appeared to be pitted against earmarks. The budgets for the 
National Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation, however, remained off 
limits to earmarks. The National Institutes of Health and the National Science 
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Foundation are by far the two largest sources of peer-reviewed competitive research 
grants to individual investigators. (Brainard and Southwick 2001 b) 
There was, however, a scare of sorts with regard to the National Science 
Foundation appropriation in 2001. The 2001 National Science Foundation appropriation 
contained the Children's Research Initiative. Congress went into detail in the report 
accompanying the NSF appropriation about the criteria by which it hoped proposals to 
the Children's Research Initiative would be evaluated. It also went into great detail about 
the profile of institutions it hoped would be awarded grants. The report included 
language stating that Children's Research Initiative grants should be competitively 
awarded, but some observers felt Congress was getting dangerously close to earmarking 
the previously sacred NSF budget. (Southwick 2001) 
The efforts of Mississippi Senator Thad Cochran to influence the National 
Institutes of Health grant process prompted similar concerns. Cochran made direct 
appeals to the top administration at the NIH for funds to support bio-imaging grants at the 
University of Mississippi Medical Center. He wanted these grants to be made outside the 
NIH's normal competitive peer-reviewed grant process. His intervention alarmed some 
people, and he received some negative feedback and chose to back off. (Brainard 2002a) 
A third of all the NIH grant money in fiscal year 2001 went to investigators in 
California, New York, and Pennsylvania. The ten states receiving the least in NIH grants 
received less than 1 % of the grants awarded. The NIH budget in fiscal year 2001 was 
$23.6 billion. (Brainard 2002a) 
Another development in 2001 was the emergence of community colleges as 
players in the earmarking game. Prior to 2001, community colleges had mostly relied 
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solely on their associations for federal lobbying. 2001 saw more community colleges 
lobbying themselves and hiring lobbyists to lobby for them. Community colleges 
received $6 million in academic earmarks in fiscal year 1997. They received $48 million 
in fiscal year 2001. (Evelyn 2001) 
In late 2001, a group met in Washington to discuss academic earmarking. There 
were some at the meeting who said academic earmarking would not go down until 
institutions curbed their appetites and some who said attention should be focused on 
making sure earmarked money is spent better. Former Senator J. Bennett Johnson of 
Louisiana said he thought earmarking stimulated Congress to support research. (Brainard 
2001d) 
In the first shot of the fiscal year 2002 budget battle, President Bush proposed a 
budget that would increase funding for basic research by 6%. Most of that increase was 
accounted for by a proposed 13.4% increase in the NIH budget. An increase of that 
amount would keep the NIH on track to double by 2003. Bush's budget included $100 
million in the NIH budget for facilities funding. It also included a 1.3% increase for the 
National Science Foundation, a .1 % for the Energy science budget, a 2% increase for the 
NASA research budget, and no increase for agriculture research. Some critics 
complained that outside of the NIH increase, the budget really held little good news. 
Some concern was also expressed that an imbalance was developing because biomedical 
research was being funded while other important areas of science were not. The Bush 
administration maintained that fiscal discipline and tax cuts restricted a rise in budgets 
other than the NIH's. (Brainard and Southwick 2001a) 
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By the time the appropriations process had run its course in fiscal year 2002, 
$1.837 billion had been earmarked to 668 colleges and universities. Both of these totals 
were new highs. Budget deficits returned in fiscal year 2002 but did not seem to slow 
earmarks. 74% of the academic earmarks in 2002 went to fund projects. 13% went to 
fund facilities construction projects. (Brainard 2002c) 
The September 11, 2001 attacks and the war on terror broke budget discipline 
across the board in 2002. Discretionary spending in the entire fiscal year 2002 budget 
went up 13%. The Department of Defense appropriations bill was the most earmarked 
bill. Colleges and universities received $116 million for 35 terrorism related projects in 
the Department of Defense appropriation. The total budget for the Department of 
Defense in fiscal year 2002 was $351 billion, so earmarks were a rather small part of the 
overall budget. 56 of the 61 American members of the Association of American 
Universities received academic earmarks in fiscal year 2002. (Brainard 2002c) 
Among these institutions, the largest award went to Auburn University which 
received $20 million for construction costs on a Center for Transportation Technology 
(Brainard 2002c ). Other large recipients in 2002 were Wheeling Jesuit University, which 
received $45.5 million from 1990 to 2002 with the help of Senator Robert C. Byrd for its 
National Technology Transfer Center (Brainard 2002h); the University of Alaska at 
Fairbanks, which received $72 million from 199 1 to 2002 with the help of Senator Ted 
Stevens for its Arctic Region Supercomputing Center (Brainard 2002g); the Medical 
University of South Carolina, which received $72 million from 1990 to 2002 with the 
help of Senator Ernest F. Hollings for its Ernest F. Hollings Cancer Center (Brainard 
2002f); Loma Linda University, which received $60.3 million from 1994 to 2002 with 
37 
the help of Representative Jerry Lewis for its National Medical Technology Testbed - a 
program which takes in earmarks and awards grants through a peer review process to 
other institutions (Brainard 2002e); and Georgetown University, which received $44.5 
million from 1991 to 2002 to develop a hydrogen-fueled bus (Brainard 2002d). 
President Bush sought a 15.7% increase for the NIH in his fiscal year 2003 budget 
but again sought minimal increases for the National Science Foundation, agriculture, and 
the research budget of the Department of Defense. Critics complained that physics, 
computer science, and other non-biomedical science areas were languishing. Some made 
the point that advances in bio-medical research were often dependent on advances in 
other scientific disciplines like physics and computer science. (Brainard and Southwick 
2002) 
While Bush's overall 2003 budget proposal for agriculture research was flat, he 
did propose a doubling of the National Research Initiative, agriculture's primary 
competitive peer-reviewed grant program. The program had been funded at $120 million 
in fiscal year 2002. Bush proposed funding it at $240 million in fiscal year 2003. Bush 
proposed cutting agriculture earmarks to finance the National Research Initiative's 
doubling. (Hebel 2002) 
During the 2003 appropriations process, a movement to double the National 
Science Foundation budget in five years started. This movement was very similar to the 
effort that had· been made to double the NIH budget between 1998 and 2003. The House 
Science Committee authorized a 15% increase for three years which would put the NSF 
budget on the proper pace to double. The Senate Appropriations Committee sub­
committee over the NSF budget approved a 12% increase in the NSF budget for fiscal 
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year 2003. This was a little short of what would be needed to put the NSF budget on a 
doubling pace. Both the House and Senate committees expressed a clear preference for 
funding increases in peer-reviewed competitive research grants to individual investigators 
over facilities funding. NSF facilities funding was cut by 43% during the appropriations 
process. (Brainard 2002b) 
At the end of the fiscal year 2003 appropriations process, $2.012 billion in 
academic earmarks had been appropriated to 716 institutions. This was an increase of 
10% over the previous year. Homeland security and anti-terrorism earmarks accounted 
for $223 million of the $2.012 billion total. The homeland security/anti-terrorism total 
had been $126 million in fiscal year 2002 and $73 million in fiscal year 2001. 60% of 
the earmarks in 2003 went to research projects. 13% went to research buildings or 
equipment. Many earmarks were much larger than the typical peer-reviewed grants 
handed out by the NIH or NSF. The NIH facilities program had $120 million in its fiscal 
year 2003 budget. Academic earmarks for facilities and equipment in 2003 totaled $232 
million. (Brainard and Borrego 2003) 
The $223 million in homeland security earmarks in fiscal year 2003 was a 68% 
increase over the total in fiscal year 2002. Competitive peer-reviewed homeland security 
research grants were also up in 2003. (Borrego and Brainard 2003a) 
New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology clearly led the pack in homeland 
security and overall earmarks in 2003. New Mexico Institute received $50 million in 
academic earmarks in fiscal year 2003. It received another $35 million in earmarks from 
2000 through 2002. Most of its earmarks have gone to train fire, police, emergency 
technicians, and other first responders to respond to terrorism. $5 million of a $20 
39 
million earmark received in 2003 was used to buy a 160 acre ghost town in southern New 
Mexico to use as a training ground. (Borrego 2003b) 
New Mexico Institute had always been good in explosives research. In the 
1990' s, it moved into training and formed the National Domestic Preparedness 
Consortium with Louisiana State University, Texas A&M University, and two federal 
research and training facilities. In 2003, the New Mexico Institute was training 120 
people each week. The people trained went back to their agencies and trained others. 
(Borrego 2003b) 
Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico was instrumental in sending New Mexico 
Institute its earmarks. The Institute's normal course in pursuing earmarks was to go for 
large expensive equipment-laden projects and eschew smaller grants to individual 
investigators. (Borrego 2003b) 
Other institutions receiving large homeland security earmarks in 2003 were 
Dartmouth College, which received $78 million from 1999 to 2003 for its Institute for 
Security Technology Studies with the help of Senator Judd Gregg, and the University of 
South Florida, which received $32 million in 2002 and 2003 for its Center for Biological 
Defense with the help of Representative Bill Young. The Center for Biological Defense 
distributed $22.6 million of the earmarked funds it received in 2002 and 2003 to other 
institutions. (Borrego and Brainard 2003b) 
The period from 1990 to 2003 saw academic earmarking really come into its own 
and grow to $2.0 1 2  billion by the end of the period. There was a dip in the middle of the 
period which for the most part corresponded with a change in the political party which 
controlled a majority in both Houses of Congress. However, there were two fiscal years, 
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prior to this change of power and the low point of the dip in fiscal year 1996, in which 
academic earmarking was going down somewhat seemingly in response to fiscal 
pressures and the negative light being shined on it by Congressional hearings. After the 
change of power in Congress, academic earmarking bottomed out in fiscal year 1996 and 
then rebounded steadily in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 before reaching new heights in 
fiscal year 1999 and continuing to rise until the end of this period in 2003. 
This is the general trend when the value of all earmarks in each year of the period 
is taken into account, but the trend is rather consistent, with only a single minor 
difference, when the number of institutions receiving earmarks and the number of 
earmarks granted in each year are considered. The single minor difference in the trend 
for the number of institutions receiving earmarks and the number of earmarks granted is 
that these totals are slightly higher in fiscal year 199 5 than in fiscal year 1994 before 
dipping in fiscal year 1996 along with the value of earmarks awarded. 
During this period of time when earmarks grew so significantly, some major 
programs which utilize peer reviewed competitions to award their funding also saw 
significant increases in their budgets. The National Institutes of Health, which is the 
largest federal source of peer-reviewed competitive grants to individual investigators for 
research, saw its budget double between 1998 and 2003. The National Science 
Foundation, second only to the NIH in federal grant making, also saw increases in its 
budget during this period. 
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RECENT TRENDS IN ACADEMIC EARMARKING 
In recent years, academic earmarking has continued to be a prominent feature of 
the federal appropriations process. President Bush requested $3 .2 billion for homeland 
security research in his fiscal year 2004 budget. This amount was more than four times 
the amount spent in fiscal year 2002. In fiscal year 2002, 35 institutions received $126 
million in homeland security academic earmarks. David Goldston, the Chief of Staff to 
Republicans on the House Science Committee, commented on Bush's  request by saying, 
"This is exactly what the federal-funding system is supposed to do - direct researchers 
that have fairly widely applicable expertise to issues of national concern." (Borrego 
2003a, A22) 
In 2005, a lawsuit was filed by atheists and agnostics which sought to block 
academic earmarks to Alaska Christian College. The lawsuit charged the earmarks to the 
college violated the separation of church and state guaranteed by the constitution. Alaska 
Christian College received $1, 185,000 in earmarks from 2003 to 2005. The lawsuit 
sought to block a $435,000 earmark to Alaska Christian College included in the 2005 
appropriation for the Fund for the Improvement of Post Secondary Education, a program 
of the Department of Education. (Field 2005c, Field 2005d) The suit entitled Freedom 
from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Margaret Spellings was filed in United States District 
Court in the Western District of Wisconsin on April 2 1, 2005. Judge John C. Shabaz 
dismissed the case with prejudice on October 12, 2005. (Web PACER 2007) 
Early in the fiscal year 2006 appropriations process, Congress considered lifting a 
2 year ban it had imposed upon itself which forbade the placing of earmarks in the 
Homeland Security appropriations bill in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. Those arguing to 
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lift the ban pointed out the Department of Defense and Department of Justice 
appropriations bills in 2004 and 2005 had been earmarked. Their argument was, if 
Defense and Justice could be earmarked, why not Homeland Security. (Field 2005b) 
In fiscal year 2006, the transportation bill that sends gas tax money back to the 
states came before the House and Senate. This bill comes up every six years. The 2006 
bill contained a record 174 academic earmarks to 142 institutions totaling $602,741,940. 
The earmarks funded everything from bus depots, parking garages, and pedestrian 
walkways to a materials-research institute. Tennessee received the most of any state in 
the bill receiving $41 million including $20 million that went to the University of 
Tennessee at Knoxville for a new materials-research institute. (Field 2005e) 
Later in the fiscal year 2006 appropriations process, a tight spending environment 
caused Senators and Representatives in conference to take all the earmarks out of the 
Labor-Health and Human Services-Education appropriations bill. Taking the earmarks 
out freed up about $1 billion for other spending needs. Some in the House and Senate 
wanted to use a surplus in the Pell Grant program to fund earmarks and a larger increase 
in the NIH budget. (Burd and Brainard 2005) The House rejected this conference bill 
because members on both sides of the aisle were angry about the earmarks left out 
(Brainiard 2005a). 
The House and Senate eventually passed a second compromise Labor-Health and 
Human Services-Education appropriations bill. The second compromise bill had no 
earmarks, but it had an additional $90 million for health programs in rural areas put into 
the bill to win back enough House Republicans to pass the bill. No House Democrats 
voted for either compromise bill. Enough Senate Democrats voted to pass the second 
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compromise bill because they were convinced the alternative, funding at fiscal year 2005 
levels through a continuing resolution, would be worse than the bill. (Brainard 2005b) 
In early 2006, Jeffrey Brainard reported that a tighter funding environment would 
mean one in five NIH and NSF grant applications would be funded in fiscal year 2006. 
Approximately one in three were funded in fiscal year 2001. Brainard also reported that 
the doubling of the NIH budget from 1998 to 2003 had made some people believe the 
institutes could do without additional funding in a tougher tighter time. (Brainard 2006a) 
Later in the 2006 appropriations process, the Department of Defense 
appropriations bill was passed with a measure that imposed a 1 % across the board cut on 
all appropriations, even those already made in other appropriations bills. The 1 % cut 
meant that research and student aid would be cut in fiscal year 2006 for the first time 
since 1982. (Brainard, Burd, Field, and Selingo 2006) 
In his 2006 State of the Union, President Bush advanced a plan that would double 
budgets for the NSF, Department of Energy's Office of Science, and the Department of 
Commerce's  National Institute of Standards and Technology. Bush proposed that $50 
billion be put towards this objective over the next ten years. (Field 2006) 
In the wake of a scandal involving former California Republican Representative 
Randy "Duke" Cunningham and another scandal involving lobbyist Jack Abramoff, 
Republicans in the House and Senate considered placing limits on earmarks. 
Cunningham was indicted for taking a bribe in exchange for supporting an earmark for a 
defense contractor. Abramoff was known for securing earmarks for his clients and has 
been indicted for violating a number of lobbying laws. Among the things considered by 
Republicans were placing a limit on the number of earmarks a member of Congress can 
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request, making known which member of Congress is sponsoring each earmark, and 
making known a justification for each earmark. (Brainard 2006b) 
The Senate passed a bill later in 2006 that required disclosure of sponsors and 
justifications but set no limit on the number of earmarks a member could pursue. The 
Senate bill also allowed Senators to make a point of order to strip an earmark from any 
bill brought to the floor of the Senate. When the point of order is made, the earmark 
would be stripped unless 60 Senators voted to keep it. (Brainard 2006c) 
The House passed its own bill restricting earmarks. The House bill required 
disclosure of sponsors but not justifications. It also defined earmark in such a way that 
earmarks which do not specify a certain recipient are not considered earmarks. (Selingo 
2006) The House and Senate bills were in conference at the time this study was written. 
In May 2006, John H. Marburger III, President Bush's science advisor, said 
earmarks obscured how much federal spending for peer reviewed projects is going up or 
down. Marburger maintained that earmarks were difficult to disaggregate from totals of 
federal research spending. (Brainard 2006d) 
Academic earmarking in recent years has occurred within a tighter funding 
environment. This tighter funding environment has also affected the budgets of the 
National Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation which enjoyed increases in 
the more flush funding times of the late 1990's and early part of the 2000's. Scandals 
involving members of Congress and lobbyists have caused academic earmarks and all 
earmarks to be viewed with more scrutiny. As this study was being completed, both 
Houses of Congress were considering various regulations which would affect academic 
earmarks such as limits on the number of earmarks a member of Congress can request 
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and disclosure of the name of the member sponsoring an earmark and some justification 
for why an earmark should be granted. 
ARGUMENTS MADE FOR AND AGAINST ACADEMIC EARMARKING 
Members of Congress earmark because they believe bringing federal funds home 
will enhance their image with voters in their state or district and thus enhance their 
chances of being reelected. Other motivations for earmarking include a desire to enact 
good public policy or exercise power in Congress. Most members of Congress consider 
earmarking their right. It is a means by which they can sweeten the pot and make 
legislation more palatable. It is probably only human nature that members enjoy 
directing funds. Opportunities to honor themselves or other members by naming 
buildings or programs in their states and districts are quite enticing. (Andres 1995, 
Savage 1999) While reelection motivation may prompt most earmarking, Congressmen 
and Senators are dependent on the lobbying effort of Colleges and Universities to supply 
them with important information about how much to send back and for what to send it 
( de Figueiredo and Silverman 2002). 
Academic institutions have many motivations to seek earmarks. The number of 
scientists in the United States has grown as the various scientific disciplines have 
developed and training in the scientific disciplines has become more readily available. 
The fact there are more scientists means more competition for the research money 
available. The amount of peer reviewed research money available to scientists has not 
kept pace with the growth in trained scientists. Consequently, research dollars per 
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scientist have declined. The ambitions of researchers and institutions have tended to 
exceed the amount of funding available. (Savage 1999) 
There has also been little federal money available to institutions to build research 
facilities. The only consistent money available, besides earmarks, for providing research 
facilities has been the amount of money included in grants for indirect costs. Indirect 
· costs are the costs not directly related to carrying out the research activities a grant funds. 
Indirect costs include things like utilities, copies, and depreciation on buildings and 
equipment. Most federal grants for research include some funding for indirect costs that 
goes to the institution in which the investigator winning the grant will carry out his 
research. The majority of the funds in federal research grants go to individual 
investigators to fund their research activities. (Savage 1999) 
The indirect cost reimbursement part of federal research grants has been the only 
consistent way the federal government has supported research facilities. This has created 
pressures for earmarking. Practically the only way for an institution to get funding for 
facilities, besides getting an earmark for them, has been to have investigators on their 
faculty who were bringing in federal research grants. This creates a major problem for 
institutions lacking both adequate research facilities and grant-winning faculty members. 
Oftentimes, the only way to get grant-winning faculty members is to build facilities for 
them, but practically all of the money available for facilities costs comes only after an 
institution has faculty who are receiving grants. In order to get into the federal research 
game, an institution has either had to receive an earmark, raise money from private 
sources, receive state funding, or direct other institutional funds towards facilities cost. 
Newer, less-established, less-prestigious institutions often have not had established 
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alumni and donor lists from which to raise money, adequate state support, or other 
sources of funding they could direct to research facilities. Even institutions with research 
facilities and grant-winning faculty members have had strong incentives to earmark 
because the up-front costs of facilities have to be borne by institutions before indirect cost 
reimbursement from federal research grant activity can be enjoyed. (Cook 1998, 
Ketcham and Wells 1991, Rose 1986, Savage 1999, Tenzer 1985) 
Some have argued that building research facilities more broadly throughout the 
country leads to more competition for peer-reviewed research grants and that earmarks 
for facilities are truly an add-on and have little to do with the financing of basic research 
or the peer review process (Schlossberg 1990). Earmarks for facilities also have the 
effect of holding down indirect cost rates because institutions cannot bill the government 
for the interest on debt they assume to build facilities or for depreciation. Institutions are 
able to charge for depreciation when they fund facilities from non-federal sources. 
( Cordes 1992b) 
The main argument proponents of academic earmarking have made is that it 
addresses geographical and institutional inequities in how the peer review system of 
awarding federal research money distributes funds. Since the 1960's, it has been well 
documented that a very few institutions, located mainly in the northeast and on the west 
coast of the United States, have received most of the federal funding for academic 
research. These institutions have been considered the most prestigious institutions and 
have been advantaged in facilities and resources, tradition of philanthropic support from 
alumni and friends, and attracting the best and brightest scholars to their faculties. Some 
have compared the system of awarding research grants to individual investigators based 
48 
on the merit of proposals they submit to committees of their peers to an "old boy's 
network". The reviewers, who sit on peer review committees, tend to come from the 
institutions that get the awards peer review committees pass out. (Rose 1986, Savage 
1999) 
Dr. John Silber, President of Boston University from the 1980's to the early part 
of the 2000's, was perhaps earmarking's most vociferous and effective proponent. Silber 
maintained that the peer review process rewarded the conventional at the expense of the 
novel or creative and that earmarks were a way for the have-not institutions to penetrate 
into the peer review system and become able to win peer-reviewed grants. (Savage 1999) 
Silber said in 2001, "Peer review is understandably and inevitably biased in favor of 
established programs whose faculties dominate the review process. The rich have always 
tended to see the system that made them rich as the best and noblest." (Brainard 2001 b, 
A30) 
Proponents of earmarking have pointed out Congress has its own powers of 
review and may have a better grip on the economic development ramifications of 
awarding federal research money than scientists do. Members of Congress are also at 
least accountable to voters while those serving on peer review committees are not directly 
accountable for the decisions they make. (Rose 1986) 
Earmarking proponents argue there is favoritism in the peer review process, 
geographic dispersal of federal research money is desirable, research infrastructure needs 
to be developed across the nation, economic development needs to occur in all regions, 
non-elite institutions deserve federal research support too, earmarking keeps rich 
institutions from getting richer, earmarking meets national needs in targeted ways, and 
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earmarking promotes access and diversity within academic research. Proponents also 
argue that earmarks bolster the ability of institutions, not in the elite club of institutions 
which consistently gamer the most peer-reviewed grants, to compete for peer-reviewed 
funding and that earmarks go to states and institutions which otherwise would receive 
little federal research money. Arguments have also been made that earmarks go to non­
research projects, like facilities, and are add-ons in the federal appropriations process that 
do not come at the expense of other funds appropriated for peer-reviewed individual 
investigator grants. It has also been pointed out that earmarks comprise a small 
percentage of the total amount spent by the federal government to support academic 
research. (Brainard 2001c, Cook 1998, Feller 2004, Rose 1986) 
Opponents to academic earmarking have often had a general cultural and 
professional belief in the scientific method and the peer review method of awarding 
federal research money. Faculty winning peer-reviewed grants have probably had the 
most commitment to the peer-reviewed system and most objections to the practice of 
academic earmarking. It is these faculty who write grants, do the research, and sit on the 
peer review panels that hand out peer-reviewed money. These faculty often have a 
problem with money being awarded by Congress without a proposal being written and 
reviewed for scientific merit. They are also frequently concerned about funds being 
awarded based on which institution's Representatives or Senators are most influential or 
strategically placed within Congress. Arguments have been made that bypassing peer 
review leads to an erosion of quality in research and that money appropriated for 
earmarks reduces the money available for peer-reviewed grants. Others have stated their 
belief that peer review encourages learning by both individuals and institutions about 
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what it takes to be competitive. The general argument of opponents of earmarking and 
proponents of the peer review system of research funding has been that peer review 
promotes the best science and that earmarking lacks any quality control. (Feller 2004, 
Savage 1999, Tenzer 1985) 
Irwin Feller of Pennsylvania State University argued in 2004 that the federal 
interest in supporting research needed to be clarified and that the number and 
geographical dispersion of institutions the government should and is willing to support 
should be determined. He argued for assessing earmarking results. Feller advocated a 
role for the Association of American Universities similar to the role the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association plays in regulating college athletics. Feller felt the AAU 
should punish Universities reputationally for seeking earmarks through some sanctioning 
procedure similar to the enforcement procedures the NCAA uses to enforce athletic 
regulations. (Feller 2004) 
N orrine Noonan, the former chief of the Environmental Protection Agency's  
research office said in 2001 that earmarks hampered that agency's operations. She 
complained that, while she headed the EPA research office, agency personnel had to 
work with earmark recipients to insure their work was worthy and contributed to the 
EPA' s mission. This took time and hampered the effectiveness of the agency. (Brainard 
2001b) 
Some have felt that the inequities in the distribution of research funds by the peer 
review system could better be addressed by set aside programs. Both the National 
Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation have had set aside programs. Set 
aside programs limit peer review competition to those states underperforming in the 
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receiving of peer review funds. They provide a sort of sheltered form of competition and 
are designed to increase the research capacity of low performing states and make them 
more able to compete in peer review competitions. (Brainard 1999d, Brainard 2002a) 
The National Science Foundation's main set aside program has been the 
Experimental Program for the Stimulation of Competitive Research (EPSCOR). A study 
of EPSCOR states in the program conducted in 1999 showed that about half of the states 
in the program had improved in receiving peer-reviewed grants and half had not. One of 
the major criticisms of the EPSCOR program is that states that do improve do not 
graduate from the program. The EPSCOR program requires states and institutions to 
kick in some of their own money to match some of the funds provided by EPSCOR 
grants. (Brainard 1999d) 
The National Institutes of Health started awarding Institutional Development 
Awards in 2002. In 2002, these awards provided institutions in 23 states up to $2 million 
a year for three years to recruit faculty, buy equipment, and renovate laboratories so that 
they could compete more successfully in the NIH's other peer reviewed programs. Every 
institution that applied in 2002 received an award prompting some to criticize the 
program as nothing more than a ruse for earmarking. Still, the program, funded at $160 
million in 2002, was a small part of the NIH's $23.6 billion budget in fiscal year 2002. 
The EPSCOR program was funded at $110 million in 2002. (Brainard 2002a) 
Set aside programs have generally not been funded at high enough levels to affect 
the distributional inequities which concern proponents of earmarking. Smaller states in 
the set aside programs file fewer grant applications than other states. In 2000, the set 
aside states only filed 8% of all NIH grant applications filed. This 8% roughly matched 
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the share of grants approved for investigators in set aside states. Set aside states also 
have a smaller percentage of grants approved. In 2000, 24% of the applications filed by 
investigators in the set aside states were approved. 31 % of all applications were 
approved. (Brainard 2002a) 
Some have felt that the lack of a uniform definition for what constitutes an 
earmark has obscured earmarks and made them difficult to fight. Earmarks have been 
defined as any award that has not gone through external peer or merit review, as an award 
directly funded by Congress, and as an appropriation for an institution not authorized by 
an authorizing committee in Congress. Some have also thought agriculture earmarks 
should not be counted because agriculture has a long tradition of awarding research 
funding through earmarking and that monies earmarked to a consortium which are 
subsequently awarded to other institutions through some sort of review process should 
not count either. (Savage 1993) 
The Citizens Against Government Waste has classified as pork any project that is 
initiated by the House or Senate but not both, that is not authorized by a Congressional 
authorizing committee, that is not competitively awarded, that is not requested by the 
President, that is funded at more than the level the President requests, that is not 
subjected to a Congressional hearing, and that serves local or special interests. To be 
pork, a project need meet only one of the Citizens Against Government Waste's criteria. 
(Cordes 1998a) 
A lack of consensus on what constitutes an earmark has without doubt clouded 
the policy debate over earmarks. It has weakened the arguments on both sides of the 
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debate but has vexed those against earmarking most because it has made earmarks an 
elusive target. 
In sum, there are many motivations for members of the House and Senate to 
earmark but greatest among these motivations is the motivation to further their reelection 
prospects by noticeably bringing federal resources to their districts and states. Members 
of the House and Senate also earmark to enact what they feel is good policy and 
sometimes use earmarks to entice other members into voting for policies for which they 
might not otherwise vote. 
Those within academia have many motivations to seek earmarks. Their greatest 
motivations, however, are economic as there are more scientists than ever before and less 
money available per scientist. The lack of facilities money available has also motivated 
academic leaders to seek earmarks for their institution's facilities needs. 
Those for academic earmarks have insisted that they remedy geographical and 
institutional inequities of the peer review process and send money where it would 
otherwise not go. They believe that Congress has powers of review at least as good as 
committees of academic experts and is more accountable to citizens than the experts who 
serve on peer review committees, that the geographic dispersal of federal research 
funding is desirable, and that earmarks help meet national needs in targeted ways. 
Those against the practice of academic earmarking believe in the superiority of 
the scientific method and the peer review process. They believe that bypassing peer 
review leads to erosion in the quality of research, that earmarking takes away funds 
which-could otherwise be awarded in peer reviewed competitions, and that peer reviewed 
competitions for grants promote the best science while earmarking lacks effective quality 
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control. While those against earmarking have often espoused competitive set aside 
programs as the best means to combat any geographical or institutional inequities the 
peer reviewed system may reinforce, set aside programs have never been funded at a high 
enough level to affect distributional inequities. 
THE HIGHER EDUCATION ASSOCIATIONS FIGHT EARMARKS 
The higher education community is filled with many associations that represent 
member institutions and groups of faculty, students, and administrators. These 
associations have traditionally played a major role in federal relations. They have 
lobbied Congress on financial aid, research policy, Medicare reimbursement, and 
immigration laws concerning foreign students. (Cook 1998) 
There are six associations which are considered the peak associations in the 
higher education _community. These six associations all have institutional members but 
some of them also have other associations as members. The broadest of the "Big Six" 
associations is the American Council on Education (ACE). Most of the higher education 
institutions in the United States belong to it as do each of the other five "Big Six" 
associations. ACE has traditionally played a coordinating role among the other 
associations in the higher education community. 
The smallest and most elite of the "Big Six" is the Association of American 
Universities (AAU). To become a member of the AAU, an institution must be invited. 
Most of the prestigious private research Universities, like Harvard University, and many 
of the more prestigious state Universities, like the University of California-Berkeley, are 
members of the AAU. 
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The second smallest of the "Big Six" is the National Association of State 
Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC). Its members are public colleges and 
universities, especially land-grant institutions and state flagship universities, as well as 
public higher education systems. 
The American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU) is the 
next largest of the "Big Six". It is composed of master's institutions, regional 
universities, and state systems of higher education. 
The next largest of the "Big Six" is the National Association of Independent 
Colleges and Universities (NAICU). It is composed of independent or private colleges 
and universities as well as some organizations which coordinate private higher education 
within states and some other smaller associations of private institutions. 
The largest of the "Big Six" associations, except for ACE, is the American 
Association of Community Colleges (AACC). Its membership is composed of public and 
private two-year degree granting institutions. (Cook 1998) 
The "Big Six" associations opposed the practice of earmarking to varying degrees 
in the 1980's and 1990's. The Association of American Universities opposed earmarking 
most vigorously. This is not too surprising considering AAU member institutions were 
then and are now some of the largest recipients of peer reviewed federal research grants. 
The National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges and the 
American Council on Education were the next most active associations on the earmarking 
issue. Some feel the earmarking question demonstrated the impotence of the associations 
as none of the associations, despite being on the record against earmarking, were able to 
convince their member institutions not to participate in earmarking. (Cook 1998) 
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After Catholic University and Columbia University, both AAU members, 
received $5 million earmarks in 1983, Robert Rosenzwieg, the President of the AAU, 
was spurred into action. The AAU and NASULGC both passed resolutions declaring a 
moratorium on earmarking in the mid-1980's. ACE, the National Academy of Sciences, 
the Council of Scientific Society Presidents, the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, the National Science Board, AAS CU, the American Physical 
Society, the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology, and the Council 
of Graduate Schools followed suit. The moratoriums did not stop earmarking. The 
associations did not enforce the moratoriums on their members and did not sanction 
members receiving earmarks because of the voluntary nature of association membership. 
None of the associations took an institution's earmarking into account when considering 
new members. Also, the associations found it difficult to lobby against specific earmarks 
because it was difficult to know an earmark was in the works until it surfaced in one of 
the appropriations committees. Once an earmark had surfaced, it had supporters. 
(Savage 1999) 
In 1986 and 1987, Donald Langenberg, Chancellor of the University of Illinois -
Chicago Circle, chaired a committee sponsored by the AAU, NASULGC, the Council of 
Graduate Schools, and ACE that looked into the earmarking issue. The committee's 
report encouraged Congress to use merit assessments in considering earmarks; for 
associations to oppose any earmarking in the NIH, NSF, National Endowment for the 
Humanities, National Endowment for the Arts, and four other federal research agency 
budgets; more facilities funding; and efforts to educate the public about the negatives of 
earmarking. Arthur Sussman, President of the University of Chicago filed a dissenting 
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addendum to the Langenberg report which stated any earmarking was bad. In 1987, 
AAU members adopted the Langenberg report with a resolution to discuss it further in 
future meetings. (Palca 1987, Savage 1999) 
The Langenberg report was more accommodating to earmarking than the 
moratorium on earmarking the AAU had previously passed. After the Langenberg report, 
the AAU's moratorium remained in effect, but the AAU's policy was to not waste energy 
fighting earmarks once they became visible, to fight earmarks for research projects but 
not facilities, and to fight the earmarking of major peer-reviewed budgets like the NSF's 
and NIH's. Also, AAU policy was not to sanction any of its members which received 
earmarks. Robert Rosenzwieg, the President of the AAU, particularly, opposed 
publishing lists of institutions receiving earmarks. He did not feel that this form of public 
embarrassment would be effective in curtailing earmarking activity and also thought that 
it would reflect negatively on the AAU. (Savage 1999) 
The moratorium on earmarking was never adhered to by those AAU institutions 
which voted against it. The University of Pennsylvania was the first institution which 
voted for the moratorium to pursue an earmark. Penn's President Sheldon Hackney 
needed money for facilities and sought an earmark for facilities in 1988. Rosenzwieg and 
other University Presidents in the AAU's leadership strongly opposed to the practice of 
earmarking, like Chancellor Joe B. Wyatt of Vanderbilt, were quite dismayed by 
Hackney's decision. The AAU, however, took no formal action in response to Penn's 
defection from the moratorium. (Savage 1999) 
In April 1989, the AAU passed a resolution at its spring meeting in Washington 
calling for more facilities funding but denouncing earmarking. The resolution had no 
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language about AAU member institutions participating in an earmarking moratorium. 
The resolution also supported set aside programs as the proper way to address concerns 
about the geographical dispersion of federal research funds. Later in 1989, another 
resolution was passed at the AAU's fall meeting calling for no earmarking in the NIH, 
NSF, Department of Defense, NASA, and Department of Energy budgets. (Savage 1999) 
The AAU's fight against earmarks in the 1980's was hampered by the AAU's 
willingness to go down the path of trying to distinguish good earmarks from bad ones. 
Further muddying the waters was the fact Congress traditionally supported Historically 
Black Colleges and Universities, Galludet University for the Deaf, and Native American 
schools. Also university-managed Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 
and University Affiliated Research Centers like the Stanford Linear Accelerator, the 
Applied Physics Laboratory at Johns Hopkins University, and the Lawrence Berkeley 
Laboratory of the University of California were awarded non-competitive sole source 
contracts by the government. Some pointed to these sole source contracts, which the 
AAU supported and did not consider earmarks, as points of hypocrisy in the AAU's 
policy. The AAU's moratorium leaked from the beginning, but it may have restrained 
some institutions from participating in earmarking while it was in effect. (Savage 1999) 
In the early 1990's, the AAU seemed to stop trying to even oppose earmarking. 
In 1994, Cornelius J. Pings, who succeeded Robert Rosenzwieg as President of the AAU, 
said, "I have a personal view that money for research and money for research facilities 
are always best awarded based on merit reviews in open competition but I acknowledge 
that Congress has its own rules and prerogatives." (Jaschik 1994d, A30) By 1998, 
associations, like the AAU, had muted their criticism of earmarking, begun to note that 
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the vast majority of research funding still flowed through peer reviewed programs, and 
were admitting that some earmarks fund worthwhile things (Cordes 1998b). In 1999, 
Nils Hasselmo, who succeeded Pings as AAU President, called for more facilities 
funding to abate earmarking pressures and said some earmarks go to worthy causes. The 
AAU under Hasselmo in 1999 was largely silent on the earmarking issue and focused 
only on keeping earmarks out of the NIH and NSF budgets. (Brainard and Cordes 1999) 
In 2000, C. Peter McGrath, President of NASULGC, said he thought many 
earmarks supported worthy programs and that earmarks were add-ons in the funding 
process. McGrath said he would rather see earmarked money go to the NSF or National 
Endowment for the Humanities budgets, but he did not think earmarked money would be 
appropriated at all if it were not earmarked. (Brainard and Southwick 2000) 
A big surge in earmarks in fiscal year 2001 prompted the AAU to resume its 
opposition to earmarking. Hasselmo called on AAU members to at least refrain from 
taking earmarks that undermine peer review. 51 of the 61 American members of the 
AAU received earmarks in fiscal year 2001. Hasselmo said in 2001, "To have individual 
members ( of Congress) decide how individual research grants are awarded can only be 
harmful to the scientific research enterprise in the long run." (Brainard and Southwick 
2001b, A20) 
· C. Peter McGrath, the President ofNASULGC, pointed out that some of the 
members of Congress who earmark are also big supporters of the NIH and NSF. 
McGrath thought it imperative that the associations not antagonize these members with 
condemnations of earmarking. (Brainard and Southwick 2001 b) 
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At its fall 2001 meeting, the AAU discussed earmarking but could not arrive at a 
consensus about what to do. The association affirmed statements that merit based awards 
should be favored over earmarks and also that set aside peer-reviewed programs were the 
right way to address distributional equity concerns. (Brainard 2001 e) 56 of 61 American 
AAU members received earmarks in fiscal year 2002 (Brainard 2002h). 
In sum, the AAU led the charge against academic earmarking early on with 
NASULGC and ACE in prominent supporting roles. In the mid- 1980's, the AAU passed 
a resolution calling for AAU member institutions to observe a moratorium on seeking 
earmark funding. The moratorium leaked from the beginning but was dealt a mortal 
blow when the University of Pennsylvania, which had been for the moratorium in AA U 
deliberations, sought an earmark for facilities in 1988. From the beginning the AAU's 
and the other associations' efforts at opposing the practice of earmarking were hampered 
by the associations' willingness to debate the difference between good and bad earmarks; 
by the associations' support of historical preferential funding for Historically Black 
Colleges and Universities, Galludet University for the Deaf, and Native American 
schools; and by the associations' belief that non-competitive sole source contracts 
awarded to university-managed Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 
and University Affiliated Research Centers should not be challenged. In the 1990's, the 
AAU, NASULGC, and the other associations generally pursued a strategy of 
accommodation with regard to the practice of earmarking. In 2001, the AAU resumed its 
opposition to academic earmarking when the amount and number of earmarks spiked 
significantly. By 2001 most AAU member institutions were receiving earmarks. 
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NASULGC and the other associations did not join the AAU when it resumed hostilities 
in 2001. 
CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO FIGHT EARMARKING 
Members of Congress have fought earmarks by using their seniority, proposing 
amendments to strike earmarks from bills brought to the floor of the House or Senate, 
using rules to delete earmarks, and holding hearings. There have been many opponents 
of earmarking in both the Senate and House. Among these opponents some of the 
strongest have been Senator Jake Garn of Utah, Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, 
Senator Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico, Senator John Danforth of Missouri, Senator 
Lawton Chiles of Florida, Senator James Sasser of Tennessee, Senator Sam Nunn of 
Georgia, Representative Edward Boland of Massachusetts, Representative George Brown 
of California, Representative William Natcher of Kentucky, and Representative Robert 
Walker of Pennsylvania. (Savage 1999) 
Natcher was very effective as chair of the House appropriations sub-committee 
which handled the Labor-Health and Human Services-Education appropriation in keeping 
earmarks out of his bill. The Labor-Health and Human Services-Education bill includes 
the appropriation for the National Institutes of Health. Natcher was so effective in 
blocking earmarks in his bill that many earmarks for biomedical research and facilities 
migrated to other bills like the Energy and Water bill. (Savage 1999) 
In 1986, the Department of Defense refused to spend $65.6 million earmarked for 
10 Universities in reports accompanying the Defense appropriation bill because the 
earmarked projects had never been submitted to the Defense department for review. The 
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House and Senate appropriations committees put funding for 9 of the 10 projects into a 
supplemental appropriations bill to force the Department of Defense to spend the money. 
The tenth project not included in the supplemental appropriations bill was a $10 million 
computer research grant to Cornell University. Cornell University's President Frank 
Rhodes refused to accept any money not awarded through a competitive process. (Spitler 
1986) 
The battle between Congress and the Department of Defense over these earmarks 
spilled out onto the Senate floor. Senators Danforth, Bingaman, and Sasser proposed an 
amendment on the Senate floor which would strip the supplemental appropriations bill of 
the earmarks. Senators Stevens and DeConcini made a distributive argument against the 
amendment pointing out that the peer-reviewed system sent funds to a relatively small 
number of states and institutions and that these earmarks were a way to distribute funds 
more broadly. Senator Weicker made a motion to table the Danforth, Bingaman, Sasser 
amendment. Weicker's motion was defeated, and the amendment was subsequently 
passed by a voice vote. Senator Dole and Speaker Tip O'Neill added the 9 projects 
deleted by the amendment back into the conference version of the appropriations bill, and 
the Senate passed the conference version of the bill. There was a similar debate in the 
House in 1986 in which an anti-earmarking bill went down to defeat. (Spitler 1986) 
In 1989, an effort was made by Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia to pass a law that 
would require the Department of Defense to use competitive procedures to award all 
grants and contracts to colleges and universities. This effort was sidetracked by concerns 
about what to do about sole source non-competitive contracts awarded to university 
operated laboratories like the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory. The Johns 
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Hopkins APL, and other similar laboratories, had enjoyed a special relationship with the 
Department of Defense since World War II. Labs of this sort did very special one-of-a­
kind, often classified, technical work. Nunn and others pushing for the law requiring 
competitive procedures yielded to arguments that, without sole source contracting for 
these labs, businesses would beat out universities for these sorts of awards because they 
would be the only entities capable of funding competition, national security would be 
compromised, and efficiency would be undermined because labs would not be rewarded 
for specializing. Nunn's effort to curtail earmarking failed in large part because the 
exception he was willing to make to his rule for the special arrangements the Defense 
department had with university operated laboratories opened the door back up to 
earmarking in Department of Defense appropriations bills. (Cordes 1989b) 
In 1991, Nunn raised objections to $135 million in academic earmarks in the 
fiscal year 1992 Department of Defense appropriations bill. He was particularly angered 
by 16 projects that gave $94.6 million to institutions in 12 states. Among the institutions 
receiving these earmarks were Boston University which was due $29 million; Louisiana 
State University, Marywood College, and the University of Minnesota which were 
scheduled to receive $10 million each; and Kansas State University which was due $7. 7 
million. Nunn was so incensed by these earmarks that he voted against the full Defense 
Department appropriations bill for the first time. The DOD appropriations bill passed by 
a margin of more than two to one. ("Ways & Means: Colleges Still Reap Set-Aside 
From Military Budget." 1991) 
In the 1993 fiscal year military spending bill the Senate included $96 million in 
academic earmarks for 12 projects but gave the Pentagon discretion on how much to 
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award for each project. Senator Nunn was successful in getting an amendment passed 
that replaced the earmarks with a competitive process that would involve a panel of 
reviewers chosen by the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant 
Colleges and the American Association of State Colleges and Universities. Reviewers 
chosen by these associations were offered as a remedy to arguments that a few selected 
elites dominated peer review processes. In conference, the House had its own list of 
earmarks, and the Senate added back money for its earmarks. However, Senator Nunn's 
amendment was kept in force for the Senate earmarks. Some criticized Nunn's 
amendment saying it improperly limited reviewers and that agencies should have the 
right to pick the most knowledgeable reviewers without regard to how elite the 
institutions they come from might be. (Cordes 1992f) 
Perhaps the single greatest crusader against academic earmarking in Congress was 
Representative George Brown of California. Representative Brown chaired the House 
Science, Space, and Technology Committee and held hearings on earmarking in the mid-
1990's. In 1992, the Congressional Research Service prepared two reports for Brown's 
committee prior to its hearings on earmarking. The reports showed that $2.5 billion had 
been earmarked since 1989. Half of this amount had come in fiscal years 1991 and 1992. 
There were 234 recipients of these awards and awards were made for both research and 
facilities. Ten states got more than 50% of the money, and ten institutions received about 
a third of the money awarded. Half of the money went to institutions not in the top 100 
in total federal research funding received. 70% of the funding came from the Energy and 
Water, Agriculture, and military spending bills. Upon receiving this report, Brown 
65 
recommended that no earmarks for projects be approved unless the projects had been 
reviewed and authorized by an authorizing comm�ttee of Congress. (Cordes 1992d) 
Later in 1992, Brown was successful in getting a floor amendment passed that 
redirected some money left for earmarks in the fiscal year 1993 Energy appropriations 
bill to a competitive merit-reviewed process. The merit review process would make 
awards for academic research facilities. Ten projects amounting to about $95 million lost 
their earmark status because of Brown's amendment. Brown's problem with the 
earmarks in the bill was not that they had bypassed peer review but that Congress itself 
had not reviewed the projects through its normal procedures. (Cordes 1992e) 
When Brown's committee convened hearings on earmarks later in 1993, it was 
noted in opening remarks that earmarking was spiraling out of control. In fiscal year 
1992 over 500 earmarks totaling $707 million had been made. The focus of the House 
committee's hearings was to be on the value of projects begun in the 1980's, whether 
these projects improved the ability of the institutions receiving them to compete for peer­
reviewed funding, whether agencies gave preference to earmarked projects with regard to 
oversight and evaluation, whether earmarks robbed other research programs in agency 
budgets of funds, and the motivations of university presidents and members of Congress 
to earmark. (McDonald 1993) Early in the hearings, Brown's committee looked at 
alternatives to earmarking like expanding the NSF facilities program and set aside 
programs like the Experimental Program for the Stimulation of Competitive Research 
(Cordes 1993a). 
The committee tried to find out if institutions were using earmarks well. 
Chancellor William Danforth of Washington University in St. Louis argued that, when 
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monies were earmarked to a consortium and then distributed to institutions through some 
sort of review procedures, institutions receiving funds should not be considered to have 
received an earmark. The University of California San Diego did not consider its 
research on materials for bridge construction to be subject to peer review because the 
research brought industry, university, and government together in pursuit of defense 
conversion and regional economic development goals. Columbia University had tapped 
the Environmental Protection Agency budget for biomedical research facilities. 
Columbia called a building it built with EPA earmarks the Center for Disease Prevention. 
The Chronicle of Higher Education reported, after reviewing forms Columbia submitted 
to Representative Brown's committee, that some research in the $75 million center was to 
be focused on the environment/disease link but that a lot of the research in the building 
would not concern the environment. The Chronicle also reported that Columbia had used 
the moniker "environment research center" in its efforts to secure funding from Congress 
but had allocated the monies received to the Center for Disease Prevention. Similarly, 
Michigan State had received a $4.6 million earmark for a National Food Safety and 
Toxicology Center. The center was supposed to promote microbiology as a means to 
improve meat inspections even though the Chronicle reported Michigan State admitted 
little competence in microbiology. Delta College stated in forms submitted to 
Representative Brown's committee that it did not know the meaning of peer review but 
was grateful to NASA for the $8 million it received for a science learning center and 
planetarium. The University of Alabama Birmingham reported receiving $19 .5 million 
of the $37 million cost for a Center for Human Genome Structure and Function Research. 
(Cordes 1993b) 
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In one of the first reports released by Brown's committee, Brown wrote that 
academic earmarking "destroys rational efforts to set priorities tied to national needs" 
(Cordes 1993c, A37). He also decried the closed door lobbyist facilitated rape of 
taxpayers by appropriations committee members attempting to do favors for their 
constituents. (Cordes 1993c) 
In September 1993, officials from Columbia University, Tufts University, and the 
University of Alabama Birmingham appeared before Brown's committee. Louisiana 
State University did not appear before the committee and instead sent written testimony. 
LSU claimed it was too expensive to make the trip to Washington. The institutions 
appearing before the committee were asked the size of their endowments, how much they 
had paid lobbyists to represent them, and what they would do when their Congressional 
patrons left office. (Cordes 1993d) 
Tufts had paid more than $3 million in lobbying fees to Cassidy and Associates 
from 1984 to 1993. Tufts had paid as much as $360,000 in lobbying fees in single year. 
Tufts had received a $3 million earmark for a Center for Environmental Management in 
the EPA budget in fiscal year 1993. (Cordes 1993d) 
Columbia reported it had an endowment of more than $1 billion, that it was 
paying Cassidy and Associates $10,000 a month for representation, and that it received a 
$10 million earmark in fiscal year 1993 from the EPA for its Center for Disease 
Prevention. Columbia brought letters from the Mayor of New York City and the 
Governor of New York endorsing its earmarked projects. (Cordes 1993d) 
The University of Alabama Birmingham received a $10 million earmark for a 
new biomedical research facility from the Department of Energy in fiscal year 1993. In 
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testimony, UAB officials stated their institution was a relatively new institution and 
therefore had a small base of private support. UAB's endowment was $102 million in 
1993. Officials stated UAB had to rely on earmarks for facilities funding in order to 
compete with other older more established institutions. (Cordes 1993d) 
Brown and committee members commented at the hearings that the process of 
academic earmarking was flawed but that the projects funded by earmarks were not 
necessarily poor investments (Cordes 1993d). 
Later in 1993, Brown sought help in his fight against earmarking from Vice 
President Gore. Brown sent a letter to Gore in which he suggested the President issue an 
order stating that report language accompanying appropriations bills was not binding and 
that agencies should not follow it in funding earmarks which had not been authorized by 
Congressional authorizing committees. Brown's letter proposed that earmarks be 
approved by both authorizing and spending committees in order to be funded. When not 
approved by both types of committees, he proposed that the funds appropriated for the 
earmark be transferred by the authorizing and spending committees to programs that have 
been authorized. If all of the committees in the House and Senate could not agree on 
these transfers, Brown's proposal was that the money for the earmark in question be 
returned to the treasury. (Cordes 1993e) 
Early in fiscal year 1994, it appeared that Brown's efforts were succeeding. A 
study of four spending bills by his committee showed earmarking was down in all but 
one of the bills studied. The bills studied were the Energy bill; the bill funding the 
National Science Foundation and NASA; the Agriculture bill; and the bill funding the 
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Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State. The only bill in which earmarking had 
increased was the Commerce, Justice, and State bill. (Cordes 1993f) 
Later in 1994, Brown and Representative Robert Walker of Pennsylvania 
proposed that institutions receiving earmarks be ineligible for National Science 
Foundation grants (McDonald 1994). In the NSF reauthorization bill, which sets the 
spending ceiling for the NSF appropriation, Brown and Walker were successful in 
including a provision that prohibited institutions receiving earmarks for facilities from 
competing for NSF facilities funding (Cordes 1994a). 
Brown and Representative John P. Murtha of Pennsylvania squared off about 
earmarking in 1994. Murtha, a powerful member of the House Armed Services 
Committee and strong supporter of earmarking, told the Pentagon not to release 
documents showing Department of Defense earmarks to Brown's committee in 1994. 
Brown's committee reacted by threatening to use its subpoena power. Speaker of the 
House Foley intervened and promised to get the documents from the Pentagon to Brown 
and his committee. (Cordes 1994b) 
Murtha then got mad because he felt the universities he had helped with earmarks 
had not been appreciative and supported him in his fight with Brown. He threatened to 
cut $900 million allocated for university research out of the Department of Defense fiscal 
year 1995 budget. (Cordes 1994c) He was successful in getting a House bill passed with 
the $900 million cut and went a step further by promising to hold hearings of his own on 
indirect cost rates. Murtha cited a tight Pentagon budget and too much university 
research money spent on overhead as reasons for the cuts in the Defense budget. Most 
observers thought the real reason for the cut was that Murtha was piqued that universities 
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did not come to his defense in his fight over earmarks with Brown. Despite the cuts for 
university research in the Department of Defense bill, there were still earmarks in the bill 
including some for institutions in Murtha' s district. ( J aschik 1994b) 
Later in the year, a conference bill passed by both the House and Senate cut the 
military research budget by $200 million rather than the $900 million Murtha had 
shepherded through the House. The report accompanying the conference bill blamed 
overhead rates for the cut. (Jaschik 1994d) 
When earmarks dropped to $650.8 million in fiscal year 1994, Brown stated he 
wanted to see them fall below $100 million a year. Murtha's retaliatory actions, 
however, seemed to have scared the associations and other university lobbyists into 
silence. The Association of American Universities refused to comment on the decrease 
in earmarks in 1994. (Cordes and Ornstein 1994) 
Murtha had been quite successful in directing earmarks to institutions in his 
district sending $333 million to Pennsylvania and $202 million to his district between 
fiscal years 1990 and 1994. He was quoted in 1994 as saying, "Nobody knows better 
than the members which projects need to be done in their districts." (Cordes 1994f, A49-
50) 
Brown's fight with Murtha, however, had an effect on earmarks to Pennsylvania 
institutions. The University of Pittsburgh severed most, but not all, of its corporate links 
to Concurrent Technologies Corporation located in Murtha's district in part because of 
the unfavorable light shed on CTC and the University by Murtha's earmarking activities. 
( Cordes 1994 t) 
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Murtha, however, received campaign contributions in 1992 and 1994 from 
officials at Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Pittsburgh, Seton Hill College, 
and the University of Pennsylvania. Each of these institutions had received earmarks, 
thanks to Murtha, in the years preceding these elections. (Burd 1994) 
Brown's committee documented in 1994 that most earmarked money went to 
states that had representation on the House or Senate Appropriations Committee. Brown 
particularly highlighted the money that went to Pennsylvania because of Murtha, the 
chair, and Representative Joseph McDade of Pennsylvania, the ranking Republican on 
the House Defense appropriations subcommittee. Brown was quoted about the 
earmarking process in 1994 as saying, "When you get right down to it there's no equity 
or justice or any other fundamental principle except the principle of exercising brute 
power." (Cordes l 994e, A29) 
Later in 1994, the Energy Department wrote to four committees in Congress 
asking for permission to shift $2.4 million from an equipment account to an operating 
account to fund three earmarks. Such reprogramming requests are usually approved 
almost automatically, but Brown's committee voted to deny the request in this case. 
After the committee's denial, the Energy Department was puzzled about what to do. 
(Ornstein 1994b) 
In later committee proceedings, Brown threatened to lead the California 
delegation into the pork barrel if earmarking was not brought under control. President 
John Silber of Boston University testified that peer review was appropriate for choosing 
between the research projects of individual scientists but not for choosing which facilities 
requests to fund. Silber also defended Boston University earmarks by claiming they were 
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in the national interest. Brown expressed dismay about the fact that federal research 
officials listened more to appropriations staff than to him as Chair of the House Science, 
Space, and Technology Committee. Several agency staff also defended their funding of 
earmarks in their testimony while generally decrying the practice of earmarking. (Cordes 
1994d) 
Representative George Brown died on July 15, 1999 at the age of 79. He was the 
senior minority member of the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee when 
he died. (Evangelauf 1999) 
In an interesting postscript to Brown's death, California State University at San 
Bernardino asked Congress for a $19. 7 million earmark in 2001 to name a science 
building after the late Representative George Brown. Brown and his widow had thought 
the money for the science building was to come through a competitive program. Brown's 
widow asked for Brown's name to be removed from the building when she found out 
about the earmark. The University complied. ("Ways & Means: Archenemy of Pork­
Barrel Spending Almost Has College Building Named After Him." 2001) 
In 2003, eight dissident Republicans tried to strip all earmarks out of a large fiscal 
year 2003 spending bill passed in February. They pointed to $300,000 earmarked to 
Iowa State University for research on universal kitchen design as one of the worst 
examples of earmarking. (Brainard 2003a) 
Later in 2003, Representative Ralph Regula, the Cardinal of the subcommittee 
over the Labor-Health and Human Services-Education appropriations bill, vowed to 
punish 198 Democrats who voted against his fiscal year 2004 bill because they thought it 
had too small an increase in public school and social program spending by denying them 
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any earmarks. Regula also vowed to punish nine Republicans and an independent who 
voted against his bill. (Brainard 2003b) The Democrats punished by Regula fought back 
by issuing a report that blamed Republicans for pork-barrel spending (Borrego and Burd 
2003). 
Representative Jeff Flake of Arizona started introducing amendments on the 
House floor to strip earmarks from appropriations bills in 2006. Flake was the first to do 
this in the House. His amendments have thus far always been soundly defeated. 
(Brainard 2006e) 
While there have been many individual members of the House and Senate who 
have crusaded with some effect against the practice of academic earmarking, their efforts 
have failed to stymie what has generally been an unabated trend of annual increases in 
the amount and number of earmarks awarded and in the number of institutions receiving 
earmarks. California Representative George Brown's efforts stand out as perhaps the 
only member's efforts which seemed to make a difference in the overall trend. The 
. hearings he held on earmarking of the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee 
in the mid- 1990's seemed to have had an effect. When coupled with the fiscal constraints 
of a tight funding environment, the negative light cast on earmarking by these hearings 
seemed to deter other member's enthusiasm for earmarking and may have played a role 
in a decrease in the amount of earmarks funded in fiscal years 1994 and 199 5. This 
decrease was followed by a substantial decrease in the amount of earmarks in fiscal year 
1996 after the Republicans had taken control of both Houses of Congress. These lows, 
however, were short lived as earmarking began its ascent anew in fiscal year 1997. 
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Other than Brown, other crusaders have made a difference in some instances and 
won certain battles but have had little effect on the overall trend. Notable among these 
crusaders are Representative William Natcher of Kentucky, who as chair of the House 
appropriations sub-committee which handled the Labor-Health and Human Services­
Education appropriation in the early-1990's was successful in keeping earmarks out of 
his bill, and Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, who was successful in a few key battles 
regarding earmarks to the Department of Defense appropriation. In recent years, 
members of Congress in both Houses opposing the practice of earmarking have been on 
the dissident fringe of their parties and clearly in the minority. 
PRESIDENTIAL EFFORTS TO FIGHT EARMARKING 
Presidents have also taken on the practice of earmarking by seeking budget 
rescissions striking earmarks, using the line item veto to strike earmarks during the short 
time the President had this power, and campaigning against earmarks. 
In 1992, President George Herbert Walker Bush sent several proposals to rescind 
earmarks to Congress in his 1992 fiscal year budget proposal. (Cordes 1992a) The 
House and Senate subsequently passed rescission proposals cutting more than $90 
million in fiscal year 1992 academic earmarks from the Department of Defense 
appropriations bill. Senator Robert Byrd was so angered by the cutting of these earmarks 
that he went after 3 peer-reviewed grants made by the National Institute of Dental 
Research and 31 peer-reviewed National Science Foundation grants that he thought 
funded ridiculous projects. Byrd was successful in inserting his own rescissions into the 
Senate bill. (Goodman 1992a) 
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After the House and Senate conference, both chambers passed $8. 1 billion in 
budget rescissions for fiscal year 1992. The rescissions cut more than $100 million in 
earmarks. Specifically, the rescissions only eliminated $1.349 million in earmarks but 
allowed the Secretary of Defense to choose not to fund $115.9 million earmarked for 19 
projects. The $1.349 million specifically cut included $750,000 that was to go to West 
Virginia University for Appalachian-hardwoods research, $500,000 that was to go to 
North Dakota State University for a road, $50,000 that was to go to the University of 
Arkansas for seedless-table-grape research, and $49,000 that was to go to the University 
of Vermont for integrated orchard management. The conference bill passed did not 
include Senator Byrd's specific cuts of NSF grants but required the NSF to cut $2 million 
from its budget and suggested the 31 grants that should be targeted in that cut. The 
conference bill did include rescissions for half of the dental grants Senator Byrd went 
after. President Bush signed the conference bill. (Goodman 1992b) 
In 1997, President Clinton used the line item veto to strike a $5 million earmark to 
Montana State University for research on environmentally friendly building technologies. 
He also line item vetoed $1 million in Agriculture earmarks to four different institutions 
in 1 997. (Cordes 1997b) 
In 2002, President George W. Bush asked Congress to pay for a shortfall in the 
Pell Grant budget by rescinding $1.3 billion in earmarks and other low priority projects. 
The shortfall was created when Congress did not appropriate enough money to cover an 
increase in the Pell Grant award it passed. (Burd 2002a) 
Later in 2002 when Bush submitted his fiscal year 2003 budget, his budget 
request kept the Pell Grant at the same level as in fiscal year 2002. He again asked 
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Congress to rescind the funds for 1,626 earmarks in the fiscal year 2002 Labor-Health 
and Human Services-Education appropriation. Bush proposed that the rescissions be 
used to pay for the shortfall in the Pell Grant program and be passed as part of a 
supplemental appropriations bill. Representative C.W. (Bill) Young of Florida, the 
Republican Chair of the House Appropriations Committee, did not take Bush's proposal 
very seriously stating, "All wisdom on the allocation of federal grant funding does not 
reside in the Executive Branch. Members know the needs of their districts better than 
civil servants working in Washington, D.C. Many of these projects are in rural 
communities or from small community-based organizations that lack the capacity to hire 
grant writers and compete with more sophisticated organizations for funding." (Burd 
2002b, A27) 
Later in 2002, Congress appropriated $1 billion in a supplemental appropriations 
bill to fund the shortfall in the Pell Grant budget. This did not fund the entire shortfall. 
Additional funds were left to be appropriated in fiscal year 2003 appropriations towards 
the shortfall. By taking this step, Congress rejected President Bush's plan to fund the 
shortfall by rescinding earmarks. (Burd 2002c) 
In late 2002, Mitch Daniels, President Bush's Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget and a crusader for the administration against earmarking, 
backed off in his opposition to earmarks stating that he would be happy if Congress just 
stayed within the overall spending limits set by the White House (Brainard 2002g). Just 
after leaving office in June 2003 to run for Governor of Indiana, Daniels remarked about 
his fight with Congress over earmarking, "If we were ever very persuasive with members 
of Congress on this subject, I couldn't detect it." (Brainard and Borrego 2003, A18) 
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In the fiscal year 2005 budgeting process, Bush tried to cut Department of 
Defense research spending by defunding earmarks. Congress defied him by adding the 
earmarks members wanted to the Defense spending bill. Bush signed the bill. (Field 
2004) 
Presidential efforts at cutting earmarks through budget rescissions have usually 
run into opposition in Congress. A few such efforts have led Congress to rescind a few 
earmarks but have also prompted reprisals towards other funding objectives from angered 
Congressional patrons. Clinton's use of the line item veto was successful in excising a 
few earmarks from appropriations bills while the President had use of this power, but the 
line item veto was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court on June 
25, 1998. In general, Presidential efforts to fight the practice of earmarking have had 
little effect and less effect than efforts against earmarking undertaken by members of 
Congress. This is largely because earmarking is a creature of the appropriations process 
and, as such, is more fully under the control of Congress than it is of the President. 
PAID LOBBYISTS AND THE REPORTING OF LOBBYING EXPENSES 
A little bit of attention has been paid in reports about earmarking to the role paid 
lobbyists play in helping institutions secure earmarks. The two most famous hired-gun 
lobbyists in the earmarking game have without doubt been Gerald Cassidy and Kenneth 
Schlossberg. Schlossberg and Cassidy worked together when earmarking first began and 
later split into separate firms. Cassidy and Associates, Cassidy's firm after he split with 
Schlossberg, has been one of the biggest players in the earmarking game and one of the 
largest and most well known lobbying firms on the Washington scene. Lobbyists, like 
78 
Cassidy and Schlossberg, are selective in picking their clients. They generally do not like 
to pursue lost causes. (Savage 1999) 
In 1991, it was reported that colleges and universities were hiring more paid 
lobbyists to pursue earmarks and advise on other matters than ever before. The 
University of Hawaii paid $636,000 between 1987 and 1991 to Cassidy and Associates 
and got $33 million in earmarks for two campus science projects. As hiring paid 
lobbyists became more commonplace, some expressed concerns about a backlash against 
earmarking and hired gun representation. ( Cordes 1991 c) 
These concerns seemed well founded when Senator Robert Byrd reportedly 
tongue-lashed West Virginia University officials who showed up for a meeting with their 
Cassidy and Associates representative. Byrd chastised West Virginia University for 
wasting money on representation maintaining he needed no prodding to direct funding to 
his constituents. While he was angry, Byrd pushed legislation through the Senate that 
required a report to be filed when an institution paid a lobbyist to help them win any 
specific grant of $100,000 or more. (Cordes 1991c) 
In 1994, a new lobbying law was considered that would require colleges and 
universities to keep up with lobbying activities of their faculty and file reports if at least 
one employee devoted 10% or more of their time to lobbying activities or $1,000 to 
$2,500 was spent on lobbying in a six month period (Jaschik 1994a). 
These efforts to impose reporting requirements on institutions culminated in the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act in 1996. This law required institutions to register if they spend 
$20,000 on lobbying in a six month period or have at least one person devoting 20% of 
their time to lobbying. The Lobbying Disclosure Act had a stricter definition of lobbying 
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than IRS laws mandating lobbying disclosure. The Lobbying Disclosure Act defined 
most contacts with Congress and Congressional staff and some contacts with Executive 
branch officials as lobbying. Contacts with Department of Education and science agency 
officials were also covered under the law. (Lederman 1996) 
Compliance to this act by colleges and universities has historically been spotty. 
For example, Rutgers University registered its government affairs office. Princeton 
University, Brown University, Duke University, Indiana University, Purdue University, 
Washington University, and Georgetown University did not. The AACC, ACE, and 
NAICU registered. The AAU, AASCU, and NASULGC did not. The American 
Association of Medical Colleges registered. The NCAA did not. The reason why 
seemingly similar government relations operations from similar institutions made 
different choices about whether to register or not was that the law as written applied 
differently to different types of institutions. All public institutions had to follow the law, 
but private institutions could follow the law or follow an IRS reporting standard based on 
whether their government relations activities were targeted towards influencing 
legislation. (Lederman 1996) IRS regulations required reporting lobbying expenditures 
on the IRS form 990 all non-profits have to file. A study in 1998 found that few colleges 
and universities reported any lobbying expenses on their form 990. (Lederman 1998b) It 
would seem many colleges and universities have been able to avoid the lobbying 
disclosure requirements Congress has attempted to impose on them. 
In 2000, Jeffrey Brainard reported that 182 institutions employed independent 
paid lobbyists in 1999. This was an increase over the approximately 150 institutions that 
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employed such lobbyists in 1997. Brainard noted that most institutions receiving 
earmarks in 1999 did not hire a lobbyist. (Brainard 2000) 
In 2004, Brainard reported that academic institutions had spent $61. 7 million on 
lobbying in 2003. Most of this lobbying expense was reported to have been spent on 
lobbying for earmarks. College and university officials surveyed reported that paid 
independent lobbyists were especially helpful in determining in which appropriations bill 
it was best to try to place an institution's earmark. For example, since Congress 
traditionally does not place earmarks in the National Institutes of Health budget, 
biomedical earmarks often end up in the Department of Defense appropriations bill. 
Consultants help point where best and from whom to seek earmark funding. (Brainard 
2004) 
Paid lobbyists, particularly Gerald Cassidy and Kenneth Schlossberg, have played 
an important role in the birth and development of academic earmarking. Efforts to 
require that colleges and universities report their lobbying expenses, however, have met 
with a mixed result as different interpretations of the laws passed and what they actually 
require have led to less than uniform compliance across the entire universe of higher 
education institutions and associations. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has chronicled the rise of academic earmarking. It has discussed the 
early years of academic earmarking from 1983 to about 1990. In the early years of 
academic earmarking, prominent institutions pioneered the practice but concerns about 
the efficacy of academic earmarking and its effect on peer reviewed funding were heard 
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in the academic community. There were also concerns about whether Congress was 
creating contingent liability for itself by starting to fund projects that would continue to 
need funding in future years and about whether earmarks were being used for the 
purposes for which they were being awarded. At the end of this early era, the results 
from academic earmarking were mixed with some accounts of waste and scandal 
balanced by some notable success stories. 
The trends in academic earmarking from 1990 to 2003 have also been discussed. 
The period from 1990 to 2003 saw academic earmarking really come into its own and 
grow to $2.012 billion by the end of the period. There was a dip in the middle of the 
period which for the most part corresponded with a change in the political party which 
controlled a majority in both Houses of Congress. However, there were two fiscal years, 
prior to this change of power and the low point of the dip in fiscal year 1996, in which 
academic earmarking was going down somewhat seemingly in response to fiscal 
pressures and the negative light being shined on it by Congressional hearings. After the 
change of power in Congress, academic earmarking hit its low point in the dip in fiscal 
year 1996 and then rebounded steadily in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 before reaching new 
heights in fiscal year 1999 and continuing to rise until the end of this period in 2003. 
This is the general trend when the value of all earmarks in each year of the period 
is taken into account, but the trend is rather consistent, with only a single minor 
difference, when the number of institutions receiving earmarks and the number of 
earmarks granted in each year are considered. The single minor difference in the trend 
for the number of institutions receiving earmarks and the number of earmarks granted is 
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that these totals are slightly higher in fiscal year 1995 than in fiscal year 1994 before 
dipping in fiscal year 1996 along with the value of earmarks awarded. 
During this period of time when earmarks grew so significantly, some major 
programs which utilize peer reviewed competitions to award their funding also saw 
significant increases in their budgets. The National Institutes of Health, which is the 
largest federal source of peer-reviewed competitive grants to individual investigators for 
research, saw its budget double between 1998 and 2003. The National Science 
Foundation, second only to the NIH in federal grant making, also saw increases in its 
budget during this period. 
The chapter has also briefly discussed more recent trends in academic earmarking 
since 2003. Academic earmarking in recent years has occurred within a tighter funding 
environment. This tighter funding environment has also affected the budgets of the 
National Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation which enjoyed increases in 
the more flush funding times of the late 1990 's and early part of the 2000 's. Scandals 
involving members of Congress and lobbyists have caused academic earmarks and all 
earmarks to be viewed with more scrutiny. As this study was being completed, both 
Houses of Congress were considering various regulations which would affect academic 
earmarks such as limits on the number of earmarks a member of Congress can request 
and disclosure of the name of the member sponsoring an earmark and some justification 
for why an earmark should be granted. 
The arguments proponents and opponents of academic earmarking have made 
against and in support of academic earmarking have also been examined in the chapter. 
There are many motivations for members of the House and Senate to earmark but greatest 
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among these motivations is the motivation to further their reelection prospects by 
noticeably bringing federal resources to their districts and states. Members of the House 
and Senate also earmark to enact what they feel is good policy and sometimes use 
earmarks to entice other members into voting for policies for which they might not 
otherwise vote. 
Those within academia have many motivations to seek earmarks. Their greatest 
motivations, however, are economic as there are more scientists than ever before and less 
money available per scientist. The lack of facilities money available has also motivated 
academic leaders to seek earmarks for their institution's facilities needs. 
Those for academic earmarks have insisted that they remedy geographical and 
institutional inequities of the peer review process and send money where it would 
otherwise not go. They believe that Congress has powers of review at least as good as 
committees of academic experts and is more accountable to citizens than the experts who 
serve on peer review committees, that the geographic dispersal of federal research 
funding is desirable, and that earmarks help meet national needs in targeted ways. 
Those against the practice of academic earmarking believe in the superiority of 
the scientific method and the peer review process. They believe that bypassing peer 
review leads to erosion in the quality of research, that earmarking takes away funds 
which could otherwise be awarded in peer reviewed competitions, and that peer reviewed 
competitions for grants promote the best science while earmarking lacks effective quality 
control. While those against earmarking have often espoused competitive set aside 
programs as the best means to combat any geographical or institutional inequities the 
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peer reviewed system may reinforce, set aside programs have never been funded at a high 
enough level to affect distributional inequities. 
This chapter has detailed efforts by the higher education associations to fight the 
practice of academic earmarking. The AAU led the charge against academic earmarking 
early on with NASULGC and ACE in prominent supporting roles. In the mid-1980's, the 
AAU passed a resolution calling for AAU member institutions to observe a moratorium 
on seeking earmark funding. The moratorium leaked from the beginning but was dealt a 
mortal blow when the University of Pennsylvania, which had been for the moratorium in 
AAU deliberations, sought an earmark for facilities in 1988. From the beginning the 
AAU's and the other associations' efforts at opposing the practice of earmarking were 
hampered by the associations' willingness to debate the difference between good and bad 
earmarks; by the associations' support of historical preferential funding for Historically 
Black Colleges and Universities, Galludet University for the Deaf, and Native American 
schools; and by the associations' belief that non-competitive sole source contracts 
awarded to university-managed Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 
and University Affiliated Research Centers should not be challenged. In the 1990's, the 
AAU, NASULGC, and the other associations generally pursued a strategy of 
accommodation with regard to the practice of earmarking. In 2001, the AAU resumed its 
opposition to academic earmarking when the amount and number of earmarks spiked 
significantly. By 2001 most AAU member institutions were receiving earmarks. 
NASULGC and the other associations did not join the AAU when it resumed hostilities 
in 2001. 
85 
Efforts by individual members of Congress and the President to fight the practice 
of academic earmarking have also been detailed. While there have been many individual 
members of the House and Senate who have crusaded with some effect against the 
practice of academic earmarking, their efforts have failed to stymie what has generally 
been an unabated trend of annual increases in the amount and number of earmarks 
awarded and in the number of institutions receiving earmarks. California Representative 
George Brown's efforts stand out as perhaps the only member's efforts which seemed to 
make a difference in the overall trend. The hearings on earmarking he held of the House 
Science, Space, and Technology Committee in the mid-1990's seemed to have had an 
effect. When coupled with the fiscal constraints of a tight funding environment, the 
negative light cast on earmarking by these hearings seemed to deter other member's 
enthusiasm for earmarking and may have played a role in a decrease in the amount of 
earmarks funded in fiscal years 1994 and 1995. This decrease was followed by a 
substantial decrease in the amount of earmarks in fiscal year 1996 after the Republicans 
had taken control of both Houses of Congress. These lows, however, were short lived as 
earmarking began its ascent anew in fiscal year 1997. 
Other than Brown, other crusaders have made a difference in some instances and 
won certain battles but have had little effect on the overall trend. Notable among these 
crusaders are Representative William Natcher of Kentucky, who as chair of the House 
appropriations sub-committee which handled the Labor-Health and Human Services­
Education appropriation in the early-1990 's was successful in keeping earmarks out of 
his bill, and Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, who was successful in a few key battles 
regarding earmarks to the Department of Defense appropriation. In recent years, 
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members of Congress in both Houses opposing the practice of earmarking have been on 
the dissident fringe of their parties and clearly in the minority. 
Presidential efforts at cutting earmarks through budget rescissions have usually 
run into opposition in Congress. A few such efforts have led Congress to rescind a few 
earmarks but have also prompted reprisals towards other funding objectives from angered 
Congressional patrons. Clinton's use of the line item veto was successful in excising a 
few earmarks from appropriations bills while the President had use of this power, but the 
line item veto was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court on June 
25, 1998. In general, Presidential efforts to fight the practice of earmarking have had 
little effect and less effect than efforts against earmarking undertaken by members of 
Congress. This is largely because earmarking is a creature of the appropriations process 
and, as such, is more fully under the control of Congress than it is of the President. 
Finally, the chapter has discussed the role of paid lobbyists and the reporting of 
lobbying expenses. Paid lobbyists, particularly Gerald Cassidy and Kenneth Schlossberg, 
have played an important role in the birth and development of academic earmarking. 
Efforts to require that colleges and universities report their lobbying expenses, however, 
have met with a mixed result as different interpretations of the laws passed and what they 
actually require have led to less than uniform compliance across the entire universe of 
higher education institutions and associations. 
The next chapter, Chapter 3, discusses the data and methods which will be 
employed to answer this study's research questions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND METHODS 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the sources of data used in this study and the steps taken in 
collecting data from these sources are discussed. The chapter also discusses the methods 
employed in answering the study's four basic research questions. A chapter summary 
concludes the chapter. 
DATA 
This study utilizes three different sources of data. The first source is a set of 
statistical tables compiled by the National Science Foundation. Each year the National 
Science Foundation surveys the 18 major federal agencies most involved in federal 
research funding and prepares a report for the President. The agencies surveyed are the 
Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, the Appalachian 
Regional Commission, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the 
Department of Energy, the Department of Education, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Justice, the 
Department of Labor, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National 
Science Foundation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Social Security 
Administration, and the Department of Transportation. The National Science Foundation 
89 
maintains that these 18 agencies provide virtually all of the federal funding for science 
and engineering research and development at United States universities and colleges. 
The National Science Foundation's annual report to the President is published on 
the National Science Foundation's website and is available for federal fiscal years 1992 
to 2003. This study uses information from the set ·of tables entitled, "Federal Science and 
Engineering Support to Universities, Colleges, and NPO's: Fiscal Year 2003" and the 
sets of tables with the same title for previous fiscal years. Specifically, this study draws 
information from Table 16 in the 2003 set of tables and from the table that corresponds 
with this table in the sets of tables for previous fiscal years. Table 16 is entitled, "Federal 
obligations for science and engineering to universities and colleges by location, 
institution, and agency: FY 2003." Table 16 includes a figure for the total amount of 
federal science and engineering obligations for that fiscal .year for all academic 
institutions as well as a figure for the total amount of federal science and engineering 
obligations for that fiscal year for each specific academic institution. Earmarks are 
included in Table 16's totals but are lumped in with the total and cannot be distinguished 
from the other types of funding that make up the total. (National Science Foundation 
2007) This set of National Science Foundation tables is the only known source of federal 
research obligations data which provides a figure for each specific institution. The figure 
for total science and engineering obligations, both for all institutions and for each specific 
institution, is used as a surrogate for total federal research funding at times in this study. 
There are two problems with using the science and engineering obligations 
figures in this way. First, if an earmark is added to the appropriation of, or a grant is 
made by, an agency, which is not one of the 18 agencies the National Science Foundation 
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pulls its data from, this federal research funding will not be reflected in the National 
Science Foundation science and engineering obligations totals. Secondly, there are a few 
grants, and some earmarks, made to academic institutions for non-science and 
engineering purposes. I am referring specifically to grants towards the arts and 
humanities which might be made by the National Endowment for the Humanities or the 
National Endowment for the Arts and earmarks which might have a non-science and 
engineering purpose. The National Science Foundation collected data on non-science 
and engineering obligations until 1995 and last published this data in 1992. In 1992, total 
obligations for federal research funding totaled $19,047,464,000, total science and 
engineering obligations totaled $12,729,720,000, and non-science and engineering 
activities totaled $6,317,744,000. (National Science Foundation 2007) 
The fact that the National Science Foundation has discontinued collecting non­
science and engineering activities data in its annual survey places a serious limitation on 
the use of National Science Foundation data in this study. Because of this 
discontinuation, potentially a significant chunk of federal research funding might not be 
included in the annual science and engineering obligations totals posted after 1992. Still, 
the National Science Foundation annual survey is the most complete compilation of 
federal research obligations and the only compilation which lists obligations by specific 
institution. To deal with this limitation on the use of National Science Foundation data, I 
have limited much of my study to an examination of the distribution of science and 
engineering funding rather than the distribution of all federal research funding. I have 
also taken steps in the compilation and use of other data sources to match them with this 
limitation and clearly identified at all times during this study when figures represent 
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science and engineering obligations totals only and when they represent something else. 
Science and engineering research still composes a clear majority of all federally funded 
research, and it is my belief that a study of how academic earmarking affects the 
distribution of science and engineering research funding is still useful. While the results 
of this study cannot be generalized to the entire realm of federally funded academic 
research because of data limitations, they can shed important light on a significant portion 
of that realm. 
The second source of data used in this study is a database of academic earmarks 
compiled by the Chronicle of Higher Education. This database which is searchable and 
can be accessed on the Chronicle of Higher Education's website provides a listing of all 
academic earmarks made to academic institutions during federal fiscal years 1990 to 
2003. The database provides information on each earmark made from 1990 to 2003 by 
institution, year, amount, and agency as well as a short description of each earmark 
drawn from the actual appropriations language in which the earmark was mentioned. 
(Chronicle of Higher Education 2007) 
All of the earmarks made to the institutions considered in this study were pulled 
from the Chronicle of Higher Education website and entered into a database. They were 
looked at individually and coded as either a science and engineering earmark or a non­
science and engineering earmark. This coding was done to take into account the 
limitations of the National Science Foundation data and to match the earmark data with 
the science and engineering obligations data in the National Science Foundation tables. 
The vast majority of earmarks were coded as science and engineering earmarks. Only 
324 of the 8,422 earmarks considered were coded non-science and engineering earmarks. 
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There were two reasons why an earmark might be coded as a non-science and 
engineering earmark. The first reason was that it came from the appropriation for an 
agency that does not report its science and engineering research obligations to the 
National Science Foundation for inclusion in the National Science Foundation's annual 
survey. Northern Arizona University's $4,500,000 earmark in the 1991 appropriation of 
the General Services Administration for the Southwest Forestry Science Complex is an 
example of an earmark coded a non-science and engineering earmark for this reason. 
The General Services Administration, from which N orthem Arizona received this 
earmark, does not participate in the National Science Foundation annual survey. Even 
though the Southwest Forestry Science Complex is clearly a science and engineering 
obligation, this earmark would not be included in N orthem Arizona's total science and 
engineering obligations for 1991. The earmark was therefore coded as a non-science and 
engineering earmark. A list of all the earmarks coded as non-science and engineering 
earmarks because of the agency the earmark came from is provided in table 1. 
The second reason an earmark might be coded as a non-science and engineering 
earmark was because its purpose clearly was not a science and engineering purpose. 
Department of Transportation earmarks are good examples of earmarks which were 
coded non-science and engineering for this reason. The University of Arkansas at 
Fayetteville received a $500,000 earmark in the 1999 appropriation for the Department of 
Transportation "to help buy buses for the free, university operated transit system that 
serves the campus and town" (Chronicle of Higher Education 2007). This earmark was 
coded as a non-science and engineering earmark because, even though the Department of 
Transportation reports its science and engineering obligations to the National Science 
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Foundation for inclusion in the annual survey, the purpose of this particular earmark did 
not seem to be a science and engineering purpose. The University of Alabama's 
$1,250,000 earmark in the 2000 Department of Transportation appropriation for a 
"comprehensive research program in injury sciences", however, seems like a science and 
engineering obligation of the Department of Transportation and thus was coded as such 
(Chronicle of Higher Education 2007). A list of earmarks coded as non-science and 
engineering earmarks because their purpose did not seem to be a science and engineering 
purpose is provided in table 2. 
One problem with the earmark data from the Chronicle of Higher Education 
database that had to be overcome was how to account for earmarks shared by multiple 
institutions. The Chronicle reports the full value of a shared earmark for each institution 
that receives a portion of the earmark and notes in the purpose notes that the earmark is 
shared. An example of this is a $7,500,000 earmark in the National Aeronautical and 
Space Administration 2001 appropriation which was to be shared by the University of 
Alabama and 4 other universities. The earmark shows up in the Chronicle database for 
the University of Alabama as $7,500,000 in the amount column. The purpose column, 
however, reads "to be shared with 5 universities for infrastructure needs at the National 
Space Science and Technology Center" (Chronicle of Higher Education 2007). There is 
really no way to know exactly how the money was split between the 5 institutions sharing 
the earmark. For this study's purposes, I needed to assign a specific value for each 
earmark to a specific institution in order to utilize the data effectively. Therefore, several 
decision rules had to be made to split shared earmarks among sharing institutions. 
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In cases where the purpose notes stated that an earmark was shared by multiple 
institutions and the number of institutions was specified as in the example above, I 
assumed the institution for which I was trying to specify an amount was one of the 
number of institutions specified. I divided the earmark amount total by two if the number 
of institutions was not specified. When it was specified that the earmark would be shared 
with a non-educational institution, I counted the non-educational institution as one of the 
institutions the shared earmark needed to be divided by in order to assign a value. When 
it was stated that the earmark was to be shared by organizations or institutions in the 
plural, I assumed that meant the earmark would be shared by the institution I was trying 
to assign a value for and at least two other institutions and therefore divided the amount 
total by three. Earmarks assigned to University systems were applied to the totals of the 
flagship member of that system unless the purpose notes clearly showed the earmark 
would be used by another member of the system. 
There is some imprecision in dividing shared earmarks among the sharing 
institutions by utilizing these decision rules. As mentioned above, there is no precise way 
to know exactly how shared funding was allocated between sharing institutions. When it 
is specified that an earmark is to be shared but the number of institutions is unspecified, 
there is also the chance that the assumptions utilized in my decision rules underestimate 
the actual number of institutions sharing the earmark. The decision rules were 
formulated to divide the earmarks as precisely as possible among sharing institutions. 
The rules err towards underestimating sharing institutions and therefore towards 
overstating the value of earmarks. This conscious decision to overestimate the value of 
earmarks in this study was made because it is one of the study's contentions that 
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earmarks operate at the margins of federal research funding. By overestimating their 
value, even by a small amount, it is more likely that their effect on the distribution of 
federal research funding will be detected and discerned. 
The third source of data utilized in this study comes from the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching website (www.camegiefoundation.org). 
The Carnegie Foundation has a classification system that groups higher education 
institutions into categories based on certain characteristics. This study uses the Carnegie 
classification system to limit the number of institutions examined. The study will focus 
upon what the Carnegie classification system identifies as Doctorate-granting institutions 
and Special Focus Institutions - Medical Schools and Medical Centers. (Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 2006) 
Within the Doctorate-granting classification, 96 institutions are classified as 
RUNH or research universities with very high research activity, 103 institutions are 
classified as RU/H or research universities with a high level of research activity, and 84 
institutions are classified as DRU or doctoral research universities. Duke University and 
Florida State University are examples of the RUNH institutions. George Washington 
University and Mississippi State University are examples of the RU/H institutions. 
Depaul University and East Tennessee State University are examples of the DRU 
institutions. (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 2006) 
There are 57 Special Focus Institutions - Medical Schools and Medical Centers. 
Baylor College of Medicine and the University of California San Francisco are examples 
of the Special Focus Institutions - Medical Schools and Medical Centers. (Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 2006) 
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A final step had be taken to make the set of institutions delineated by the Carnegie 
Foundation classification system fit with the other two sources of data being used in the 
study. For some institutions, like Cornell University, the National Science Foundation 
aggregates the totals of all campuses of the institution into one total and reports in its 
tables only the aggregated total for the entire institution. This makes it seem like 
campuses of institutions, like Weill Cornell Medical College which is the medical 
campus of Cornell University located in New York City (Cornell 's main campus is 
located in Ithaca, New York), have no total science and engineering obligation activity 
when they are considered as separate independent institutions. The Carnegie Foundation 
classification system lists 13 separate independent institutions which are aggregated with 
a parent institution, of which they are a component, in the National Science Foundation 
science and engineering obligations data.2 To deal with the data limitation the National 
Science Foundation's aggregation imposes, these 13 institutions have been dropped from 
the set of institutions considered in this study and their earmark totals and science and 
engineering obligations totals have been aggregated with their parent institution in the 
2 These institutions are: Indiana University-Purdue University-Indianapolis which has its totals aggregated 
with Indiana University-Bloomington and Purdue University-Main Campus in the National Science 
Foundation data, Louisiana State University-Health Sciences Center which is aggregated with Louisiana 
State University in the NSF data, Oklahoma State University Center for Health Sciences which is 
aggregated with Oklahoma State University in the NSF data, Pennsylvania State University-College of 
Medicine which is aggregated with Pennsylvania State University-Main Campus in the NSF data, Rutgers 
University-Newark which is aggregated with Rutgers University-New Brunswick in the NSF data, Texas 
A&M University-Commerce which is aggregated with Texas A&M University in the NSF data, Texas 
Tech University Health Sciences Center which is aggregated with Texas Tech University in the NSF data, 
the University of Colorado at Denver and Health Sciences Center which is aggregated with the University 
of Colorado at Boulder in the NSF data, the University of Connecticut School of Medicine and Dentistry 
which is aggregated with the University of Connecticut in the NSF data, the University of Kansas Medical 
Center which is aggregated with the University of Kansas Main Campus in the NSF data, the University of 
Mississippi Medical Center which is aggregated with the University of Mississippi in the NSF data, the 
University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center which is aggregated with the University of Oklahoma in 
the NSF data, and Weill Cornell Medical College which is aggregated with Cornell University in the NSF 
data. 
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same way the National Science Foundation does. The 327 institutions included in this 
study are listed in Table 3. 
By limiting my focus to these 327 institutions, this study will be ignoring some 
earmarking that goes to institutions outside of the study group. As noted elsewhere 
earlier in this text, some community colleges and other non-doctoral granting institutions 
receive earmarks from time to time. The purpose of this study, however, is to examine 
the effect of earmarks on the distribution of federal research funding. Important to this 
purpose is a careful examination of the interplay between peer-reviewed funding and 
earmarking. By limiting the focus to Doctorate-granting institutions and Special Focus 
Institutions - Medical Schools and Medical Centers practically all of the institutions most 
likely to receive both peer-reviewed and earmarked funding will be included in the study . 
. Figure 4 presents a line graph representation of the value of all earmarks, science 
and engineering earmarks, and non-science and engineering earmarks awarded to the 
institutions included in this study for each year data is available. Figure 5 presents a line 
graph representation of the number institutions in this study receiving earmarks in each 
year data is available broken down to show all earmarks, just science and engineering 
earmarks, and just non-science and engineering earmarks. Figure 6 presents a line graph 
representation of the number of earmarks awarded to institutions in this study for each 
year data is available broken down by all earmarks, just science and engineering 
earmarks, and just non-science and engineering earmarks. 
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METHODS 
This study will address four basic research questions about the effect of earmarks 
on the distribution of federal research funding. Basic Research Question I :  Does 
receiving earmarks improve the ability of an institution to receive other types of federal 
research funding? 
Proponents of earmarking have long maintained they are a necessary feature of 
federal academic research funding because certain institutions are disadvantaged in the 
peer review competitions which are held to award the vast majority of federal research 
funds. For these proponents, earmarks are a method of distributing some federal research 
funding through a method other than peer review to institutions which are not well suited 
to gamer the funds by competing for them in a peer review process. Besides having the 
effect of spreading federal research funding to a wider array of institutions than would 
receive funding if all awards were made through peer review, proponents have also 
argued that the awarding of earmarks enables institutions, which have traditionally not 
garnered the most peer reviewed funds, to use the earmarks they receive to upgrade their 
research infrastructure so that they can compete more effectively in future peer review 
competitions. (Brainard 2001 c, Cook 1998, Feller 2004, Rose 1986, Savage 1999) 
This idea that receiving earmarks can increase an institution's ability to gamer 
other forms of research funding is important to explore because earmarking comprises a 
very small percentage of total federal research funding. Most of the research funds the 
federal government awards are awarded through peer review processes, so, if an 
institution is to increase its share of federal research funding significantly, at some point 
its faculty will have to be able to compete more effectively in peer review competitions 
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for funding. A strategy of relying solely on earmarks to catch up to the institutions which 
gamer the most federal research funding in the end would not catch up a trailing 
institution. 
To assess whether earmarks have the effect of increasing an institution's ability to 
compete for other federal research funds, two tables have been created. Table 4 presents 
a listing of the 327 institutions in this study by how they rank in all earmarks they 
received between 1992 and 2003. In subsequent columns the institution's rank in total 
science and engineering obligations for 1992 and the institution's rank in total science 
and engineering obligations for 2003 are presented. If receiving earmarks has a positive 
effect on an institution's ability to gamer other forms of funding, it follows that the 
institutions which received the most earmarked funding in the 1992 through 2003 period 
should rank higher in total science and engineering funding in 2003, at the end of this 
period, than they ranked in total science and engineering funding in 1992, the beginning 
of the period. Table 5 duplicates Table 4 with the one exception being that it ranks 
institutions by total science and engineering earmarks received from 1992 to 2003 rather 
than by all earmarks received during the period. 
It should be noted that receiving earmarks has some effect on total science and 
engineering funding as science and engineering earmarks are counted in total science and 
engineering figures. However, as noted above, while science and engineering earmarks 
help boost total science and engineering funding figures, to make real progress in 
improving rank, institutions will have had to become more successful during this period 
in garnering funds from the larger pool of peer reviewed funding in order to show much 
improvement relative to other institutions. 
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This assessment of whether the institutions which have garnered the most 
earmarks during a period have improved in how they rank in total obligations at the end 
of the period has been done before but has never been done utilizing this period and these 
data sources. Savage did a similar ranking comparison in his 1999 book and such 
rankings comparisons have appeared at various times in the Chronicle of Higher 
Education's reporting on the earmark phenomenon. 
This study advances another novel method for assessing whether receiving 
earmarks improves an institution's ability to gamer other research funds. In columns G, 
H, and I of tables 4 and 5, the percentage of total science and engineering obligations for 
all institutions that each individual institution secured in 1992 and 2003 and the percent 
change between the 1992 and 2003 figures are presented. 
While federal academic research funding is in many important ways not 
analogous to a market, the metaphor of market share is a useful prism through which to 
look at these percentages. Column G in tables 4 and 5 provides what would be the 
market share for each individual institution of the total science and engineering 
obligations of all institutions for 1992 if the analogy of the market could be applied to 
federal academic research funding. Column H provides what would be the market share 
for 2003. Column I provides what would be the percentage of market share gained or 
lost for the 1992 through 2003 period. 
It follows that, if earmarks have the effect of making institutions more able to win 
other types of funding, the institutions which gamer the most earmarks during the 1992 
through 2003 period would have a larger percentage of total science and engineering 
obligations in 2003 than they did in 1992. These institutions should also experience 
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positive percent changes between 1992 and 2003. How large these positive percent 
changes are is a measure of how much ground an institution has gained. It would be 
expected that the institutions which have garnered the most earmarks would gain the 
most ground. 
The measures reported in columns G, H, and I of tables 4 and 5 have not been 
utilized in any other previous studies. I believe the percent change figure reported in 
column I is perhaps a more accurate measure of assessing whether earmarks have 
improved an institution's total funding situation than looking solely at changes in the 
institution's total funding ranking. A different amount of federal research funding is 
awarded each year. The amount awarded has grown progressively during the period of 
this study. Institutions could fall in their ranking relative to other institutions while still 
winning a larger share of the total funds awarded. For these reasons, the percent change 
figure in column I is probably the more accurate measure. However, both change in rank 
and change in percentage of total science and engineering obligations are utilized in this 
study. 
Finally, a bivariate correlation has been run between the total earmark ranking for 
each of the institutions for the entire period (listed in column A of table 4) and the rank in 
total science and engineering obligations for each of the institutions in 1992 at the 
beginning of the study period (listed in column C of table 4). A bivariate correlation has 
also been run between the total earmark ranking for each of the institutions for the entire 
period (listed in column A of table 4) and the institutions rank in total science and 
engineering obligations in 2003 at the end of the study period (listed in column E of table 
4). These correlations are reported in table 6 and have been run for the entire set of 
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institutions, for the set of institutions ranked 1 to 20 in total earmark ranking for the 
entire period (the column A figure), for the set of institutions ranked 1 to 50 in total 
earmark ranking for the entire period (the column A figure), for the set of institutions 
ranked 1 to 100 in total earmark ranking for the entire period (the column A figure), and 
for the set of institutions ranked 101  to last in total earmark ranking for the entire period 
(the column A figure). 
The first column of table 6, which reports the correlation between total earmark 
ranking for the entire period ( column A in table 4) and total science and engineering 
obligations ranking in 1992 at the beginning of the period ( column C), can be viewed as a 
baseline figure to which the second column of table 6, which reports the correlation 
between total earmark ranking for the entire period (column A in table 4) and total 
science and engineering obligations ranking in 2003 at the end of the period ( column E), 
can be compared. If receiving earmarks during the period has helped institutions receive 
other forms of federal research funding and thereby improve their rank in total science 
and engineering obligations at the end of the period over their ranking at the beginning, it 
would be expected that the effect or slope numbers in the second column of table 6 would 
be positive and higher than the effect or slope numbers in the first column of table 6 
especially for the higher ranked groups considered. The slope or effect numbers tell us 
that for every one move up in earmark rank there is a corresponding move in obligation 
rank of the slope or effect number. Doing well by the measure of earmark ranking during 
the period should drive the obligation ranking up more at the end of the period than it 
does at the beginning of the period if receiving earmarks actually improves· the ability of 
an institution to receive other types of federal research funding. The R-square values in 
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parentheses are measures of the strength of the correlations reported in each of the 
columns. The higher the R-square values the stronger the correlation and the more of the 
effect explained by earmark rank. 
One other bivariate correlation is reported in the third column of table 6. This 
correlation is the correlation between total earmark ranking for each of the institutions for 
the entire period (listed in column A of table 4) and the institutions change in rank in total 
science and engineering obligations rank between 1992 and 2003 (listed in column J of 
table 4). If receiving earmarks during the period has helped institutions receive other 
forms of federal research funding and thereby improve their rank in total science and 
engineering obligations at the end of the period over their ranking at the beginning, it 
would be expected that the effect or slope numbers in the third column of table 6 would 
be positive especially for the higher ranked groups considered and that the value of the 
effect or slope number would be higher for the higher ranked groups considered. The 
slope or effect numbers in this case tell us that for every one move up in earmark rank 
there is a corresponding jump or slide of the slope or effect number in rank when 1992 
obligation rank is compared to 2003 obligation rank. If doing well by the measure of 
earmark ranking during the period drives obligation rankings up, the higher ranked 
groups considered should experience the largest positive changes in ranking and in 
general with each move up in earmark ranking there should be a positive change in 
ranking. As with the other correlations reported in table 6, the R-square values in 
parentheses in the third column are measures of the strength of the correlations reported 
in the third column. The higher the R-square values the stronger the correlation and the 
more of the effect explained by earmark rank. 
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Table 7 reports the same correlations for the same groups of ranked institutions as 
table 6 does using only science and engineering earmarks. Table 6 corresponds to table 4 
in the same way table 7 corresponds to table 5. The data for the correlations reported in 
table 6 come from table 4. The data for the correlations reported in table 7 come from 
table 5.3 
Basic Research Question 2: How does the awarding of earmarks affect the 
geographical distribution of federal research funding? Since the 1960's, there has been 
some concern that a large and disproportionate share of federal research funding awarded 
in peer review competitions goes to a very few elite institutions located in the northeast 
Atlantic and west coast regions of the United States. Earmarking has been extolled as a 
means of combating the perceived disproportionate geographical concentration of 
funding that results from the peer review process. Many Congressional and other leaders 
have felt it important to distribute federal research funding widely throughout the country 
because often where federal research money goes, economic development follows. 
( Greenberg 1966) 
There have been several efforts which preceded this study that have attempted to 
look at the question of where federal research money goes. Savage addressed the 
geographical question in his 1999 book and in some earlier studies. The geographical 
distribution of earmarks and peer reviewed funding has been frequently discussed in the 
Chronicle of Higher Education's reporting on federal academic research funding. It is 
3 The only difference between table 4 and table 5 is that table 4 reports earmark ranking for each institution 
in the study for the entire study period in column A using all earmarks in its calculations while table 5 
reports earmark ranking for each institution in the study for the entire study period in its column A using 
only science and engineering earmarks in its calculations. All other columns in tables 4 and 5 report the 
same totals. 
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my belief, however, that earlier attempts to look at where federal research money ends up 
have been seriously flawed. Every attempt I have come across has simply tabulated and 
reported the amount of funding that has gone to a state or region. Such simple 
tabulations are misleading. States have different population densities and different 
numbers of research institutions within their boundaries. Simply saying that California 
receives more federal research money than Alaska ignores the fact that California has 
many more people that live within its borders and many more academic institutions than 
Alaska. California should probably be expected to receive more federal research money 
in the aggregate than Alaska because it has a larger need for funding. 
This study looks at the geographical question by dividing the amount of federal 
research money a state receives by the number of doctoral granting and specially focused 
medical institutions a state has. It is my belief that the introduction of this control will 
render a truer picture of the geographical distribution of federal research funds than a 
picture based solely on the raw figures. There are, of course, other controls which could 
have been used, but using the per institution control is the right choice for this study. 
This study is about the distribution of federal research funds and the number of doctoral 
granting and specially focused medical institutions in a state more closely relates to how 
funds are likely to be distributed than other controls which could have been employed 
like population and economic measures like gross domestic product. 
The whole issue of which states get the most funding and whether a state gets its 
fair share of funding is a complicated issue. To determine how much funding a state 
receives one must add together how much funding the institutions within the state 
receive. States are not only aggregators of institutions, in many ways institutions are 
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aggregators of investigators. Investigator is the term for the individual faculty member 
whose research is supported by a federal grant. Most federal research money is awarded 
in the form of project grants made to specific investigators who just happen to work at 
certain institutions. Many grants are so tied to individual investigators that investigators 
funded by multi-year grants, who decide to leave their present institution for another 
institution, take their grants with them. Earmarks are a little more tied to the institution 
than grants but many still support very specific research efforts carried out by one or a 
few faculty members. 
The whole point of the peer review system is that awards are made based solely 
on scientific merit without regard to geography and other factors. Any concentration of 
funding in certain geographical areas is viewed by peer review advocates as simply an 
accidental byproduct of a system which does not take geography into account. 
Members of Congress, however, have thought that geographical distribution did 
matter especially since they became aware that regional economic development may be a 
byproduct of strong academic research programs at the institutions in their districts and 
states. This keen interest about where the money ends up on the part of the members of 
Congress necessitates that some attention be paid to the issue of geographical 
distribution. Members of Congress after all are the appropriators of both earmarked and 
peer reviewed funding. If they relate to things geographically, those in the academic 
community must to some extent do so as well. 
Another group with a keen interest about where funds end up is the college and 
university presidents, trustees, and patrons of institutions not located in the northeast 
Atlantic or west coast regions of the United States where traditionally most federal 
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research funding has gone. Since the end of World War II the higher education 
community has expanded enormously. More citizens attend higher education institutions 
now than did so in the early 1900's, and many more institutions exist than did so 50 years 
ago. A good portion of the institutions young and old which are not located in the 
northeast Atlantic and west coast regions still have aspirations of having vigorous 
research enterprises. Institutions, which in a previous era were content to be teacher's 
colleges and liberal arts schools, now aspire to be nationally prominent research 
institutions. 
In a previous era, these institutions might have been content to let just a few 
prominent institutions in the northeast and on the west coast carry the research load and 
receive the overwhelming majority of federal research funding. In today's climate, 
institutional leaders cannot afford to take such a stance. It is understood that economic 
development is dependent upon the creation of new knowledge and that regional 
economic development often occurs around vital research universities. Governors, state 
legislators, and members of Congress everywhere therefore expect the leaders of the 
universities in their area to get into and do well in the research game so that their 
constituents can enjoy better lives. 
Our society is also more conscious of measures of prestige than it used to be. 
Rightly or wrongly, research universities are often perceived of as more prestigious than 
those institutions with a non-research mission. This has led many institutional leaders of 
non-research institutions to try to expand their institution's activities and grow their 
institution into a research institution. It seems like there is pressure on institutional 
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leaders to constantly expand their institution's roles so that the institution can climb up to 
the next notch in the Carnegie classification system. 
There is also pressure on the institutional leaders of research institutions to catch 
up to those institutions ahead of them in various rankings. Federal research funding is an 
important criterion by which institutions are ranked and measured. There are a lot of 
college presidents at institutions, not situated in the northeast or on the west coast, who 
are aspiring to elevate their institutions in the rankings and thereby enhance their 
institutions perceived prestige. These presidents are likely to question a system of 
funding which seems to distribute money disproportionately to a few institutions and 
concentrate funding in a very few geographical areas. The question of geographically 
where federal research money goes is pertinent to these presidents and their constituents 
even though the aggregation involved in dealing with which states or regions get the most 
money comes with an element of distortion. 
To assess how the awarding of earmarks affects the geographical distribution of 
federal research funding, four color coded maps have been constructed. For each map the 
various 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have been colored a different 
shade of blue depending upon which quintile the state, District, or territory ranked within 
for the total study period. Figure 8 presents the results by quintile of how the various 
states ranked in total science and engineering obligations per institution during the study 
period. Figure 9 presents the results by quintile of how the various states ranked in total 
peer reviewed funding per institution during the study period. Figure 10  presents the 
results by quintile of how the various states ranked in total earmarks received per 
institution during the study period. Figure 11  presents the results by quintile of how the 
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various states ranked in science and engineering earmarks received per institution during 
the study period. 
To calculate for figure 8 which states fell within each quintile, the total science 
and engineering obligations of each institution in this study which resides within a given 
state for all years of the study ( 1 992 to 2003) were added together. This total for each 
state was then divided by the number of institutions in this study which reside within the 
state. This provided a total for each state of its total science and engineering obligations 
per institution during the study period. 
To calculate for figure 9 which states fell within each quintile, the total science 
and engineering obligations of each institution in this study which resides within a given 
state for all years of the study were added together. This total was then subtracted from 
the total amount of earmarks made to study institutions in the state during the same 
period.4 Performing these additions and subtractions provided a figure for each state that 
approximated the total amount of peer reviewed funding the state received during the 
study period. This peer reviewed funding approximation was then divided by the number 
of institutions in this study which reside in the state. This provided a total for each state 
of its total peer reviewed funding per institution during the study period. 
To calculate for figure 10 which states fell within each quintile, all of the 
earmarks received by each institution in this study within each state during all years of 
the study were added together. This total for each state was then divided by the number 
of institutions within this study which reside within the state. This provided a total for 
4 Subtracting the total amount of all earmarks and subtracting the total amount of only science and 
engineering earmarks made no difference in the quintile rankings of figure 9. Since it made no difference, 
only one map for peer reviewed funding was prepared rather than two maps - one subtracting out only 
science and engineering earmarks and one subtracting out all earmarks. 
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e�ch state of the total amount of earmarked funding per institution received during the 
study period. 
To calculate for figure 11  which states fell within each quintile, all of the science 
and engineering earmarks received by each institution in this study within each state 
during all years of the study were added together. This total for each state was then 
divided by the number of institutions within this study which reside within the state. This 
provided a total for each state of the total amount of science and engineering earmarked 
funding per institution received during the study period. 
Quintiles were used to color code the maps because they convey the best visual 
and most accurate picture of the geographical distribution of the various types of funding 
the maps depict. They convey the best visual because having roughly equal groupings in 
the quintiles and using different shades of the same color sort of shows into which parts 
of the country funding is flowing and at what magnitude funds flow. From an accuracy 
standpoint, rankings of this sort are more accurate to use than ranges based on the raw 
numbers. During the early stages of the study period, both earmarked funding and total 
science and engineering funding were at significantly lower levels than they were at the 
end of the period. Towards the end of the period, there simply was more money in the 
system than there was at the beginning. This fact could skew the results if raw numbers, 
rather than the broad category of a quintile, were relied upon. Using the broader category 
of the quintile also makes it less necessary to worry about the affect of inflation on the 
value of the dollar. Since there were 52 states when you count the District of Columbia 
and Puerto Rico, one quintile had to be larger than 10 states. Therefore, the lowest 
quintile for all the maps contains 12 states. 
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If the conventional wisdom that peer reviewed methods concentrate funding in the 
northeast Atlantic <;1nd west coast regions holds true, the maps depicting total science and 
engineering obligations and total peer reviewed funding should have a lot of darker blue 
in the northeast and along the west coast. Similarly, if earmarks serve the equalizing 
function of distributing federal research money to places where peer reviewed funding 
does not; the maps depicting total earmarks and total science and engineering earmarks 
should have the darker blues in the interior of the country and be lighter in the northeast 
and on the west coast. 
Basic Research Question 3: Are earmarks additive or do they come at the 
expense of peer reviewed funding? For many within the higher education community, 
earmarks would not be objectionable at all if they were an additive feature to federal 
research funding - serving the same role as a cherry on top of a chocolate sundae. There 
have been fears, however, within the higher education community as earmarks have 
escalated that, at some point, earmarks would eat into money which could otherwise be 
used for peer reviewed grants. It is very difficult to tell when an earmark might be 
additive or when it might come at the expense of peer reviewed funding because the 
appropriations process is not completely transparent. After an appropriation has 
occurred, whether it be for earmarked or peer reviewed funding, one is left with the 
challenge of trying to "prove the counterfactual" that absent a specific earmark more 
would have been appropriated for peer review programs. 
The methods used to address this question are therefore less sophisticated and 
precise than the other methods utilized in this study. Table 8 presents the percentage of 
total science and engineering obligations all earmarks comprise for each of the fiscal 
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years in the study period (1992 through 2003). If earmarks are beginning to eat into peer 
reviewed funding as they rise, one would expect that on this global level the percentage 
of science and engineering funding they comprise would be rising. 5 
A short individual case study is also presented to examine the effects of 
earmarking on the peer reviewed funding offered by one agency between fiscal year 1998 
and 2005. The Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education saw the number of 
earmarks in its budget appropriation increase from 2 in 1998 to 419 in 2005 and saw its 
budget increase in the same period from $25,200,000 to $163,600,000. The FIPSE case 
provides the opportunity to witness the effect of greatly increased earmarking activity on 
peer reviewed funding within one program area. Such small case studies may be the only 
method of peering into the appropriations process deep enough to actually discern 
whether earmarks are additive or come at the expense of peer reviewed funding. One 
case study, of course, cannot be universalized to the entire appropriations process, but it 
can provide some idea of whether on an individual program level earmarks are additive 
or come at the expense of peer reviewed funding. If earmarks are additive, one would 
expect that the addition of earmarks to the FIPSE appropriation caused the overall FIPSE 
appropriation to go up and that in effect a rising tide lifted all boats. If the earmarks 
5 Total earmarks are used in this comparison rather than just science and engineering earmarks because the 
earmark figures are taken directly from Chronicle of Higher Education reports and represent the total of earmarks appropriated by Congress for each year for all institutions receiving earmarks in that fiscal year, 
not just for the 327 institutions included in this study. The total science and engineering obligations totals 
are also for the entire universe of institutions. The coding exercise done to segregate science and 
engineering earmarks from non-science and engineering earmarks was only done for the 327 institutions 
included in this study. Using total earmarks rather than just science and engineering earmarks of course 
overstates the effect of earmarks some as the Chronicle total earmarks figure includes some non-science and engineering earmarks. The total science and engineering obligations figure includes no non-science and engineering obligations and thus would not include non-science and engineering earmarks. This just 
makes the fact that the percentage total earmarks comprise of total science and engineering obligations is so 
low all the more compelling because the effect of earmarks is overstated somewhat in the comparison. 
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came at the expense of peer reviewed funding, one would expect, that even though the 
overall appropriation went up each year, with each year earmarks took up a larger and 
larger proportion of the FIPSE budget. The FIPSE case study will be in the form of a 
narrative and will appear in the next chapter. 
Basic research question 4: Is there much difference in the institutions which 
garner the most earmarked funding and those which receive the most peer reviewed 
funding? Proponents of earmarking have extolled earmarking as a means by which 
emerging institutions can access some federal funding to use to catch up to more 
established institutions. Earmarking has also been hailed for sending federal research 
money to institutions and places where little money would otherwise go and for funding 
projects important to members of Congress and their constituents back home but not 
necessarily important to the national scientific community which makes decisions about 
peer review funding. (Brainard 2001c, Cook 1998, Feller 2004, Rose 1986, Savage 
1999) Each of these arguments assumes that earmarking has a redistributive effect and 
that the set of institutions which gamer the most earmarks is quite different from the set 
of institutions which gamer the most peer reviewed funds. 
However, two factors would seem to indicate that, even if leaders in earmarking 
and leaders in peer reviewed funding start off as two fairly discrete groups of institutions, 
these groups will not be stable and over time may merge with each other and become 
more closely correlated. First, if earmarks are effective in boosting an emerging 
institution's capabilities to compete for peer reviewed funding, eventually that institution 
is going to start to gamer more peer reviewed funds and not require earmarks to catch up. 
Secondly, there are indications in the literature, especially in the Chronicle of Higher 
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Education's  reporting on earmarking, that, as earmarking has become more established, 
the policy debate within the higher education community about the efficacy of 
earmarking has died down. The literature seems to indicate that virtually no institutions 
or higher education associations are actively campaigning against earmarking at present 
and that most institutions are now actively pursuing and accepting earmarks. 
These two factors would seem to indicate that during the early years of this study, 
when the policy debate about earmarks was most heated and when earmarking was a 
fairly new practice, the group of institutions which garnered the most earmarks would be 
very different from the group of institutions which garnered the most peer reviewed 
funding. This would have to be the case if earmarks served the redistributive function of 
sending federal research money to institutions and places where it would not go if peer 
review were solely relied upon. However, in the later years of the study, as the 
institutions which benefited early on from earmarks increased their capabilities to receive 
peer reviewed funding and the institutions which garnered the most peer reviewed 
funding gave up their inhibitions about pursuing earmarks, the two groups of institutions 
would grow more similar and earmarking's redistributive effect would be muted. 
To assess whether this has been the pattern, each of the 327 institutions were 
ranked by the total amount of earmarks and the total amount of peer reviewed funding 
they received during each year of the study period. To calculate the amount of peer 
reviewed funding an institution received during a given year, the amount of earmarked 
funding the institution received that year was subtracted from that institution's total 
science and engineering obligations figure for that year. These calculations were 
performed using both all earmarks and only science and engineering earmarks. 
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A bivariate correlation of the two rankings was then done to calculate the effect of 
earmark ranking on peer reviewed ranking for each year of the study. Since earmark 
ranking and peer reviewed ranking were used in calculating these correlations, 
institutions which received no earmarks during the study period tied for last place. 
Correlations using both all institutions and also dropping the institutions tied for last from 
the model were calculated. 
Figure 12 presents a line graph of the effect of earmark ranking on peer review 
ranking using all earmarks for each year of the study. Figure 13 presents a line graph of 
the effect of earmark ranking on peer review ranking using all earmarks but dropping the 
institutions not receiving any earmarks from the model. Figure 14 presents a line graph 
of the effect of earmark ranking on peer review ranking using only science and 
engineering earmarks for each year of the study. Figure 15 presents a line graph of the 
effect of earmark ranking on peer review ranking using only science and engineering 
earmarks but dropping the institutions not receiving any earmarks from the model. 
Table 9 uses all earmarks and presents the slope or effect of earmark ranking on 
peer reviewed ranking and the R-square value, which is an assessment of how strong the 
correlation is, for each study year for both the set of all institutions and the set of 
institutions that excludes those institutions which received no earmarks. Table 10 uses 
only science and engineering earmarks and presents the slope or effect of earmark 
ranking on peer reviewed ranking and the R-square value for each study year for both the 
set of all institutions and the set of institutions that excludes those institutions which 
received no earmarks. 
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The correlations reported in tables 9 and 10 and depicted in figures 12, 13, 14, and 
15 are one part of the picture of whether the set of institutions which does well at 
earmarking does well at garnering peer reviewed funds also. The other two parts of the 
picture which need to be taken into account are depicted in figures 2 and 7. Figure 2 
shows the number of institutions which have received earmarks in each year from 1990 to 
2003. Figure 7 is a histogram which depicts the change in peer reviewed funding rank 
between 1992 and 2003. 
Figure 2 shows how many institutions are getting into the earmarking game. 
Tables 9 and 10 and figures 12, 13, 14, and 15 show how earmark ranking and peer 
reviewed ranking relate in each year of the study. If the group of institutions which does 
the best at earmark ranking is becoming more similar with the group of institutions that is 
doing the best in receiving peer reviewed funds in latter years of the study period, it 
would follow that, as figure 2 shows an increase in the number of institutions getting into 
the earmark game, the relationship between earmark ranking and peer reviewed ranking 
will at least remain stable if not increase in effect. The histogram in figure 7 would show 
whether peer reviewed funding rankings are fairly stable or are moving around and 
affecting the relationship. A relationship between earmark ranking and peer review 
ranking that is at least stable would show that, as those institutions which do well at 
garnering peer reviewed funding enter into the earmark game, the rewards they reap from 
earmarking will be approximately commensurate with their peer reviewed ranking status. 
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CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed the data employed in this study and the methods used 
in answering the study's four basic research questions. Data for this study has been 
drawn from three basic sources. Science and engineering obligations data has been 
drawn from tables accessible through the National Science Foundation's website 
(www.nsf.gov). Earmark data has been drawn from a database maintained by the 
Chronicle of Higher Education and accessible through their website 
(http://chronicle.com/stats/pork/). A classification system of institutions of higher 
learning developed and maintained by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching was used to limit the number of institutions considered by the study. 
To address Basic Research Question 1 :  Does receiving earmarks improve the 
ability of an institution to receive other types of federal research funding? , tables (tables 
4 and 5) which display the change in total obligations rank between 1992 and 2003 and 
the change in the percentage of the total obligations funding of all institutions in the study 
between 1992 and 2003 were described in this chapter and constructed for the study. 
Comparing the institutions ranked the highest in earmarks (both the total earmarks dealt 
with in table 4 and science and engineering earmarks dealt with in table 5) for the period 
is one way of discerning whether receiving earmarks improves the ability to win other 
types of funding. 
Bivariate correlations of total earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992 
(table 6), of total earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 6), of science 
and engineering earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992 ( table 7), and of science 
and engineering earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 7) were also 
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described in the chapter and have been calculated. Comparing the correlation between 
earmark rank for the entire period and obligation rank at the beginning of the study 
period with the correlation between earmark rank for the entire period and obligation 
rank at the end of the study period provides some indication of whether receiving 
earmarks has built the capacity of institutions to gamer other types of funding. 
A bivariate correlation of total earmark ranking for the entire period with change 
in obligation rank between 1992 and 2003 (table 6) and of science and engineering 
earmark ranking for the entire period with change in obligation rank between 1992 and 
2003 (table 7) was also discussed and has been calculated. This correlation is helpful in 
showing whether receiving earmarks helps an institution gamer other types of funding. 
All correlations were calculated for all institutions as ranked by total earmarks 
(table 6) and by science and engineering earmarks (table 7) for the study period, for the 
top 20 institutions in total earmarks (table 6) and science and engineering earmarks (table 
7) for the study period, for the top 50 institutions in total earmarks (table 6) and science 
and engineering earmarks (table 7) for the study period, for the top 100 institutions in 
total earmarks (table 6) and science and engineering earmarks (table 7) for the study 
period, and for institutions 101 through the last institution in total earmarks (table 6) and 
science and engineering earmarks (table 7) for the study period. 
To address Basic Research Question 2: How does the awarding of earmarks 
affect the geographical distribution of federal research funding?, color coded maps were 
discussed and have been prepared displaying different shades of blue for the quintiles the 
50 states Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia fall within when they are ranked by 
several different measures. The measures used for the quintile rankings are total 
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obligations received during the study period per institution in the study group, total peer 
reviewed funding received during the study period per institution in the study group, total 
earmarks received during the study period per institution in the study group, and total 
science and engineering earmarks received during the study period per institution in the 
study group. 
To address Basic Research Question 3: Are earmarks additive or do they come at 
the expense of peer reviewed funding?, a table presenting the percentage total earmarks 
comprise of total science and engineering obligations for each year from 1990 through 
2003 has been prepared. A short case study of earmarking activity in the Fund for the 
Improvement of Postsecondary Education budget between 1998 and 2005 will also be 
presented in the next chapter . 
. To address Basic research question 4: Is there much difference in the institutions 
which garner the most earmarked funding and those which receive the most peer 
reviewed funding?, bivariate correlations of earmark ranking and peer reviewed ranking 
for each year of the study ( table 9) and of science and engineering earmark ranking and 
peer reviewed ranking for each year of the study (table 10) will be combined with 
observations from figure 2 about the number of institutions pursuing earmarks each year 
and from figure 7 about the stability of peer reviewed funding ranking over time to derive 
a picture of whether there is much difference in the institutions which gamer the most 
earmarked funding and those which receive the most peer reviewed funding. 
In the next chapter, the four basic research questions discussed in this chapter will 
be analyzed and the findings which can be derived from assessing these questions with 
the methods discussed in this chapter will be presented. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will analyze the study's basic research questions by the methods 
described in chapter 3 and present findings. The first basic research question, Does 
receiving earmarks improve the ability of an institution to receive other types of federal 
research funding?, will be anal�ed by creating two tables which display the change in 
total obligatic:ms rank between 1992 and 2003 and the change in the percentage of the 
total obligations funding of all institutions in the study between 1992 and 2003. Bivariate 
correlations of total earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992 (table 6), of total 
earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 6), of science and engineering 
earmark rank with total obligations ·rank in 1992 (table 7), of science and engineering 
earmark rank with·total obligations rank in 2003 (table 7), of total earmark ranking for 
the entire period with change in obligation rank between 1992 and 2003 (table 6), and of 
science and engineering earmark ranking for the entire period with change in obligation 
rank between 1992 and 2003 (table 7) will also be run. 
The second basic research question, How does the awarding of earmarks affect 
the geographical distribution of federal research funding?, will be analyzed by creating 
color coded maps displaying how all of the states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto 
Rico rank by total obligations received during the study period per institution in the study 
group, total peer reviewed funding received during the study period per institution in the 
study group, total earmarks received during the study period per institution in the study 
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group, and total science and engineering earmarks received during the study period per 
institution in the study group. 
The third basic research question, Are earmarks additive or do they come at the 
expense of peer reviewed funding?, will be assessed by looking at a table presenting the 
percentage total earmarks comprise of total science and engineering obligations for each 
year from 1990 through 2003 and a short case study of earmarking activity in the Fund 
for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education budget between 1998 and 2005. 
Finally, the fourth basic research question, Is there much difference in the 
institutions which garner the most earmarked funding and those which receive the most 
peer reviewed funding?, will be analyzed by assessing the picture presented by a 
combination of bivariate correlations of earmark ranking and peer reviewed ranking for 
each year of the study (table 9) and of science and engineering earmark ranking and peer 
reviewed ranking for each year of the study (table 10) with observations from figure 2 
about the number of institutions pursuing earmarks each year and from figure 7 about the 
stability of peer reviewed funding ranking over time. 
The chapter will conclude with a chapter summary. 
BASIC RESEARCH QUESTION 1: DOES RECEIVING EARMARKS 
IMPROVE THE ABILITY OF AN INSTITUTION TO RECEIVE OTHER TYPES OF 
FEDERAL FUNDING? 
Proponents of earmarking have long maintained they are a necessary feature of 
federal academic research funding because certain institutions are disadvantaged in the 
peer review competitions which are held to award the vast majority of federal research 
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funds. For these proponents, earmarks are a method of distributing some federal research 
funding through a method other than peer review to institutions which are not well suited 
to gamer the funds by competing for them in a peer review process. Besides having the 
effect of spreading federal research funding to a wider array of institutions than would 
receive funding if all awards were made through peer review, proponents have also 
argued that the awarding of earmarks enables institutions, which have traditionally not 
garnered the most peer reviewed funds, to use the earmarks they receive to upgrade their 
research infrastructure so that they can compete more effectively in future peer review 
competitions. (Brainard 2001c, Cook 1998, Feller 2004, Rose 1986, Savage 1999) 
This idea that receiving earmarks can increase an institution's ability to gamer 
other forms of research funding is important to explore because earmarking comprises a 
very small percentage of total federal research funding. Most of the research funds the 
federal government awards are awarded through peer review processes, so, if an 
institution is to increase its share of federal research funding significantly, at some point 
its faculty will have to be able to compete more effectively in peer review competitions 
for funding. A strategy of relying solely on earmarks to catch up to the institutions which 
gamer the most federal research funding in the end would not catch up a trailing 
institution. 
To assess whether earmarks have the effect of increasing an institution's ability to 
compete for other federal research funds, two tables have been created. Table 4 presents 
a listing of the 327 institutions in this study by how they rank in all earmarks they 
received between 1992 and 2003. In subsequent columns the institution's rank in total 
science and engineering obligations for 1992 and the institution's  rank in total science 
123 
and engineering obligations for 2003 are presented. If receiving earmarks has a positive 
effect on an institution's ability to gamer other forms of funding, it follows that the 
institutions which received the most earmarked funding in the 1992 through 2003 period 
should rank higher in total science and engineering funding in 2003, at the end of this 
period, than they ranked in total science and engineering funding in 1992, the beginning 
of the period. Column J reports the change in rank for each institution between 1992 and 
2003. Columns G, H, and I report the percentage of total science and engineering 
obligations for all institutions that each individual institution secured in 1992 and 2003 
and the percent change between the 1992 and 2003 figures. Table 5 duplicates Table 4 
with the one exception being that it ranks institutions by total science and engineering 
earmarks received from 1992 to 2003 rather than by all earmarks received during the 
period. 
A careful look at table 4 shows that in general receiving earmarks does not seem 
to aid institutions in their efforts to receive other types of federal funding. Of the top 20 
recipients of all earmarks during this study period, only 4 jumped more than 5 places in 
rank when their ranking in total science and engineering obligations in 1992 was 
compared to their ranking in total science and engineering obligations in 2003. 7 of the 
top 20 recipients of all earmarks actually went down more than 5 places when their 
science and engineering obligations rankings for 1992 and 2003 were compared. 9 of the 
top 20 institutions maintained a ranking in 2003 within 5 places of where their ranking 
was in 1992. 
The picture is slightly different when an institution's percentage of the total 
science and engineering obligations of all institutions in 1992 is compared to the same 
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percentage calculated for 2003. Of the top 20 recipients of all earmarks during this study 
period, 6 institutions gain more than 10 percentage points when the 1992 percentage is 
compared to the 2003 percentage. 7 institutions lose more than 10 percentage points 
when the figures are compared. 7 institutions have positive or negative percentage 
changes of less than 10 percentage points between 1992 and 2003. 
When the top 50 recipients of all earmarks during this study period are 
considered, 11 institutions move forward in rank more than 5 places when their rank in 
total science and engineering obligations for 1992 is compared to the same ranking for 
2003, 22 institutions move backwards in rank more than 5 places, and 17 institutions 
maintain a rank in 2003 within 5 places of their 1992 ranking. 14 of the top 50 recipients 
of all earmarks during this study period increase by more than 10 percentage points their 
percentage of the total science and engineering obligations of all institutions when the 
percentages for 1992 and 2003 are compared, 21 of the top 50 have decreases of more 
than 10 percentage points, and 15 have percentage changes to the positive or negative of 
less than 10 percentage points. 
Of the top 100 recipients of all earmarks during this study period, 29 move 
forward in rank more than 5 places, 40 move backwards in rank more than 5 places, and 
31 maintain a rank in 2003 within 5 places of their 1992 ranking. 35 have percent gains 
of more than 10 percent, 4 1  have percent losses of more than 10 percent, and 24 have 
percent changes to the positive or negative of less than 10 percentage points. 
If receiving earmarks helps an institution increase its research capacity to the 
point that the institution can compete more effectively for peer-reviewed funding, the 
expectation would be that the institutions which gamer the most earmarks during a period 
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of time would move up in the rankings of institutions by total science and engineering 
obligations and gain a larger percentage of the total science and engineering obligations 
of all institutions by the end of the period. Clearly, this is not what is happening when 
the results presented in Table 4 are analyzed. Most of the institutions which gamer the 
most earmarks do not improve their ranking. They either remain very close to their 
ranking at the beginning of the period or move backwards in the rankings. The 
institutions which gamer the most earmarks for the most part do not gain a larger 
percentage of total science and engineering obligations either. They generally lose 
percentage points when the end of the period is compared to the beginning or maintain a 
percentage very close to their percentage at the beginning of the period. 
Still, some institutions do make the gains in rank and percentage which would be 
expected if earmarks enhance an institution's ability to secure other types of funding. 2 
of the top 20 (The University of South Florida and The University of Mississippi), 6 of 
the top 50 (The University of South Florida, The University of Mississippi, the Medical 
University of South Carolina, Montana State University-Bozeman, Oregon Health & 
Science University, and Texas Tech University), and 17 of the top 100 recipients of all 
earmarks improved their total science and engineering rank by more than 14 places and 
increased their percentage of the total and science and engineering obligations of all 
institutions by more than 50 percent during this study period. While there are perhaps 
multiple factors which enabled these institutions to improve their ranking and percentage, 
one stark factor which sticks out is the fact that 5 of the 6 improving institutions in the 
top 50 have medical schools. Of the 6, only Montana State University-Bozeman does not 
have a medial school. Savage pointed out in his 1999 book that earmarks for biomedical 
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purposes may be more productive than earmarks for other purposes because there is a 
great deal more federal research money available for biomedical research than for any 
other purpose (Savage 1999). Having a medical school was also a significant variable in 
the model of earmarking de Figueiredo and Silverman created in their 2002 study ( de 
Figueiredo and Silverman 2002). 
A quick look at the earmarks of the 6 institutions in the top 50 which experienced 
dramatic gains in rank and percentage shows that the University of South Florida 
received 66 earmarks during the study period of which 26 were clearly for biomedical 
purposes. The University of Mississippi received 103 earmarks during the study period 
of which 10 were clearly for biomedical purposes. The Medical University of South 
Carolina received 24 earmarks during the study period all of which were for biomedical 
purposes. Montana State University-Bozeman received 129 earmarks during the study 
period of which 6 were clearly for biomedical purposes. Oregon Health & Science 
University received 18 earmarks all of which were for biomedical purposes. Finally, 
Texas Tech University received 58 earmarks of which 13 were clearly for biomedical 
purposes. The literature and these results suggest that earmarks for biomedical purposes 
may enhance an institution's ability to secure other types of federal funding, but further 
study into the role having a medical school and the role earmarks for biomedical research 
play in the federal funding of academic research is necessary to determine whether this is 
actually the case. 
Of the top 20 recipients of all earmarks during the study period, only 2 ( the 
University of Alabama and West Virginia University) experience dramatic losses of rank 
by total science and engineering obligations and percentage of the total science and 
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engineering obligations of all institutions. Both institutions lose 46 places in rank and 
over 50 percentage points. There are no other institutions in the top 50 or top 100 
recipients of earmarks during the study period which experience l_osses of both more than 
20 places and 50 percentage points. It is difficult to come up with a rationale for why 
these two institutions experienced such losses in rank and percentage. The University of 
Alabama does not have a medical school, but West Virginia University does. Further 
research into the factors which may have caused these institutions to experience such 
dramatic losses in rank and percentage is required. 
In the entire study group of 327 institutions, 50 institutions increase their ranking 
by total science and engineering obligations by more than 10 and their percentage of the 
total and science and engineering obligations of all institutions by more than 50 
percentage points during the study period. 1 7 institutions lose at least 16 places in rank 
and 50 percentage points. There is less significance in the rank and percentage gained 
and lost by institutions towards the bottom of the table because institutions have received 
less earmarked money during the study period and less federal research money in general. 
Earmarks thus explain less about the gains and losses of institutions the closer one gets to 
the bottom of the table. Also, since in most cases there is less money in play towards the 
bottom of the table, small changes in total science and engineering obligations can trigger 
fairly large changes in rank and percentage. One grant, or simply an unusually good 
year, can cause large fluctuations in rank and percentage for the institutions at the bottom 
of the table. 
Table 5 presents the same findings as table 4 with the exception that only science 
and engineering earmarks are used in calculating the earmark ranking reported in column 
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A. Removing non-science and engineering earmarks from consideration reshuffles the 
deck somewhat, but all of the top 20 recipients of all earmarks listed in column A of table 
4 remain in the top 20 recipients of science and engineering earmarks listed in column A 
of table 5. The top 20 institutions in table 5 are in a slightly different rank order than in 
table 4. The University of Alabama is number 3 in table 5 and number 4 in table 4. West 
Virginia University is number 4 in table 5 and number 5 in table 4. Loma Linda 
University is number 5 in table 5 and number 3 in table 4. Pennsylvania State 
University-Main Campus is number 9 in table 5 and number 11 in table 4. Georgetown 
University is number 10 in table 5 and number 9 in table 4. The University ofMissouri­
Columbia is number 12 in table 5 and number 13 in table 4. Texas A & M University is 
number 13 in table 5 and number 10 in table 4. The University of Mississippi is number 
11 in table 5 and number 12 in table 4. These minor fluctuations in rank order between 
table 5 and 4 continue to occur as one descends down the column A rankings of each 
table. However, no institution's column A rank changes more than a few places when 
both tables are compared, and there is no difference in the figures reported for each 
institution in columns C through J of each table. 
The exercise of identifying and segregating non-science and engineering earmarks 
from all earmarks lends little explanatory power to the issues addressed by both table 4 
and table 5. Table 5, the table which utilizes a ranking of institutions by science and 
engineering earmarks only, is probably the more accurate of the two tables because the 
elimination of non-science and engineering earmarks from the calculations used to rank 
institutions makes the earmark ranking more closely match up with the National Science 
Foundation obligation data which is limited to science and engineering obligations only. 
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The use of both ranking by total science and engineering obligations and an 
institution's percentage of the total science and engineering obligations of all institutions 
also lent very little explanatory power to these issues. There were no instances in the 
entire study where rank order went up more than 5 places and percentage went down 
more than 10 percentage points and no instances where the reverse occurred either. 
There were only 35 instances in the entire study where rank order went up or down more 
than 5 places while percentage did not change by at least 10 percentage points or where 
rank order stayed within 5 places and percentage changed more than 10 percentage 
points. For these cases, in which one factor remained rather constant while the other 
factor differed from 1992 to 2003 past the range set to indicate significant change had 
occurred ( 5 places for rank and 10 percentage points for percentage), it is interesting to 
look at which factor (rank or percentage) exceeds the range. In 12 instances in the whole 
study, rank did not change more than 5 places between 1992 and 2003 but percentage 
went up more than 10 percentage points. In 9 instances in the whole study, rank did not 
change more than 5 places between 1992 and 2003 but percentage went down more than 
10 percentage points. In 2 instances in the whole study, rank went up more than 5 places 
between 1992 and 2003 while percentage remained within 10 percentage points. In 12 
instances in the whole study, rank went down more than 5 places between 1992 and 2003 
while percentage remained within 10 percentage points. 
Looking only at the top 100 recipients of all earmarks, in 6 cases rank did not 
change more than 5 places between 1992 and 2003 but percentage went up more than 10 
percentage points. In 2 of these 6 cases, difference of rank is at 5 places, right at the edge 
of where the boundary is set for determining whether little change or significant change 
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in rank order had occurred, while the change in percentage is well outside the 10 
percentage point boundary set to mark significant change in percentage.6 In 1 of these 6 
cases, difference of rank is at 1 place to the positive, well within the boundary set for 
determining whether little change or significant change in rank order had occurred, while 
the change in percentage is at 11.04 percent to the positive, just outside the 10 percentage 
point boundary set to mark significant change in percentage. 7 
In 3 cases within the top 100, rank did not change more than 5 places between 
1992 and 2003 but percentage went down more than 10 percentage points. In 1 of these 3 
cases, there is a 2 place decrease in rank between 1992 and 2003, which is well within the 
boundary set for determining whether little change or significant change in rank order 
had occurred, while the change in percentage is 14.05 percent to the negative, well 
outside the 10 percentage point boundary set to mark significant change in percentage. 8 
In 1 of these 3 cases, there is no change in rank between 1992 and 2003 while the change 
in percentage is 17.44 percent to the negative, well outside the 10 percentage point 
boundary set to mark significant change in percentage.9 In 1 of these 3 cases, there is a 5 
place decrease in rank between 1992 and 2003, right at the edge of where the boundary is 
6 The University of Alaska Fairbanks ranked 102 in total science and engineering obligations in 1992 and 
97 in total science and engineering obligations in 2003 but experienced a 1 7.34 percent gain in its 
percentage of the total science and engineering obligations of all institutions between 1992 and 2003. 
North Dakota State University-Main Campus ranked 141 in total science and engineering obligations in 
1992 and 136 in total science and engineering obligations in 2003 but experienced a 1 5 .9 1 percent gain in 
its percentage of the total science and engineering obligations of all institutions between 1992 and 2003 . 
7 The University of Idaho ranked 1 3 1  in total science and engineering obligations in 1992 and 130 in total 
science and engineering obligations in 2003 but experienced an 1 1 .04 percent gain in its percentage of the 
total science and engineering obligations of all institutions between 1992 and 2003. 
8 The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ranked 24 in total science and engineering obligations in 
1992 and 26 in total science and engineering obligations in 2003 but experienced a 14.05 percent loss in its 
fercentage of the total science and engineering obligations of all institutions between 1 992 and 2003. Johns Hopkins University ranked 1 in total science and engineering obligations in 1992 and 1 in total 
science and engineering obligations in 2003 but experienced a 1 7.44 percent loss in its percentage of the 
total science and engineering obligations of all institutions between 1992 and 2003. 
131 
set for determining whether little change or significant change in rank order had occurred, 
while the change in percentage is 17.39 percent to the negative, well outside the 10 
percentage point boundary set to mark significant change in percentage. 10  These three 
cases are interesting because the institutions involved (the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, Johns Hopkins University, and the University of Rochester) are all 
ranked fairly high in the total science and engineering obligations rankings. Looking at 
these 3 cases shows that, while the ranking by total science and engineering obligations 
of these highly ranked institutions changes little between 1992 and 2003, they are losing 
significant ground in their percentage of the total science and engineering obligations of 
all institutions during the same period of time. 
There are 2 cases within top 100 in which rank fell more than 5 places between 
1992 and 2003 while percentage did not change more than 10 percentage points. Both of 
these cases are close calls. Rutgers University experienced a 6 place decrease in rank 
between 1992 and 2003 moving from 52 in rank to 58. This is just at the edge of the 5 
place boundary set for determining whether little change or significant change in rank 
order had occurred. During this same period of time Rutgers experienced a 6. 79 percent 
loss in its percentage of the total science and engineering obligations of all institutions. 
This percent loss is towards the midpoint of the 10 percentage point boundary set to mark 
significant change in percentage. The University of Iowa experienced a 7 place decrease 
in rank between 1992 and 2003 moving from 34 to 41. During this same period Iowa 
experienced an 8.4 7 percent loss in its percentage of the total science and engineering 
10 The University of Rochester ranked 25 in total science and engineering obligations in 1 992 and 30 in 
total science and engineering obligations in 2003 but experienced a 17 .39 percent loss in its percentage of 
the total science and engineering obligations of all institutions between 1 992 and 2003. 
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obligations of all institutions. This percent loss is towards the top of the 10 percentage 
point boundary set to mark significant change in percentage. 
Looking only at the top 50 recipients of earmarks, in 3 cases rank did not change 
more than 5 places between 1992 and 2003 but percentage went up more than 10 
percentage points. 1 1  In 1 case rank did not change more than 5 places between 1992 and 
2003 but percentage went down more than 10 percentage points. 12  In 2 cases rank went 
down more than 5 places between 1992 and 2003 but percentage change stayed within 10 
percentage points. 1 3  These 6 cases are the only cases within the top 50 in which 
significant change occurs to one factor (ranking or percentage) while the other factor 
remains rather constant within the zone in which marginal but not significant change can 
be observed. 
Looking only at the top 20 recipients of earmarks, in 2 cases rank did not change 
more than 5 places between 1992 and 2003 but percentage went up more than 10 
percentage points. 14 There are no other cases in the top 20 in which significant change 
occurs to one factor (ranking or percentage) while the other factor remains rather constant 
within the zone in which marginal but not significant change can be observed. 
In addition to this basic analysis of tables 4 and 5, a bivariate correlation has been 
run between the total earmark ranking for each of the institutions for the entire period 
1 1  These cases are the University of Alaska Fairbanks and North Dakota State-Main Campus cases which 
have been discussed earlier and Loma Linda University. Loma Linda University ranked 147 in total 
science and engineering obligations in 1 992 and 146 in total science and engineering obligations in 2003 . 
Loma Linda University experienced a 20.54 percent gain in its percentage of the total science and 
engineering obligations of all institutions between 1992 and 2003 . 
12 The case referred to here is the case of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign which has been 
discussed earlier. 
1 3  The cases referred to here are the cases of Rutgers University and the University of Iowa which have 
been discussed earlier. 
14 The cases referred to here are the cases of Loma Linda University and the University of Alaska Fairbanks 
which have been discussed earlier. 
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(listed in column A of table 4) and the rank in total science and engineering obligations 
for each of the institutions in 1992 at the beginning of the study period (listed in column 
C of table 4). A bivariate correlation has also been run between the total earmark ranking 
for each of the institutions for the entire period (listed in column A of table 4) and the 
institutions rank in total science and engineering obligations in 2003 at the end of the 
study period (listed in column E of table 4). These correlations are reported in table 6 
and have been run for the entire set of institutions, for the set of institutions ranked 1 to 
20 in total earmark ranking for the entire period (the column A figure), for the set of 
institutions ranked 1 to 50 in total earmark ranking for the entire period (the column A 
figure), for the set of institutions ranked 1 to 100 in total earmark ranking for the entire 
period ( the column A figure), and for the set of institutions ranked 101 to last in total 
earmark ranking for the entire period (the column A figure). 
The first column of table 6, which reports the correlation between total earmark 
ranking for the entire period ( column A in table 4) and total science and engineering 
obligations ranking in 1992 ( column C), can be viewed as a baseline figure to which the 
second column of table 6, which reports the correlation between total earmark ranking for 
the entire period (column A in table 4) and total science and engineering obligations 
ranking in 2003 ( column E), can be compared. If receiving earmarks during the period 
has helped institutions receive other forms of federal research funding and thereby 
improve their rank in total science and engineering obligations at the end of the period 
over their ranking at the beginning, it would be expected that the effect or slope numbers 
in the second column of table 6 would be positive and higher than the effect or slope 
numbers in the first column of table 6 especially for the higher ranked groups considered. 
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The slope or effect numbers tell us that for every one move up in earmark rank there is a 
corresponding move in obligation rank of the slope or effect number. Doing well by the 
measure of earmark ranking during the period should drive the obligation ranking up 
more at the end of the period than it does at the beginning of the period if receiving 
earmarks actually improves the ability of an institution to receive other types of federal 
research funding. The R-square values in parentheses are measures of the strength of the 
correlations reported in each of the columns. The higher the R-square values the stronger 
the correlation and the more of the effect explained by earmark rank. 
Looking at the correlations reported in table 6, the effect or slope figures when all 
institutions are considered are very close to the same amount when the figure for the 
1992 and 2003 correlation are compared. The R-square value when all institutions are 
considered is also rather large indicating that a good portion of the effect is explained by 
earmark rank. This would seem to indicate that when all institutions are considered the 
relationship between total earmark ranking and obligations ranking is rather consistent 
whether the beginning of the study period or the end of the study period is considered. 
This supports the fundamental analysis of table 4 which showed that relatively few of the 
327 institutions in the study experienced significant changes in obligation rank when their 
1992 obligation rank was compared to their 2003 obligation rank. 
Looking at the correlations for the top 20 institutions in total earmark rank for the 
entire period reported in table 6, the effect or slope figure for the 2003 correlation is 
negative and somewhat lower than the baseline effect or slope figure from the 1992 
correlation. The R-square values for these correlations, however, are very low indicating 
that the correlations are weak and little of the effect is explained by earmark rank. Little 
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can be surmised from comparing these correlations, but the indication would be that there 
is little evidence that doing well in receiving earmarks during the study period will drive 
up an institution's obligation rank at the end of the period. In fact the evidence would 
suggest there would be little change in obligation ranking, and, if there was change, it 
might be negative. This too would support the earlier analysis of how the top 20 
institutions changed in obligation rank when their rank at beginning of the period was 
compared to their rank at the end of the period. Few institutions experienced much 
positive change in rank. Most stayed close to the same in rank or lost rank. 
When the correlations are done for the top 50 institutions in total earmark rank for 
the entire period, the slope or effect figure again remains fairly consistent when the 1992 
correlation is compared to the 2003 correlation. Both slope or effect figures, however, 
are negative. The R-square values are a little higher for these two correlations than they 
were when the top 20 were considered, but they are still low. These correlations, like 
those for the top 20, thus should be taken less seriously because they are weak and 
earmark rank explains little of the effect. However, they would seem to indicate that, if 
there is an effect to be gained from doing well at earmarking over the period, it is 
certainly not a positive effect. This too tends to support the preliminary analysis of how 
the top 50 institutions changed in obligation rank when their rank at beginning of the 
period was compared to their rank at the end of the period. Very few institutions went up 
in rank significantly. Most institutions stayed close to the same in rank or went down. 
When the correlations are done for the top 100 institutions in total earmark rank 
for the entire period, the slope or effect figure again remains fairly consistent when the 
1992 correlation is compared to the 2003 correlation. The slope or effect figures here are 
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positive, and the 2003 figure is a little over a tenth of a rank lower than the 1992 figure. 
The R-square values are lower than they were for the top 50 correlations but not quite as 
low as they were for the top 20 correlations. They are still low enough that we should 
view these correlations with suspicion because they are weak and earmark rank explains 
little of the effect. Again, however, if there is any effect to be gained from doing well at 
earmarking over the period, the effect is less at the end of the period than the baseline 
figure derived from running the correlation of earmark rank on the beginning of the 
period obligation rank. This too supports the earlier analysis of how the top 100 
institutions changed in obligation rank when their rank at beginning of the period was 
compared to their rank at the end of the period. Again, very few institutions went up in 
rank significantly. Most institutions stayed close to the same in rank or went down. 
The two correlations run for those institutions ranked 101 to last in total earmark 
rank for the entire period are quite interesting. The slope or effect numbers of the 1992 
correlation and the 2003 correlation are quite similar within .05 of each other. The 2003 
number is the lower of the two numbers. These slope or effect numbers are the largest of 
any of the slope or effect numbers for any of the correlations. The R-square numbers 
also return to significance indicating that the correlations at the bottom of the table are 
relatively strong and earmark rank explains a good portion of the effect. This shows that 
there is a lot of consistency and stability at the bottom of the table and that it is the 
bottom of the table which is stabilizing the correlations when all institutions are 
considered. This makes sense as there are quite a few institutions which are tied for last 
in ranking at the bottom of the table. 
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One other bivariate correlation is reported in the third column of table 6. This 
correlation is the correlation between total earmark ranking for each of the institutions for 
the entire period (listed in column A of table 4) and the institutions change in rank in total 
science and engineering obligations rank between 1992 and 2003 (listed in column J of 
table 4). If receiving earmarks during the period has helped institutions receive other 
forms of federal research funding and thereby improve their rank in total science and 
engineering obligations at the end of the period over their ranking at the beginning, it 
would be expected that the effect or slope numbers in the third column of table 6 would 
be positive especially when the higher ranked groups are considered and that the value of 
the effect or slope number would be higher for the higher ranked groups considered. The 
slope or effect numbers in this case tell us that for every one move up in earmark rank 
there is a corresponding jump or slide of the slope or effect number in rank when 1992 
obligation rank is compared to 2003 obligation rank. If doing well by the measure of 
earmark ranking during the period drives obligation rankings up, the higher ranked 
groups considered should experience the largest positive changes in ranking and in 
general with each move up in earmark ranking there should be a positive change in 
ranking. As with the other correlations reported in table 6, the R-square values in 
parentheses in the third column are measures of the strength of the correlations reported 
in the third column. The higher the R-square values the stronger the correlation and the 
more of the effect explained by earmark rank. 
The slope or effect numbers in the third column are all positive and the higher 
ranked groups have the higher number except for the top 50 group which actually has the 
lowest number of all of the correlations run. The R-square totals for all of the 
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correlations are very low, however, indicating these correlations are rather weak and 
earmark rank explains little of the effect. These correlations give some indication that 
there is a general positive effect of earmarking on change in rank, but it is very small and 
not statistically significant. 
Table 7 reports the same correlations for the same groups of ranked institutions as 
table 6 does using only science and engineering earmarks. Table 6 corresponds to table 4 
in the same way table 7 corresponds to table 5. The data for the correlations reported in 
table 6 come from table 4. The data for the correlations reported in table 7 come from 
table 5. 1 5  The numbers reported in table 7 are very similar to the numbers reported in 
table 6, again showing that segregating science and engineering earmarks from non­
science and engineering earmarks changes earmark ranking very little. The conclusions 
reached in the analysis of table 6 also apply to table 7. 
Both an analysis of tables 4 and 5 and of the correlations reported in tables 6 and 
7 indicate that receiving earmarks does not have a general effect of improving an 
institution's ability to receive other types of funding. An analysis of the tables shows that 
most of the institutions which gamer the most earmarks do not improve their total science 
and engineering obligations ranking. They either remain very close to their ranking at the 
beginning of the period or move backwards in the rankings. The institutions which 
gamer the most earmarks for the most part do not gain a larger percentage of total science 
and engineering obligations either. They generally lose percentage points when the end 
15 The only difference between table 4 and table 5 is that table 4 reports earmark ranking for each 
institution in the study for the entire study period in column A using all earmarks in its calculations while 
table 5 reports earmark ranking for each institution in the study for the entire study period in its column A 
using only science and engineering earmarks in its calculations. All other columns in tables 4 and 5 report 
the same totals. 
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of the period is compared to the beginning or maintain a percentage very close to their 
percentage at the beginning of the period. 
The comparison of the correlations run between ranking by total earmarks 
received for the period and science and engineering obligations rank at the beginning of 
the period and between ranking by total earmarks received for the period and science and 
engineering obligations rank at the end of the period lends support to the trends observed 
in the analysis of the tables. Analysis of the correlation between ranking by total 
earmarks received for the period and change in science and engineering obligations rank 
shows that there is a general positive effect of earmarking on change in rank, but it is 
very small and not statistically significant. 
BASIC RESEARCH QUESTION 2 :  HOW DOES THE AW ARD ING OF 
EARMARKS AFFECT THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL 
RESEARCH FUNDING? 
Since the 1960's, there has been some concern that a large and disproportionate 
share of federal research funding awarded in peer review competitions goes to a very few 
elite institutions located in the northeast Atlantic and west coast regions of the United 
States. Earmarking has been extolled as a means of combating the perceived 
disproportionate geographical concentration of funding that results from the peer review 
process. Many Congressional and other leaders have felt it important to distribute federal 
research funding widely throughout the country because often where federal research 
money goes, economic development follows. (Greenberg 1966) 
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This study looks at the geographical question by dividing the amount of federal 
research money a state receives by the number of doctoral granting and specially focused 
medical institutions a state has. It is my belief that the introduction of this control will 
render a truer picture of the geographical distribution of federal research funds than a 
picture based solely on the raw figures. To assess how the awarding of earmarks affects 
the geographical distribution of federal research funding, four color coded maps have 
been constructed. For each map the various 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 
Puerto Rico have been colored a different shade of blue depending upon which quintile 
the state, District, or territory ranked within for the total study period. 1 6  Figure 8 presents 
the results by quintile of how the various states ranked in total science and engineering 
obligations per institution during the study period. Figure 9 presents the results by 
quintile of how the various states ranked in total peer reviewed funding per institution 
during the study period. Figure 10 presents the results by quintile of how the various 
states ranked in total earmarks received per institution during the study period. Figure 11 
presents the results by quintile of how the various states ranked in science and 
engineering earmarks received per institution during the study period. 
A careful look at the map in figure 8 shows that the geographical distribution of 
total science and engineering obligations from 1992 to 2003 fits the expected pattern 
(more funds flowing to the west coast and northeast) somewhat but that there are some 
16 Totals for each funding type are aggregated for the entire study period because there are significant year 
to year fluctuations in funding which are related only to the idiosyncratic history of the particular funding 
cycle a particular year represents. Each year is only a snapshot of one year of funding and a large earmark 
or grant within that one year of funding, which may not be repeated in previous or future years, can cause 
the states to move around in rank for just that year. This is particularly true for the earmark maps because 
there is less funding involved and less stability from year to year in funding. Aggregating all years over the 
entire length of the study has the effect of smoothing out year to year fluctuations so that a true trend in the 
distribution of funding over a period of time for each of the various types of funding can be discerned. 
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notable differences. Washington and California on the west coast are both in the highest 
quintile ranking first and ninth respectively. Maryland, Massachusetts, and Connecticut 
in the northeast Atlantic, ranking second, fifth, and eighth respectively, are also colored 
with the darkest blue representing the highest quintile. Taking the fourth quintile into 
account, the northeastern states of Pennsylvania, Vermont, and New York are also 
colored with the next darkest shade of blue which represents the fourth quintile of 
states. 17 There is plenty of blue on both the west coast and in the northeast Atlantic. 
However, there are a number of interlopers. Sticking out sharply in the western 
interior part of the map in the darkest blue of the highest quintile are New Mexico and 
Colorado ranked 10 and 6 respectively. In the midwest, Wisconsin, ranked 4, is colored 
with the darkest blue. North Carolina, certainly an eastern state but generally considered 
part of the south, is also colored with the darkest blue of the highest quintile. 1 8  Perhaps 
most surprising is the darkest shade of blue Hawaii bears as the third ranked state in the 
highest quintile. 
Moving into the fourth quintile, Indiana, Iowa and Michigan join their 
midwestern brethren; Utah joins New Mexico and Colorado in the western interior; 
Alabama and Georgia bring some color to the southeastern part of the map; and Alaska 
joins Hawaii as one of the more surprising states included in the top two quintiles. 1 9  
Oregon, Rhode Island, and New Jersey, in the third quintile; New Hampshire and the 
District of Columbia, in the second quintile; and Maine and Delaware, in the lowest 
17 These states are ranked 12, 1 6, and 19  respectively in the total science and engineering obligations 
rankings reported in figure 8. 
1 8 North Carolina ranks 6 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8. 
19  Indiana is ranked 18, Iowa is ranked 12, Michigan is ranked 1 1 , Utah is ranked 14, Alabama is ranked 
15 ,  Georgia is ranked 1 8, and Alaska is ranked 17 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings 
reported in figure 8. 
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quintile, do not share the colorful character of their west coast and northeastern 
neighbors. 20 
The picture presented by figure 9, which depicts the distribution of peer reviewed 
funding, is very similar to the picture presented by figure 8. Perhaps the starkest visual 
difference between figure 9 and figure 8 is that Mississippi slides from a ranking of 40 in 
figure 8's rankings to 45 in figure 9's rankings and thus slides from the second quintile in 
figure 8 to the lowest quintile in figure 9. Mississippi's slide consolidates most of the 
white that signifies the lowest quintile into a block of connected states located in the 
northwestern and southwestern interior of the map. Only Kansas, in the second quintile 
in both figures, and Nebraska, in the third quintile in both figures, breaks off the 
northwestern block of states from the white states of Oklahoma, Arkansas, and 
Mississippi in the southwestern interior portion of the map.2 1  Mississippi's color change 
makes the lighter colors in figure 9 seem consolidated in the interior of the country. Only 
West Virginia, Delaware, and Puerto Rico's white in figure 9 are somewhat separated 
from this concentration of a lack of color in the middle portion of the map. 22 
20 Oregon is ranked 29, Rhode Island is ranked 24, New Jersey is ranked 26, New Hampshire is ranked 37, 
the District of Columbia is ranked 33, Maine is ranked 43, and Delaware is ranked 45 in the total science 
and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8. 
21 Kansas is ranked 32 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and 33 
in the total peer-reviewed funding rankings reported in figure 9. Nebraska is ranked 27 in the total science 
and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and 29 in the total peer-reviewed funding 
rankings reported in figure 9. Arkansas is ranked 46 in the total science and engineering obligations 
rankings reported in figure 8 and 43 in the total peer-reviewed funding rankings reported in figure 9. 
Mississippi is ranked 40 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and 
45 in the total peer-reviewed funding rankings reported in figure 9. Oklahoma is ranked 44 in the total 
science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and 42 in the total peer-reviewed rankings 
reported in figure 9. 
22 West Virginia is ranked 4 7 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9. Delaware is ranked 
4 1  in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9. Puerto Rico is ranked 52 in the total peer­
reviewed rankings reported in figure 9. 
143 
There are some other minor changes between figure 8 and figure 9. Pennsylvania 
and New Mexico swap quintiles in figure 9 with Pennsylvania donning the darker blue of 
the highest quintile in figure 9 and New Mexico lightening its color to the slightly lighter 
blue of the fourth quintile in figure 9.23 Texas moves into the fourth quintile in figure 9 
while Alaska slides to the third. 24 Maine gains color by moving into the second quintile 
in figure 9 while Mississippi loses what little color it has by sliding to the lowest 
quintile. 25 
The effect of earmarks in bolstering a state's ranking in total obligations is really 
seen when figure 9 is compared to figure 8. Hawaii falls 6 places from 3 in figure 8 to 9 
in figure 9. Alaska has a similar fall from 17 in figure 8 to 24 in figure 9. Mississippi 
falls 5 places from 40 in figure 8 to 45 in figure 9. Hawaii's fall does not change its color 
in the two figures as it remains in the highest quintile in both figures. Alaska's and 
Mississippi's falls, however, causes them to move to the next lower quintile in figure 9 
and thus display a lighter color than they did in figure 8. 
The picture presented by figure 10 in general is much different than the pictures 
presented by figures 8 and 9. There are a few institutions which occupy positions in the 
top quintiles of all 3 figures and thus display darker coloration on all 3 maps. Hawaii and 
23 Pennsylvania is ranked 1 1  in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 
and 10  in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9. New Mexico is ranked 10  in the total 
science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and 12 in the total peer-reviewed rankings 
reported in figure 9. 
24 Texas is ranked 21 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and 20 in 
the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9. Alaska is ranked 1 7  in the total science and 
engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and 24 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in 
figure 9. 
25 Maine is ranked 43 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and 40 
in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9. Mississippi is ranked 40 in the total science and 
engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 and 45 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in 
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Washington both rank in the highest quintiles of all 3 figures and thus display the darkest 
blue coloration on all 3 maps.26 New Mexico ranks in the highest quintile of figures 8 
and 10 and in the fourth quintile in figure 9. 27 Iowa ranks in the fourth quintile of figures 
8, 9, and 10.28 Alabama ranks in the fourth quintiles of figures 8 and 9 and in the highest 
quintile of figure 10.29 Pennsylvania ranks in the fourth quintiles of figures 8 and 10 and 
in the highest quintile of figure 9. 30 These states have institutions which are doing well at 
securing both earmarked and peer-reviewed funding. 
There are a number of states, however, which rank in the lower quintiles of 
figures 8 and 9 but show the darker colors of the higher quintiles on the map presented in 
figure 10. West Virginia, Montana, and North Dakota all show the white of the lowest 
quintile on the maps presented in figures 8 and 9 and the darkest blue of the highest 
quintile on figure l O 's map.3 1  Mississippi ranks in the second quintile of figure 8, the 
26 Hawaii is ranked 3 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 9 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 1 in the total earmark rankings reported 
in figure 10. Washington is ranked 1 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 1 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 7 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10. 
27 New Mexico is ranked 10 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, 
ranked 12 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 5 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10. 
28 Iowa is ranked 12 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 
1 3  in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 1 2  in the total earmark rankings 
reported in figure 10. 
29 Alabama is ranked 1 5  in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, 
ranked 16  in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 3 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10. 
30 Pennsylvania is ranked 1 1  in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 10 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 16 in the total earmark 
rankings reported in figure 10. 
3 1 West Virginia is ranked 41  in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, 
ranked 4 7 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 4 in the total earmark 
rankings reported in figure 10. Montana is ranked 42 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 44 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 10  in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10. North Dakota is ranked 47 in the total science and 
engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 49 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 9 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10. 
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lowest quintile of figure 9, and shows the darkest blue of the highest quintile of figure 
10.32 Nevada shows the white of the lowest quintile on the maps presented in figures 8 
and 9 but ranks in fourth quintile of figure 10' s rankings. 33 Maine gradually gains more 
color as it moves from the lowest quintile in figure 8, to the second quintile in figure 9, 
and the fourth quintile in figure 10. 34 Idaho is white in figures 8 and 9 but ranks in the 
third quintile in figure 10.35 New Hampshire ranks in the second quintile of figures 8 and 
9 and in the highest quintile of figure 10.36 South Carolina, Louisiana, the District of 
Columbia, and Florida all rank in the second quintile of figures 8 and 9 and in the fourth 
quintile of figure 10.37 
On the other end of things, several institutions which show the darker colors on 
the maps of figures 8 and 9 are noticeably lighter on figure l O's map. California and 
Colorado are both colored in the darkest blue of the highest quintile on figures S's and 9's 
32 Mississippi is ranked 40 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, 
ranked 45 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 6 in the total earmark 
rankings reported in figure 10. 
33 Nevada is ranked 48 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 
48 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 14 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10. 
34 Maine is ranked 43 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 
40 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 20 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10. 
35 Idaho is ranked 50 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 50 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 22 in the total earmark rankings 
reported in figure 10. 
36 New Hampshire· is ranked 37 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 
8, ranked 39 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 8 in the total earmark 
rankings reported in figure 10. 
37 South Carolina is ranked 34 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, 
ranked 37 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 1 1  in the total earmark 
rankings reported in figure 10. Louisiana is ranked 35 in the total science and engineering obligations 
rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 36 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 
13 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure I 0. The District of Columbia is ranked 33 in the total 
science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 35 in the total peer-reviewed 
rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 16 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10. Florida is 
ranked 39 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 38 in the 
total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 18  in the total earmark rankings reported in 
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maps but appear in the white of the lowest quintile on figure l O's map.
38 Connecticut, 
North Carolina, and Massachusetts are all the darkest of blue of the highest quintile in 
figures 8 and 9 but appear in the lightest shade of blue of the second quintile in figure 
10.39 New York shows up in the fourth quintile on figures 8 and 9's maps but appears in 
the white of the lowest quintile on figure l O 's map.
40 Maryland and Wisconsin appear in 
the darkest blue of the highest quintile on figure 8 and 9's maps but appear in figure l O's 
third quintile.41  
The picture presented by figure 11 depicting the distribution of science and 
engineering earmarks is very close to the picture presented by figure 10 of the 
distribution of all earmarks. In fact, only 6 states in figure 11 are in different quintiles 
than they appear in figure 10. Maryland and Wisconsin shift two places in rank each and 
appear in the second quintile in figure 11 rather than the third quintile in which they 
appear in figure 10.
42 Rhode Island and Oklahoma both move up two places in rank and 
38 California is ranked 9 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, 
ranked 8 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 42 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10. Colorado is ranked 6 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 5 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 
44 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10 .  3 9  Connecticut i s  ranked 8 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8 ,  ranked 7 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in  figure 9 ,  and ranked 38 in the total earmark 
rankings reported in figure 10. North Carolina is ranked 7 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 6 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 40 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10. Massachusetts is ranked 5 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 4 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 36 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10. 40 New York is ranked 19  in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, 
ranked 17 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 46 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10. 
41 Maryland is ranked 2 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 2 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 29 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10. Wisconsin is ranked 4 in the total science and engineering obligations rankings reported in figure 8, ranked 3 in the total peer-reviewed rankings reported in figure 9, and ranked 30 in the total earmark rankings reported in figure 10. 
42  Maryland shifts from 29 in the rankings reported in figure 10 to 31 in the rankings reported in figure 1 1 . Wisconsin shifts from 30 in the rankings reported in figure 10 to 32 in the rankings reported in figure 1 1 . 
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appear in the third quintile of figure 1 1  rather than the second quintile in which they 
appear in figure 10.43 Montana shifts a place in rank from 10 in figure 10 to 11 in figure 
11 and drops from the highest quintile in figure 10 to the slightly lighter blue of the 
fourth quintile in figure 11. South Carolina benefits from Montana's drop moving up 
from a ranking of 11 in the rankings reported in figure 10 to 10 in the rankings reported 
in figure 11 and taking on the darkest shade of blue of the highest quintile in figure 11 
rather than the slightly lighter shade of blue of the fourth quintile it displays in figure 10. 
There are 14 other states which shift one place in rank, 8 other states which shift two 
places in rank, 2 states which shift three places in rank, and 2 states which shift four 
places in rank without moving to a different quintile. 
The exercise of segregating non-science and engineering earmarks from science 
and engineering earmarks changes little about the picture of the geographic distribution 
of earmarked funding the maps in figures 9 and 10 present. As noted earlier, only one 
map was prepared to display the geographic distribution of peer reviewed funding (the 
map in figure 9) because using all earmarks and just science and engineering earmarks in 
calculating peer reviewed ranking produced no differences in rank. 
In general, it appears that earmarked funding is, for the most part with a few 
exceptions, distributed to a different set of states than peer reviewed funding. As such, 
earmarked funding has a redistributive effect on the distribution of federal research 
funding allowing the institutions in states which do not fare as well in securing peer 
reviewed funding to receive some funds which would not otherwise come their way. 
43 Rhode Island moves up from 32 in the rankings reported in figure 10  to 30 in the rankings reported in 
figure 1 1 . Oklahoma moves up from 3 1  in the rankings reported in figure 1 0  to 29 in the rankings reported 
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However, the amount of earmarked funding distributed is so low in comparison to the 
amount of peer reviewed funding distributed that states which rank high in the receipt of 
earmarked funding do not generally see much of a jump in their total science and 
engineering obligations ranking. Earmarking seems to operate at the margins. It sends 
money to places it would not ordinarily go but has little effect in the general overall 
geographic distribution of federal research funds. 
BASIC RESEARCH QUESTION 3: ARE EARMARKS ADDITIVE OR DO 
THEY COME AT THE EXPENSE OF PEER REVIEWED FUNDING? 
For many within the higher education community, earmarks would not be 
objectionable at all if they were an additive feature to federal research funding - serving 
the same role as a cherry on top of a chocolate sundae. There have been fears, however, 
within the higher education community as earmarks have escalated that, at some point, 
earmarks would eat into money which could otherwise be used for peer reviewed grants. 
It is very difficult to tell when an earmark might be additive and when it might come at 
the expense of peer reviewed funding because the appropriations process is not 
completely transparent. After an appropriation has occurred, whether it be for earmarked 
or peer reviewed funding, one is left with the challenge of trying to "prove the 
counterfactual" that absent a specific earmark more would have been appropriated for 
peer review programs. 
A careful look at table 8 shows that, while total earmarks have progressively gone 
up between 1992 and 2003, total science and engineering obligations have generally risen 
at a similar pace. There has been some fluctuation in the percentage total earmarks have 
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comprised of total science engineering funding between 1992 and 2003, but total 
earmarks have never comprised more than 7 .5 5 percent of total science and engineering 
obligations and have comprised as little as 2.06 percent. In the middle of the study period 
examined by this study, total science and engineering obligations were actually growing 
faster than total earmarks and the percentage total earmarks comprised of total science 
and engineering obligations was dropping. Since a low in 1996 of 2.06 percent, the 
percentage of total science and engineering obligations total earmarks comprise has 
progressively risen each year to the high for the study period of 7.55 percent in 2003. 
Earmarks thus have been growing at a more rapid pace than science and engineering 
obligations towards the end of the study period but still comprise a relatively small 
percentage of total science and engineering obligations. This analysis would seem to 
indicate that, at least on the global level, earmarks are not eating significantly into peer 
reviewed funding and are an additive feature of the federal research funding landscape. 
The case could be different within specific programs. The Fund for the 
Improvement of Postsecondary Education, a program of the Department of Education, 
saw the number of earmarks in its budget appropriation increase from 2 in 1998 to 419 in 
2005 and saw its budget increase in the same period from $25,200,000 to $163,600,000. 
Prior to fiscal year 1998, FIPSE had been a very competitive peer reviewed grant 
program which awarded grants for excellent innovation in higher education. FIPSE 
grants were considered to be quite prestigious and were highly sought. (Field 2005a) 
In fiscal year 1999, FIPSE's budget was doubled from $25.2 million to $50 
million but $27.6 million of the increase was for earmarks. FIPSE ended up canceling its 
grant competition in fiscal year 1999, despite the fact over 1 700 applications for grants 
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had been reviewed, because the funds thought available for the competition were found to 
have been earmarked in report language accompanying FIPSE' s 1999 appropriation. 
(Cordes 1998c, Healy 1999) 
The cancellation of the grants competition prompted a standoff between staff at 
the Department of Education and members of Congress. Secretary of Education Richard 
Riley and Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania met in late 1999 to discuss the FIPSE 
funding situation. They agreed that, for the next year's grants competition, Congress 
would set the categories for grants, but FIPSE staff would determine the process to select 
grant recipients. (Brainard 1999a) 
The FIPSE staff thought some of the categories Congress chose in implementing 
this compromise were not on the cutting edge of innovation and were designed to help 
institutions in a member's district or state win funds in the competition. Examples of 
categories not thought to be on the cutting edge included the conversion of library 
catalogues to electronic formats and the preparation of students for jobs in the tourism 
industry. Before Congress began to assert control over where FIPSE money went, 
institutions winning competitive FIPSE grants continued supporting 78 percent of the 
projects funded by FIPSE grants once the grant ended, 94 percent of FIPSE funded 
projects had been copied in whole or in part, and grant recipients often won other private 
grants and awards for their FIPSE funded projects. (Brainard 1999a) 
In implementing the grants competition part of the Specter/Riley compromise, 
FIPSE staff awarded grants to only 1 of the 11 institutions Congress had specified as 
favored institutions in appropriation's language and ignored 3 of the categories Congress 
had created for the grants competition. This led to an end of the compromise. Congress 
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stopped naming categories, and FIPSE reverted to a competition in which proposals 
could be submitted on any subject. Specter and other members of Congress maintained 
that they had encroached onto FIPSE staff turf and become directive about where FIPSE 
money should go because worthy institutions were being passed over in the grants 
competition and were contacting their members of Congress for help. There were only 
657 applications in the 1999 competition for 2000 funding as compared to 1,744 the 
previous year. (Brainard 1999c) 
In the fiscal year 2000 funding cycle, the FIPSE appropriation went up to $77 
million. $46.5 million of the appropriation was designated for earmarks and $30.6 
million was designated for the grants competition. Concern was expressed by FIPSE 
staff and concerned members of the higher education community that the earmarks in the 
FIPSE appropriation were diminishing the prestige of winning a FIPSE grant. Many of 
the earmarks in the FIPSE appropriation were for public policy institutes and centers 
named after former Senators and Representatives. (Brainard 1999f) 
In the fiscal year 2001 funding cycle, $115.5 million was earmarked for projects 
at 13 7 institutions and the competitive grants program was funded at $31.2 million. 
These totals were increases over the $46.5 million earmarked for projects at 51 
institutions and the $30.6 million for the competitive grants program allocated in the 
fiscal year 2000 appropriation. (Brainard 2001 a) 
By fiscal year 2005, the Department of Education had cancelled the FIPSE grants 
competition because earmarking was taking up most of the FIPSE appropriation. 
FIPSE's appropriation in 2005 was $163.6 million. 419 earmarks totaling $146.2 million 
were in the fiscal year 2005 appropriation bill. Grants continued from previous fiscal 
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years took up the remaining 2005 money which was appropriated. Earmarks in the 
FIPSE appropriation grew from 2 in 1998 to 419 in 2005 with 16 being made in 1999, 51 
in 2000, 136 in 2001, 272 in 2002, 306 in 2003, and 328 in 2004. Earmarks comprised 
89 percent of FIPSE's overall budget in 2005. (Field 2005a) Mimi Tangum of the 
American Association of State Colleges and Universities commented in 2005 that the 
elimination of the entire FIPSE competitive grants program was troubling but what she 
found really troubling about the FIPSE situation was that some members of Congress 
considered competitive peer review a less effective way to allocate federal money than 
earmarking (Tangum 2005). 
Looking at earmarking on the global level seems to indicate that earmarks operate 
at the margins of federal research funding and have not detracted significantly from the 
vast majority of funding which is awarded in peer reviewed competitions. The FIPSE 
case, however, would seem to suggest that, on the individual program level at least in this 
case, earmarking may very well have come at the expense of competitive peer review. 
The case also suggests that once earmarking starts in a program area it may progress to 
the point that it consumes a larger and larger degree of a program's resources. Further 
case studies are required to demonstrate whether the trends noticed in the FIPSE case 
apply in other individual program situations. 
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BASIC RESEARCH QUESTION 4 :  IS THERE MUCH DIFFERENCE IN THE 
INSTITUITONS WHICH GARNER THE MOST EARMARKED FUNDING AND 
THOSE WHICH RECEIVE THE MOST PEER REVIEWED FUNDING? 
Proponents of earmarking have extolled earmarking as a means by which 
emerging institutions can access some federal funding to use to catch up to more 
established institutions. Earmarking has also been hailed for sending federal research 
money to institutions and places where little money would otherwise go and for funding 
projects important to members of Congress and their constituents back home but not 
necessarily important to the national scientific community which makes decisions about 
peer review funding. (Brainard 2001c, Cook 1998, Feller 2004, Rose 1986, Savage 
1999) Each of these arguments assumes that earmarking has a redistributive effect and 
that the set of institutions which gamer the most earmarks is quite different from the set 
of institutions which gamer the most peer reviewed funds. 
However, two factors would seem to indicate that, even if leaders in earmarking 
and leaders in peer reviewed funding start off as two fairly discrete groups of institutions, 
these groups will not be stable and over time may merge with each other and become 
more closely correlated. First, if earmarks are effective in boosting an emerging 
institution's capabilities to compete for peer reviewed funding, eventually that institution 
is going to start to gamer more peer reviewed funds and not require earmarks to catch up. 
Secondly, there are indications in the literature, especially in the Chronicle of Higher 
Education's reporting on earmarking, that, as earmarking has become more established, 
the policy debate within the higher education community about the efficacy of 
earmarking has died down. The literature seems to indicate that virtually no institutions 
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or higher education associations are actively campaigning against earmarking at present 
and that most institutions are now actively pursuing and accepting earmarks. 
These two factors would seem to indicate that during the early years of this study, 
when the policy debate about earmarks was most heated and when earmarking was a 
fairly new practice, the group of institutions which garnered the most earmarks would be 
very different from the group of institutions which garnered the most peer reviewed 
funding. This would have to be the case if earmarks served the redistributive function of 
sending federal research money to institutions and places where it would not go if peer 
review were solely relied upon. However, in the later years of the study, as the 
institutions which benefited early on from earmarks increased their capabilities to receive 
peer reviewed funding and the institutions which garnered the most peer reviewed 
funding gave up their inhibitions about pursuing earmarks, the two groups of institutions 
would grow more similar and earmarking's redistributive effect would be muted. 
To assess whether this has been the pattern, each of the 327 institutions were 
ranked by the total amount of earmarks and the total amount of peer reviewed funding 
they received during each year of the study period. To calculate the amount of peer 
reviewed funding an institution received during a given year, the amount of earmarked 
funding the institution received that year was subtracted from that institution's total 
science and engineering obligations figure for that year. These calculations were 
performed using both all earmarks and only science and engineering earmarks. 
A bivariate correlation of the two rankings was then done to calculate the effect of 
earmark ranking on peer reviewed ranking for each year of the study. Since earmark 
ranking and peer reviewed ranking were used in calculating these correlations, 
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institutions which received no earmarks during the study period tied for last place. 
Correlations using both all institutions and also dropping the institutions tied for last from 
the model were calculated. 
Figure 12 presents a line graph of the effect of earmark ranking on peer review 
ranking using all earmarks for each year of the study. Figure 13 presents a line graph of 
the effect of earmark ranking on peer review ranking using all earmarks but dropping the 
institutions not receiving any earmarks from the model. Figure 14 presents a line graph 
of the effect of earmark ranking on peer review ranking using only science and 
engineering earmarks for each year of the study. Figure 15  presents a line graph of the 
effect of earmark ranking on peer review ranking using only science and engineering 
earmarks but dropping the institutions not receiving any earmarks from the model. 
Table 9 uses all earmarks and presents the slope or effect of earmark ranking on 
peer reviewed ranking and the R-square value, which is an assessment of how strong the 
correlation is, for each study year for both the set of all institutions and the set of 
institutions that excludes those institutions which received no earmarks. Table 10 uses 
only science and engineering earmarks and presents the slope or effect of earmark 
ranking on peer reviewed ranking and the R-square value for each study year for both the 
set of all institutions and the set of institutions that excludes those institutions which 
received no earmarks. 
The correlations reported in tables 9 and 10 and depicted in figures 12, 1 3, 14, and 
15 are one part of the picture of whether the set of institutions which does well at 
earmarking does well at garnering peer reviewed funds also. The other two parts of the 
picture which need to be taken into account are depicted in figures 2 and 7. Figure 2 
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shows the number of institutions which have received earmarks in each year from 1990 to 
2003. Figure 7 is a histogram which depicts the change in peer reviewed funding rank 
between 1992 and 2003. 
Figure 2 shows how many institutions are getting into the earmarking game. 
Tables 9 and 10 and figures 12, 13, 14, and 15 show how earmark ranking and peer 
reviewed ranking relate in each year of the study. If the group of institutions which does 
the best at earmark ranking is becoming more similar with the group of institutions that is 
doing the best in receiving peer reviewed funds in latter years of the study period, it 
would follow that, as figure 2 shows an increase in the number of institutions getting into 
the earmark game, the relationship between earmark ranking and peer reviewed ranking 
will at least remain stable if not increase in effect. The histogram in figure 7 would show 
whether peer reviewed funding rankings are fairly stable or are moving around and 
affecting the relationship. A relationship between earmark ranking and peer review 
ranking that is at least stable would show that, as those institutions which do well at 
garnering peer reviewed funding enter into the earmark game, the rewards they reap from 
earmarking will be approximately commensurate with their peer reviewed ranking status. 
Looking at figure 2, it is evident that the number of institutions receiving 
earmarks on an annual basis has skyrocketed in the period from 1990 through 2003. The 
number of institutions receiving earmarks has grown from 117 in 1990 to 716 in 2003. 
The growth has been rather steady throughout the period with a slight dip in the middle of 
the period and a crescendo towards the end of the period. It is clear there are more 
institutions playing the earmark game at the end of this period than there were at the 
beginning. 
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The graphs in figures 12 and 13 and the correlations reported in table 9 show that 
the slope or effect of total earmark ranking on peer reviewed funding ranking is 
remarkably constant throughout the period from 1992 through 2003. The graph in figure 
12 visually depicts this with an almost flat horizontal line drawn across the page. The 
slope or effect values reported for each year in table 9 when all institutions are included 
in the calculations range from a high of 0.7 18 in 1993 to a low of 0.676 in 1998. There is 
a less than .05 difference between the high and low figures reported for the set of 
correlations including all institutions. The R-square values when all institutions are 
included are also rather high, all over .4 and approaching .5. This indicates that the 
correlation in table 9 between total earmark ranking and peer-reviewed ranking is strong 
and that a great deal of the effect is explained by total earmark rank. 
There is more variation in slope or effect when the institutions receiving no 
earmarks and tied with the last rank are excluded from the correlation calculations. The 
graph in figure 13 shows an effect that jumps around some but still stays between 0.4 and 
0.65. The slope or effect values reported for each year in table 9 when institutions not 
receiving earmarks are excluded in the calculations range from a high of 0.621 in 2003 to 
a low of 0.401 in 1993. The difference between the high and low figures reported in 
table 9 for the set of correlations excluding institutions receiving no earmarks is .22, 
larger than the difference when all institutions are included but still a relatively small 
difference. 
The R-square values are lower for the set of correlations excluding non-recipient 
institutions than they are for the set of correlations including all institutions. They too 
jump around like the slope or effect values. For some years, they indicate rather weak 
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correlations and for others moderately strong correlations. At their highest point of 
0.3528 they approach significance. All of the R-square values for the set of correlations 
run excluding non-recipient institutions are lower than the lowest R-square value in the 
set of correlations run with all institutions. This indicates that the correlations for the 
non-recipient group are weaker than the correlations reported for the group which 
includes all institutions and that earmark ranking explains less of the effect when non­
recipient institutions are eliminated from the calculations. 
Even with the jumping around of slope or effect values and R-square values in the 
correlations reported excluding non-recipient institutions, both sets of correlations, the set 
which includes all institutions and the set excluding non-recipients of earmarks, present a 
rather stable if not static picture of the relationship between earmark ranking and peer 
reviewed ranking. The histogram in figure 7 shows that rank change in peer reviewed 
funding rank groups around 0. This gives strong indication that the peer reviewed 
funding ranking part of the correlations run in table 9 is very stable and not moving 
around very much. The combination of knowing that one variable in the table 9 
correlations is stable and that the relationship between both variables in the correlation is 
itself very stable over time means that as earmarking activity increases with each passing 
year, the rewards institutions reap from earmarking will be approximately commensurate 
with their peer reviewed ranking status. If the slope or effect values had grown over time 
rather than remaining stable, the combination of more institutions receiving earmarks, 
stability in peer reviewed ranking status, and an increasing effect would mean that as 
earmarking activity increased with each passing year, the rewards institutions reaped 
from earmarking would be amplified above their peer reviewed ranking status. The 
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stability of the slope or effect values in these correlations over time and the stability of 
peer reviewed funding rankings shows that a rising tide of earmark activity over the last 
part of the 1990's and first part of the 2000's is most likely preferentially lifting the boats 
of those who do the best at receiving peer reviewed funding. 
Table 10 reports the same correlations for the same groups as table 9 does using 
only science and engineering earmarks. The numbers reported in table 10 are very 
similar to the numbers reported in table 9, again showing that segregating science and 
engineering earmarks from non-science and engineering earmarks changes earmark 
ranking or peer-reviewed ranking very little. The similarity between the numbers is 
underscored by the graphs presented in figures 14 and 15. These graphs visually depict 
almost identically the same patterns displayed in figures 12 and 13 which graphed the 
correlations reported in table 9. The conclusions reached in the analysis of table 9 thus 
also apply to table 10. 
This section has produced an important finding. The combination of rising 
earmark activity, documented by the large increase in the number of institutions receiving 
earmarks on an annual basis in recent years depicted in figure 2, a very stable if not static 
relationship between earmark ranking and peer reviewed funding ranking from 1992 to 
2003, as shown by the bivariate correlations run in tables 9 and 10, and a great deal of 
stability in peer reviewed funding ranking, as depicted in the histogram of figure 7, mean 
that the difference between the institutions doing the best at receiving earmarks and the 
institutions doing the best at receiving peer reviewed funding is lessening. This finding 
casts considerable doubt over whether academic earmarking in the future will serve a 
redistributive function and ameliorate the perceived inequities of the peer reviewed 
160 
funding system. As earmarking activity increases, the same usual suspects, the 
institutions which gamer the most peer reviewed funding, are likely to benefit the most 
from pursuing earmarks. 
This finding runs somewhat contrary to the finding made earlier in this chapter 
. that during the study period earmarking had served somewhat of a redistributive function 
by sending funding to some states which would not otherwise receive much federal 
research funding. It will be interesting see moving forward whether this form of 
geographic redistribution continues to occur as the usual suspects play their advantaged 
hand in the earmarking game. 
This finding is also interesting when coupled with one of the findings of de 
Figueiredo and Silverman in their 2002 study. De Figueiredo and Silverman, using fiscal 
year 1997 to fiscal year 1999 data, found that the institutions which could benefit the 
most from lobbying for earmarks actually underlobby. De Figueiredo and Silverman 
used lobbying expense as their measure of lobbying activity and developed a model 
which predicted the returns to lobbying. ( de Figueiredo and Silverman 2002) As the 
secret gets out that there are riches to be had from playing the earmarking game, one 
wonders if those advantaged in the game will continue to underplay their hand. Some 
would say the secret is already out. The data in figure 2 would seem to confirm this. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has analyzed the study's basic research questions by the methods 
described in chapter 3 and presented findings. The first basic research question, Does 
receiving earmarks improve the ability of an institution to receive other types of federal 
161 
research funding?, was analyzed by creating two tables which display the change in total 
obligations rank between 1992 and 2003 and the change in the percentage of the total 
obligations funding of all institutions in the study between 1992 and 2003. Bivariate 
correlations of total earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992 (table 6), of total 
earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 6), of science and engineering 
earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992 (table 7), of science and engineering 
earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 7), of total earmark ranking for 
the entire period with change in obligation rank between 1992 and 2003 (table 6), and of 
science and engineering earmark ranking for the entire period with change in obligation 
rank between 1992 and 2003 (table 7) were also run. 
Both an analysis of tables 4 and 5 and of the correlations reported in tables 6 and 
7 indicate that receiving earmarks does not have a general effect of improving an 
institution's ability to receive other types of funding. An analysis of the tables shows that 
most of the institutions which gamer the most earmarks do not improve their total science 
and engineering obligations ranking. They either remain very close to their ranking at the 
beginning of the period or move backwards in the rankings. The institutions which 
gamer the most earmarks for the most part do not gain a larger percentage of total science 
and engineering obligations either. They generally lose percentage points when the end 
of the period is compared to the beginning or maintain a percentage very close to their 
percentage at the beginning of the period. 
The comparison of the correlations run between ranking by total earmarks 
received for the period and science and engineering obligations rank at the beginning of 
the period and between ranking by total earmarks received for the period and science and 
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engineering obligations rank at the end of the period lends support to the trends observed 
in the analysis of the tables. Analysis of the correlation between ranking by total 
earmarks received for the period and change in science and engineering obligations rank 
shows that there is a general positive effect of earmarking on change in rank, but it is 
very small and not statistically significant. 
The second basic research question, How does the awarding of earmarks affect 
the geographical distribution of federal research funding?, was analyzed by creating 
color coded maps displaying how all of the states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto 
Rico rank by total obligations received during the study period per institution in the study 
group, total peer reviewed funding received during the study period per institution in the 
study group, total earmarks received during the study period per institution in the study 
group, and total science and engineering earmarks received during the study period per 
institution in the study group. Analyzing these maps showed that in general, it appears 
that earmarked funding is, for the most part with a few exceptions, distributed to a 
different set of states than peer reviewed funding. As such, earmarked funding has a 
redistributive effect on the distribution of federal research funding allowing the 
institutions in states which do not fare as well in securing peer reviewed funding to 
receive some funds which would not otherwise come their way. However, the amount of 
earmarked funding distributed is so low in comparison to the amount of peer reviewed 
funding distributed that states which rank high in the receipt of earmarked funding do not 
generally see much of a jump in their total science and engineering obligations ranking. 
Earmarking seems to operate at the margins. It sends money to places it would not 
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ordinarily go but has little effect in the general overall geographic distribution of federal 
research funds. 
The third basic research question, Are earmarks additive or do they come at the 
expense of peer reviewed funding?, was assessed by looking at a table presenting the 
percentage total earmarks comprise of total science and engineering obligations for each 
year from 1990 through 2003 and a short case study of earmarking activity in the Fund 
for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education budget between 1998 and 2005. 
Looking at earmarking on the global level seems to indicate that earmarks operate at the 
margins of federal research funding and have not detracted significantly from the vast 
majority of funding which is awarded in peer reviewed competitions. The FIPSE case, 
however, would seem to suggest that, on the individual program level at least in this case, 
earmarking may very well have come at the expense of competitive peer review. The 
case also suggests that once earmarking starts in a program area it may progress to the 
point that it consumes a larger and larger degree of a program's resources. Studying the 
FIPSE case pointed out that further case studies are required to demonstrate whether the 
trends noticed in the FIPSE case apply in other individual program situations. 
The fourth basic research question, Is there much difference in the institutions 
which garner the most earmarked funding and those which receive the most peer 
reviewed funding?, was analyzed by assessing the picture presented by a combination of 
bivariate correlations of earmark ranking and peer reviewed ranking for each year of the 
study (table 9) and of science and engineering earmark ranking and peer reviewed 
ranking for each year of the study (table 10) with observations from figure 2 about the 
number of institutions pursuing earmarks each year and from figure 7 about the stability 
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of peer reviewed funding ranking over time. This section produced the important finding 
that the combination of rising earmark activity, documented by the large increase in the 
number of institutions receiving earmarks on an annual basis in recent years depicted in 
figure 2, a very stable if not static relationship between earmark ranking and peer 
reviewed funding ranking from 1992 to 2003, as shown by the bivariate correlations run 
in tables 9 and 10, and a great deal of stability in peer reviewed funding ranking, as 
depicted in the histogram of figure 7, mean that the difference between the institutions 
doing the best at receiving earmarks and the institutions doing the best at receiving peer 
reviewed funding is lessening. This finding casts considerable doubt over whether 
academic earmarking in the future will serve a redistributive function and ameliorate the 
perceived inequities of the peer reviewed funding system. As earmarking activity 
increases, the same usual suspects, the institutions which gamer the most peer reviewed 
funding, are likely to benefit the most from pursuing earmarks. 
The next chapter will address the conclusions of this study and offer some 
recommendations for further study. 
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CHAPTER S 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
INTRODUCTION 
This concluding chapter provides a study summary before offering some 
concluding thoughts and recommendations for further study. The study's major findings 
are summarized in the final section following the study summary and some implications 
of these findings are discussed. 
STUDY SUMMARY 
Chapter 1 of this study introduced the study's topic and research questions. The 
topic of this study is the emergence of academic earmarking and its effect on the 
distribution of federal research funds. The study examines four principal questions about 
the distribution of federal research funds. First among these questions is does receiving 
earmarks improve the ability of an institution to receive other types of federal research 
funds. Second, how does the awarding of earmarks affect the geographical distribution 
of federal research funding? Third, are academic earmarks additive or do they come at 
the expense of peer reviewed funding? Finally, the study looks at the important question 
of whether there is much difference, particularly now that both academic earmarking and 
peer review funding methods seem firmly established, in the institutions that secure the 
most funding from academic earmarking and the institutions that secure the most funding 
in peer reviewed competitions. 
Chapter 1 also defined academic earmarking and discussed the appropriations 
process in which earmarks are made. Academic earmarks are appropriations Congress 
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makes directly to academic institutions in the appropriations bills for the various units of 
the federal government or specifies in non-binding report language accompanying these 
appropriations bills. They are creatures of the appropriations process and are generally 
added to appropriations bills when those bills are "marked up" by appropriations 
subcommittee chairmen in the markup phase of the appropriations process. 
Finally, chapter 1 discussed the importance of studying academic earmarking and 
the scholarly literature produced thus far which addresses academic earmarking. It is 
important to study academic earmarking's effect on the distribution of federal research 
funding because the federal government's investment in academic research has paid large 
dividends for American society and has the potential to pay even larger dividends in the 
future. The method by which federal research funds are allocated and how they are 
distributed could dramatically affect potential breakthroughs in medicine and science 
which could transform the future. The chapter discussed eight studies which have 
addressed issues related to academic earmarking. This study builds upon these earlier 
studies and attempts to elucidate the policy effects of academic earmarking by addressing 
the study research questions. 
Chapter 2 chronicled the rise of academic earmarking. It discussed the early years 
of academic earmarking from 1983 to about 1990. In the early years of academic 
earmarking, prominent institutions pioneered the practice but concerns about the efficacy 
of academic earmarking and its effect on peer reviewed funding were heard in the 
academic community. There were also concerns about whether Congress was creating 
contingent liability for itself by starting to fund projects that would continue to need 
funding in future years and about whether earmarks were being used for the purposes for 
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which they were being awarded. At the end of this early era, the results from academic 
earmarking were mixed with some accounts of waste and scandal balanced by some 
notable success stories. 
The trends in academic earmarking from 1990 to 2003 were also discussed. The 
period from 1990 to 2003 saw academic earmarking really come into its own and grow to 
$2.012 billion by the end of the period. There was a dip in the middle of the period 
which for the most part corresponded with a change in the political party which 
controlled a majority in both Houses of Congress. However, there were two fiscal years, 
prior to this change of power and the low point of the dip in fiscal year 1 996, in which 
academic earmarking was going down somewhat seemingly in response to fiscal 
pressures and the negative light being shined on it by Congressional hearings. After the 
change of power in Congress, academic earmarking hit its low point in the dip in fiscal 
year 1 996 and then rebounded steadily in fiscal years 1 997 and 1998 before reaching new 
heights in fiscal year 1 999 and continuing to rise until the end of this period in 2003. 
During this period of time when earmarks grew so significantly, some major 
programs which utilize peer reviewed competitions to award their funding also saw 
significant increases in their budgets. The National Institutes of Health, which is the 
largest federal source of peer-reviewed competitive grants to individual investigators for 
research, saw its budget double between 1 998 and 2003. The National Science 
Foundation, second only to the NIH in federal grant making, also saw increases in its 
budget during this period. 
The chapter also briefly discussed more recent trends in academic earmarking 
since 2003. Academic earmarking in recent years has occurred within a tighter funding 
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environment. This tighter funding environment has also affected the budgets of the 
National Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation which enjoyed increases in 
the more flush funding times of the late 1990' s and early part of the 2000' s. Scandals 
involving members of Congress and lobbyists have caused academic earmarks and all 
earmarks to be viewed with more scrutiny. As this study was being completed, both 
Houses of Congress were considering various regulations which would affect academic 
earmarks such as limits on the number of earmarks a member of Congress can request 
and disclosure of the name of the member sponsoring an earmark and some justification 
for why an earmark should be granted. 
The arguments proponents and opponents of academic earmarking have made 
against and in support of academic earmarking were also examined in the chapter. There 
are many motivations for members of the House and Senate to earmark but greatest 
among these motivations is the motivation to further their reelection prospects by 
noticeably bringing federal resources to their districts and states. Members of the House 
and Senate also earmark to enact what they feel is good policy and sometimes use 
earmarks to entice other members into voting for policies for which they might not 
otherwise vote. 
Those within academia have many motivations to seek earmarks. Their greatest 
motivations, however, are economic as there are more scientists than ever before and less 
money available per scientist. The lack of facilities money available has also motivated 
academic leaders to seek earmarks for their institution's facilities needs. 
Those for academic earmarks have insisted that they remedy geographical and 
institutional inequities of the peer review process and send money where it would 
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otherwise not go. They believe that Congress has powers of review at least as good as 
committees of academic experts and is more accountable to citizens than the experts who 
serve on peer review committees, that the geographic dispersal of federal research 
funding is desirable, and that earmarks help meet national needs in targeted ways. 
Those against the practice of academic earmarking believe in the superiority of 
the scientific method and the peer review process. They believe that bypassing peer 
review leads to erosion in the quality of research, that earmarking takes away funds 
which could otherwise be awarded in peer reviewed competitions, and that peer reviewed 
competitions for grants promote the best science while earmarking lacks effective quality 
control. While those against earmarking have often espoused competitive set aside 
programs as the best means to combat any geographical or institutional inequities the 
peer reviewed system may reinforce, set aside programs have never been funded at a high 
enough level to affect distributional inequities. 
Chapter 2 detailed efforts by the higher education associations to fight the practice 
of academic earmarking. The AAU led the charge against academic earmarking early on 
with NASULGC and ACE in prominent supporting roles. In the mid-1980's, the AAU 
passed a resolution calling for AAU member institutions to observe a moratorium on 
seeking earmark funding. The moratorium leaked from the beginning but was dealt a 
mortal blow when the University of Pennsylvania, which had been for the moratorium in 
AAU deliberations, sought an earmark for facilities in 1988. From the beginning the 
AAU's and the other associations' efforts at opposing the practice of earmarking were 
hampered by the associations' willingness to debate the difference between good and bad 
earmarks; by the associations' support of historical preferential funding for Historically 
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Black Colleges and Universities, Galludet University for the Deaf, and Native American 
schools; and by the associations' belief that non-competitive sole source contracts 
awarded to university-managed Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 
and University Affiliated Research Centers should not be challenged. In the 1990's, the 
AAU, NASULGC, and the other associations generally pursued a strategy of 
accommodation with regard to the practice of earmarking. In 2001, the AAU resumed its 
opposition to academic earmarking when the amount and number of earmarks spiked 
significantly. By 2001 most AAU member institutions were receiving earmarks. 
NASULGC and the other associations did not join the AAU when it resumed hostilities 
in 2001. 
Efforts by individual members of Congress and the President to fight the practice 
of academic earmarking were also detailed. While there have been many individual 
members of the House and Senate who have crusaded with some effect against the 
practice of academic earmarking, their efforts have failed to stymie what has generally 
been an unabated trend of annual increases in the amount and number of earmarks 
awarded and in the number of institutions receiving earmarks. �alifomia Representative 
George Brown's efforts stand out as perhaps the only member's efforts which seemed to 
make a difference in the overall trend. The hearings on earmarking he held of the House 
Science, Space, and Technology Committee in the mid-1990's seemed to have had an 
effect. When coupled with the fiscal constraints of a tight funding environment, the 
negative light cast on earmarking by these hearings seemed to deter other member's 
enthusiasm for earmarking and may have played a role in a decrease in the amount of 
earmarks funded in fiscal years 1994 and 1995. This decrease was followed by a 
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substantial decrease in the amount of earmarks in fiscal year 1996 after the Republicans 
had taken control of both Houses of Congress. These lows, however, were short lived as 
earmarking began its ascent anew in fiscal year 1997. 
Other than Brown, other crusaders have made a difference in some instances and 
won certain battles but have had little effect on the overall trend. Notable among these 
crusaders are Representative William Natcher of Kentucky, who as chair of the House 
appropriations sub-committee which handled the Labor-Health and Human Services­
Education appropriation in the early-1990's was successful in keeping earmarks out of 
his bill, and Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, who was successful in a few key battles 
regarding earmarks to the Department of Defense appropriation. In recent years, 
members of Congress in both Houses opposing the practice of earmarking have been on 
the dissident fringe of their parties and clearly in the minority. 
Presidential efforts at cutting earmarks through budget rescissions have usually 
run into opposition in Congress. A few such efforts have led Congress to rescind a few 
earmarks but have also prompted reprisals towards other funding objectives from angered 
Congressional patrons. Clinton's use of the line item veto was successful in excising a 
few earmarks from appropriations bills while the President had use of this power, but the 
line item veto was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court on June 
25, 1998. In general, Presidential efforts to fight the practice of earmarking have had 
little effect and less effect than efforts against earmarking undertaken by members of 
Congress. This is largely because earmarking is a creature of the appropriations process 
and, as such, is more fully under the control of Congress than it is of the President. 
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Finally, chapter 2 discussed the role of paid lobbyists and the reporting of 
lobbying expenses. Paid lobbyists, particularly Gerald Cassidy and Kenneth Schlossberg, 
have played an important role in the birth and development of academic earmarking. 
Efforts to require that colleges and universities report their lobbying expenses, however, 
have met with a mixed result as different interpretations of the laws passed and what they 
actually require have led to less than uniform compliance across the entire universe of 
higher education institutions and associations. 
Chapter 3 discussed the data employed in this study and the methods used in 
answering the study's four basic research questions. Data for this study has been drawn 
from three basic sources. Science and engineering obligations data has been drawn from 
tables accessible through the National Science Foundation's website (www.nsf.gov). 
Earmark data has been drawn from a database maintained by the Chronicle of Higher 
Education and accessible through their website (http://chronicle.com/stats/pork/). A 
classification system of institutions of higher learning developed and maintained by the 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching was used to limit the number of 
institutions considered by the study. 
To address Basic Research Question 1 :  Does receiving earmarks improve the 
ability of an institution to receive other types of federal research funding?, tables (tables 
4 and 5) which display the change in total obligations rank between 1992 and 2003 and 
the change in the percentage of the total obligations funding of all institutions in the study 
between 1992 and 2003 were described in chapter 3 and constructed for the study. 
Comparing the institutions ranked the highest in earmarks (both the total earmarks dealt 
with in table 4 and science and engineering earmarks dealt with in table 5) for the period 
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is one way of discerning whether receiving earmarks improves the ability to win other 
types of funding. 
Bivariate correlations of total earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992 
(table 6), of total earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 6), of science 
and engineering earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992 (table 7), and of science 
and engineering earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 7) were also 
described in the chapter and were calculated. Comparing the correlation between 
earmark rank for the entire period and obligation rank at the beginning of the study 
period with the correlation between earmark rank for the entire period and obligation 
rank at the end of the study period provides some indication of whether receiving 
earmarks has built the capacity of institutions to gamer other types of funding. 
A bivariate correlation of total earmark ranking for the entire period with change 
in obligation rank between 1992 and 2003 (table 6) and of science and engineering 
earmark ranking for the entire period with change in obligation rank between 1992 and 
2003 (table 7) was also discussed and calculated. This correlation is helpful in showing 
whether receiving earmarks helps an institution gamer other types of funding. 
All correlations were calculated for all institutions as ranked by total earmarks 
(table 6) and by science and engineering earmarks (table 7) for the study period, for the 
top 20 institutions in total earmarks (table 6) and science and engineering earmarks (table 
7) for the study period, for the top 50 institutions in total earmarks (table 6) and science 
and engineering earmarks (table 7) for the study period, for the top 100 institutions in 
total earmarks (table 6) and science and engineering earmarks (table 7) for the study 
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period, and for institutions 1 0 1  through the last institution in total earmarks (table 6) and 
science and engineering earmarks (table 7) for the study period. 
To address Basic Research Question 2: How does the awarding of earmarks 
affect the geographical distribution of federal research funding?, color coded maps were 
discussed in Chapter 3 and were prepared displaying different shades of blue for the 
quintiles the 50 states Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia fall within when they are 
ranked by several different measures. The measures used for the quintile rankings are 
total obligations received during the study period per institution in the study group, total 
peer reviewed funding received during the study period per institution in the study group, 
total earmarks received during the study period per institution in the study group, and 
total science and engineering earmarks received during the study period per institution in 
the study group. 
To address Basic Research Question 3: Are earmarks additive or do they come at 
the expense of peer reviewed funding?, a table presenting the percentage total earmarks 
comprise of total science and engineering obligations for each year from 1990 through 
2003 was discussed in chapter 3 and prepared. A short case study of earmarking activity 
in the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education budget between 1 998 and 
2005 was also discussed in chapter 3 and presented in chapter 4. 
To address Basic research question 4: Is there much difference in the institutions 
which garner the most earmarked funding and those which receive the most peer 
reviewed funding?, chapter 3 discussed how bivariate correlations of earmark ranking and 
peer reviewed ranking for each year of the study ( table 9) and of science and engineering 
earmark ranking and peer reviewed ranking for each year of the study (table 10) could be 
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combined with observations from figure 2 about the number of institutions pursuing 
earmarks each year and from figure 7 about the stability of peer reviewed funding 
ranking over time to derive a picture of whether there is much difference in the 
institutions which gamer the most earmarked funding and those which receive the most 
peer reviewed funding. 
Chapter 4 analyzed the study's basic research questions by the methods described 
in chapter 3 and presented findings. The first basic research question, Does receiving 
earmarks improve the ability of an institution to receive other types of federal research 
funding?, was analyzed by creating two tables which display the change in total 
obligations rank between 1992 and 2003 and the change in the percentage of the total 
obligations funding of all institutions in the study between 1992 and 2003. Bivariate 
correlations of total earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992 (table 6), of total 
earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 6), of science and engineering 
earmark rank with total obligations rank in 1992 ( table 7), of science and engineering 
earmark rank with total obligations rank in 2003 (table 7), of total earmark ranking for 
the entire period with change in obligation rank between 1992 and 2003 (table 6), and of 
science and engineering earmark ranking for the entire period with change in obligation 
rank between 1992 and 2003 (table 7) were also run. 
Both an analysis of tables 4 and 5 and of the correlations reported in tables 6 and 
7 indicated that receiving earmarks does not have a general effect of improving an 
institution's ability to receive other types of funding. An analysis of the tables shows that 
most of the institutions which gamer the most earmarks do not improve their total science 
and engineering obligations ranking. They either remain very close to their ranking at the 
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beginning of the period or move backwards in the rankings. The institutions which 
gamer the most earmarks for the most part do not gain a larger percentage of total science 
and engineering obligations either. They generally lose percentage points when the end 
of the period is compared to the beginning or maintain a percentage very close to their 
percentage at the beginning of the period. 
The comparison of the correlations run between ranking by total earmarks 
received for the period and science and engineering obligations rank at the beginning of 
the period and between ranking by total earmarks received for the period and science and 
engineering obligations rank at the end of the period lent support to the trends observed 
in the analysis of the tables. Analysis of the correlation between ranking by total 
earmarks received for the period and change in science and engineering obligations rank 
showed that there is a general positive effect of earmarking on change in rank, but it is 
very small and not statistically significant. 
The second basic research question, How does the awarding of earmarks affect 
the geographical distribution of federal research funding?, was analyzed by creating 
color coded maps displaying how all of the states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto 
Rico rank by total obligations received during the study period per institution in the study 
group, total peer reviewed funding received during the study period per institution in the 
study group, total earmarks received during the study period per institution in the study 
group, and total science and engineering earmarks received during the study period per 
institution in the study group. Analyzing these maps showed that in general, it appears 
that earmarked funding is, for the most part with a few exceptions, distributed to a 
different set of states than peer reviewed funding. As such, earmarked funding has a 
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redistributive effect on the distribution of federal research funding allowing the 
institutions in states which do not fare as well in securing peer reviewed funding to 
receive some funds which would not otherwise come their way. However, the amount of 
earmarked funding distributed is so low in comparison to the amount of peer reviewed 
funding distributed that states which rank high in the receipt of earmarked funding do not 
generally see much of a jump in their total science and engineering obligations ranking. 
Earmarking seems to operate at the margins. It sends money to places it would not 
ordinarily go but has little effect in the general overall geographic distribution of federal 
research funds. 
The third basic research question, Are earmarks additive or do they come at the 
expense of peer reviewed funding?, was assessed by looking at a table presenting the 
percentage total earmarks comprise of total science and engineering obligations for each 
year from 1990 through 2003 and a short case study of earmarking activity in the Fund 
for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education budget between 1998 and 2005. 
Looking at earmarking on the global level seemed to indicate that earmarks operate at the 
margins of federal research funding and have not detracted significantly from the vast 
majority of funding which is awarded in peer reviewed competitions. The FIPSE case, 
however, seemed to suggest that, on the individual program level at least in this case, 
earmarking may very well have come at the expense of competitive peer review. The 
case also suggested that once earmarking starts in a program area it may progress to the 
point that it consumes a larger and larger degree of a program's resources. Studying the 
FIPSE case pointed out that further case studies are required to demonstrate whether the 
trends noticed in the FIPSE case apply in other individual program situations. 
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The fourth basic research question, Is there much difference in the institutions 
which gamer the most earmarked funding and those which receive the most peer 
reviewed funding?, was analyzed by assessing the picture presented by a combination of 
bivariate correlations of earmark ranking and peer reviewed ranking for each year of the 
study (table 9) and of science and engineering earmark ranking and peer reviewed 
ranking for each year of the study ( table 10) with observations from figure 2 about the 
number of institutions pursuing earmarks each year and from figure 7 about the stability 
of peer reviewed funding ranking over time. This section produced an important finding. 
First, earmark activity is rising. This is documented by the large increase in the number 
of institutions receiving earmarks on an annual basis in recent years depicted in figure 2. 
Second, there is a very stable if not static relationship between earmark ranking and peer 
reviewed funding ranking from 1992 to 2003. This is shown by the bivariate correlations 
run in tables 9 and 10. Finally, there is a great deal of stability in peer reviewed funding 
ranking. This stability is depicted in the histogram of figure 7. The combination of these 
factors demonstrates that the difference between the institutions doing the best at 
receiving earmarks and the institutions doing the best at receiving peer reviewed funding 
is lessening. This finding casts considerable doubt over whether academic earmarking in 
the future will serve a redistributive function and ameliorate the perceived inequities of 
the peer reviewed funding system. As earmarking activity increases, the same usual 
suspects, the institutions which gamer the most peer reviewed funding, are likely to 
benefit the most from pursuing earmarks. 
This chapter, chapter 5, presents conclusions and recommendations for further 
study. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Prior to this study the major work on academic earmarking was James Savage's 
Funding Science in America: Congress, Universities, and the Politics of the Academic 
Pork Barrel. Savage did much to describe the young phenomenon of academic 
earmarking. This study has drawn heavily from his work in its discussion of the history 
of the higher education associations' fight against earmarking, the rationales of both 
proponents and opponents of earmarking, and the history of efforts by individual 
members of the House and Senate to fight the rise of earmarking. 
Savage posed three main questions at the beginning of his study. He asked does 
earmarking remedy the biases of the peer reviewed system of awarding funding or simply 
create its own favorites. Does earmarking improve the ability of the institutions receiving 
earmarks to compete for peer reviewed research grants? Do earmarks undermine a 
system based on merit (the peer reviewed system) or remedy the inequities of a biased 
process? He also discussed peer reviewed funding as a dominant policy regime in the 
Kuhnian tradition - a paradigm of sorts with cultural and normative facets supporting its 
continuance - and earmarking as a small revolution challenging the dominant paradigm. 
In the end, he concluded that earmarks do little to remedy perceived biases and do 
not aid institutions much in their efforts to compete more effectively in peer reviewed 
grants competitions. He found that the incentives for earmarking - the desire of college 
and university presidents for money and the desire of members of the House and Senate 
for credit for bringing money back to their districts and states - were quite powerful and, 
when considered, made it quite understandable why earmarking had begun and persisted. 
He also found that earmarking had remained a "small revolution" against the dominant 
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policy regime of peer review because, at the time of his study, it had yet to challenge peer 
reviewed funding in an institutionalized, routinized, regular way. Savage found 
earmarking to be somewhat of an anomaly, and the higher education community's 
opposition to earmarking ineffective because higher education leaders were quick to 
oppose earmarking except when they needed an earmark for some campus project or 
program. 
This study has built on Savage's attempts to assess the equity and effectiveness 
issues concerned with academic earmarking. Savage attempted to assess equity in 
funding by state, institution, and region. He, himself, pointed out in his study that the 
only way to achieve true equity would be to insure equal funding for all. This study has 
dealt with the issue of equity with different and hopefully improved methods. The 
introduction of a per-institution control in the formulation of the maps created in this 
study is probably the most notable among these improvements. 
Savage also dealt with the issue of effectiveness. He looked at whether the 
institutions and states receiving the most earmarks improved their rank in receiving peer 
reviewed funding in much the same way as this study has in its analysis of basic research 
question 1. This study, however, supplemented the analysis of which institutions 
changed rank with three bivariate correlations that confirmed the trends noted from 
examining tables 4 and 5. 
Finally, Savage deserves the credit for first discussing productive and non­
productive earmarks. Savage defined a productive earmark as an earmark which built an 
institutions capacity to secure peer reviewed funding, and a non-productive earmark as an 
earmark which did not have such a leveraging effect. Savage noted that earmarks for 
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biomedical research were more likely to be productive than earmarks for other purposes 
like agriculture because there are more peer reviewed funds for biomedical research than 
for other areas. This study's analysis would seem to confirm Savage's earlier inferences 
on productive and non-productive earmarks. 
Savage was unable to discern whether earmarks really come out of peer reviewed 
funding. This study takes a stab at this question with its analysis of basic research 
question 3. 
This has been a study about the emergence of academic earmarking and its effect 
on the distribution of federal research funds. The study has given a narrative account of 
the relatively short history of academic earmarking and addressed four basic research 
questions about the effect of academic earmarking on the distribution of federal research 
funds. There are six major findings of the study: 
1. Receiving earmarks generally does not improve the ability of 
institutions to receive other types of federal funding although in a few 
instances it does; 
2. Earmarking has had somewhat of a redistributive effect on the 
geographical distribution of federal research funding by sending some 
funding to places where it would otherwise not go; 
3. Earmarked funding is such a small part of total federal research funding 
that it makes little difference in the overall general geographical 
distribution of federal research funds; 
4. When peer reviewed and total funding levels per state are figured on a 
per institution basis there are some notable exceptions to the long held 
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belief that peer reviewed funding goes mostly to institutions in the 
northeast Atlantic and west coast regions of the United States; 
5. In general earmarks appear to be an additive feature of the federal 
research funding scheme although within individual programs 
earmarking activity may consume funds which historically have been 
and could otherwise be awarded in peer reviewed competitions; 
6. With earmarking and peer reviewed funding both now firmly 
established as different but acceptable forms of awarding federal 
research funding, the difference between the institutions doing the best 
at receiving earmarks and the institutions doing the best at receiving 
peer reviewed funding is lessening and a rising tide of earmarking 
activity is most likely preferentially lifting the boats of those 
institutions which do the best at receiving peer reviewed funding. 
These findings begin to paint a picture of how earmarks affect the general 
distribution of federal research funding. There are further related issues which need to be 
explored. It would be interesting to know whether the institutions, which did not accept 
earmarks in the early years of earmarking's history but began to actively pursue and 
accept earmarks in more recent years, experienced changes in leadership before they 
changed their policy on accepting earmarks. More formal modeling of earmarking, 
similar to the modeling de Figueiredo and Silverman did in their 2002 study, needs to be 
done so that we can better understand the factors which influence whether an institution 
receives an earmark and how institutions can best pursue strategies for securing 
earmarks. Further cases, like the FIPSE case discussed in Chapter 4, need to be explored 
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so that we can understand how earmarking within an individual program area affects peer 
reviewed funding. There is much need for research on what earmarks are actually used 
for as the anecdotal evidence is that the federal government exercises little control over 
how they are spent once they are awarded. 
The role medical schools, and possibly engineering schools, play in whether an 
institution's earmarking activity builds its capacity to compete more effectively for the 
large sums of federal research money awarded for biomedical and other basic science 
research in the peer reviewed competitions of the NIH, NSF, and other agencies needs to 
be explored. Exploring this area will inform strategies University Presidents employ in 
pursuing earmarks and help them make decisions about whether they value more 
earmarks which build an institution's capacity to secure other forms of funding or 
earmarks which fund activities for which there is no other form of funding. 
Finally, earmarking needs to be looked at through the lens of distributive theory.44 
There is a rich amount of research on distributive theory to which studies of earmarking 
could contribute. The role earmarks play as the sweetener, which makes palatable a 
system of distributing federal research funding based largely on peer review and not 
under the direct control of members of Congress to members who greatly value their 
power to distribute federal funding to their districts and states, is one issue under the 
44 Distributive theory is an area of Congressional studies with two main tenets. Its first tenet is the electoral 
connection thesis which holds that members of Congress actively seek to send federal funding home to 
their districts and states because they feel like doing so brings credit to them and aids in their efforts to get 
reelected. Its second main tenet is that universalistic coalitions approaching 100 percent tend to occur 
when Congress considers how to distribute federal funding because, even though minimum winning 
coalitions would insure that members could secure a larger portion of the funding to be distributed, there is 
uncertainty about whether a member could secure and sustain his place in a minimum winning coalition 
over time. The second tenet basically holds that members cut each other in on the deals made about the 
distribution of resources to reduce uncertainty and insure that they will get a piece of the pie for their 
district. 
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banner of distributive theory which needs to be explored. The use of earmarks in 
logrolling across committees to enact the legislative will of powerful members of 
Congress, and the question of whether the tendency towards universalism in distributive 
decisions over time breaks down the influence members of the Senate and House 
Appropriations Committees exercise over earmarking decisions are two other issues 
related to distributive theory which merit further study. 
Finally, there are normative issues related to academic earmarking which, while 
not appropriate parts of objective academic studies, nevertheless need to be fully debated 
within academic and governmental circles. A major reason why there has been such a 
wide divergence of opinion about whether academic earmarking is a threat or remedy is 
that peer reviewed funding and academic earmarking have different sets of values 
associated with them. Peer reviewed funding is a creature of the academic world. It is 
imbued with the same sorts of values associated with academic freedom - a freedom of 
inquiry and a freedom of scholars to pursue their thoughts where they might lead without 
the government or religion or any other co�vention restricting or dictating the course of 
thought. 
Academic earmarking, on the other hand, is a creature of the political world. It is 
more in line with the base instincts of people to look out for themselves and their own 
interests. It is also more in line with our form of constitutional government and the 
prerogatives granted to our legislative leaders. It is Congress's prerogative to determine 
how federal money should be spent, and it is somewhat presumptive on the part of 
academics to think that Congress should completely delegate to them the authority to 
determine how all federal research money will be spent. 
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The clash between these two value sets is probably irresolvable. Academic 
leaders will probably always think they know best the direction science should take and 
look condescendingly down on earmarking as a process ruled by lay opinion and based 
on personal influence and charm. Lawmakers will probably always think they were 
elected for a purpose, that in representing their constituents they have valuable 
knowledge about how money should be spent, and, furthermore, that it is their 
constitutional duty to decide how federal money is spent because they are the only people 
accountable to the voters for their decisions. The hard edges of these two value based 
policy positions are far apart, but some good public discourse, that acknowledges that 
different people come at this subject from very different vantage points, could perhaps 
bring about some consensus about which method of funding, peer reviewed funding or 
earmarking, is the most appropriate in certain circumstances. The debate about which is 
the better method may never be decided, but issues like how much earmarking is the right 
amount of earmarking in a system in which both forms of funding are utilized could 
possibly be decided. 
Hopefully this study and others which pursue the questions outlined for further 
study discussed earlier in this section will bring light to such a debate. Studies addressing 
academic earmarking have the potential to assist college and university presidents in 
determining which earmarks are of the most value to their institution. Such studies can 
inform members of Congress and policy makers whether the current system of research 
funding is actually producing the policy results they wish for it to produce. Finally, 
studies of this sort can demystify the research funding process to the point that citizens 
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can better judge whether the scientists distributing peer reviewed funding and the 
members of Congress distributing earmarks are spending their tax money effectively. 
It is my opinion that more thought needs to be put in on the part of all of the 
players in the research funding process. We have a system of federal research funding 
which is a system which has been created almost by happenstance. There are many 
myths associated with the system which need to be exorcised. The system has without 
doubt produced incredible results, and it has mostly relied on the peer review process in 
allocating funds. Peer review can rightly be said to have produced, particularly when one 
considers other systems of research funding like those employed by the formerly 
communist countries of Russia and eastern Europe. The freedom we have given to 
scientists to chart the course of science is the tradeoff for the prosperous and 
technologically advanced society we all enjoy, and there is little evidence, besides a few 
isolated scandals, that scientists have misused the freedom our system has given them. 
Earmarks, however, may be the price we have to pay for a system which for the 
most part grants and honors the academic freedom values associated with peer reviewed 
funding. Having a relatively small amount of the federal research funding pie allocated 
by our elected representatives insures that our representatives are not asleep at the wheel 
and remain cognizant of the local needs of the people they represent. Our nation has 
always been suspicious of government by experts. Having a little bit of lay wisdom 
applied to even a technical area like science and engineering funding probably produces 
better outcomes because it forces scientists to take into account public concerns. 
If we are going to have a system that includes earmarking, college and university 
presidents need to put more thought into the programs and projects for which they are 
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going to seek earmarks and lawmakers need to impose some quality control. I looked at 
8,422 specific earmarks made between 1992 and 2003 in order to code them as science 
and engineering earmarks or non-science and engineering earmarks in the course of 
carrying out this study. It appeared to me that in many instances college and university 
presidents were going to Congress simply to get some money rather than to secure 
funding which could really advance their institution, help it serve its mission better, and 
ultimately better the lives of the citizens of their state or region. I am not trying to say 
that college and university presidents should only pursue earmarks which are what 
Savage would call productive earmarks - those earmarks which can be leveraged to 
secure other funding. If presidents pursued only such earmarks, they would only pursue 
earmarks for biomedical and hard science purposes. I recognize that non-productive 
earmarks - those which cannot be leveraged - may also be valuable to an institution. It is 
hard to raise money from other sources for bus depots and sewage treatment plants. 
Presidents bent on moving up in the US News and World Report and other rankings, 
however, would be wise to pursue the productive type of earmark. My point is not to try 
to determine which type of earmark is most valuable for an institution at some given 
point in time but just to say that I do not believe institutional leaders are asking 
themselves often enough such questions. I am harping on college and university 
presidents because the lobbying literature indicates members of Congress depend upon 
these institutional leaders for cues about how much money to send to an institution and 
for what to send it. It is the members of Congress, however, who appropriate federal 
funds. Ultimately, if college and university presidents are not going to be concerned 
about quality control in academic earmarking, Congress must be. 
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While the policy debate of the 1980's died down some in the late 1990's and early 
parts of the 2000 's, earmarking is an issue likely to come back to the forefront 
particularly in times like the present where deficit spending, the costs of war, and the 
rebuilding costs of natural disasters are likely to cause scarcities in the discretionary 
funding available to fund things like education and academic research. The debate over 
which is the better form of funding - earmarks or peer reviewed - is likely to be 
continued in the near future when we may very well struggle as a nation to keep any 
momentum going at all in what has been a very effective partnership between the federal 
government and higher education in funding the creation of new knowledge and 
innovation. There were concerns expressed in the early years of the policy debate over 
earmarking about whether higher education diminishes its status as a privileged and 
valued commodity in our society and becomes just another special interest when it 
lobbies Congress directly for earmarked funding (Cordes 1986, Parsons 2005). The 
higher education community may not have the luxury in the coming funding environment 
to debate whether it can afford to sit on the sidelines and preserve its special status. 
Higher education may have to get into the fray to preserve any sort of funding for 
research at all. If this is the case, the practice higher education leaders have had in 
lobbying members of Congress for earmarks over the last 30 years may prove to be quite 
useful. 
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Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007. 
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Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007. 
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Figure 13: Line graph of the effect of all earmarks on peer-reviewed rankings, by year, with institutions not receiving earmarks 
dropped from the model. 
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007. 
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Figure 14: Line graph of the effect of science and engineering earmarks on peer-reviewed rankings, by year. 
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007. 
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Figure 15: Line graph of the effect of science and engineering earmarks on peer-reviewed rankings, by year, with institutions not 
receiving earmarks dropped from the model. 
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007. 
Table I : Earmarks not included in "Science and Engineering" categorization due to 
agency non-reporting. 
Institution 
American University 
Arizona State University 
Arizona State University 
Boston College 
Boston College 
Boston College 
Brandeis University 
College of William and Mary 
Carnegie Mellon University 
Clark University 
Clemson University 
Columbia University 
Columbia University 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
2003 District of Columbia appropriation $50,000 
for its Women & Politics Institute's annual National Education for 
Women's  Leadership program 
1998 General Services Administration $ 1 ,000,000 
managing acquisitions 
1999 General Services Administration $2,000,000 
pilot project in digital learning technologies 
1995 National Archives and Records Administration $2,000,000 
Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., Library 
1997 United States Information Agency $ 1 ,000,000 
Center for Irish Management 
2003 State $275,000 
for its Irish Institute, which operates educational- and cultural-exchange 
programs focused on achieving a lasting peace in Ireland 
1991  General Services Administration $4,000,000 
to construct the National Center for Complex Systems 
2003 Homeland Security $250,000 
for the Virginia Institute of Marine Science to establish a prototype 
observation system in the lower Chesapeake Bay 
2001 Institute of Museum and Library Services $212,500 
To be shared with a nonprofit organization, to work with the National 
Aviary to develop and use interactive mobile robots in support of 
distance learning 
1992 Small Business Administration $750,000 
for a shared incubator facility and a science and business center 
1995 Small Business Administration $500,000 
South Carolina Small Business Development Center Network 
199 1  General Services Administration $ 1 ,000,000 
for the Center for Disease Prevention 
2003 General Services Administration $250,000 
To be shared with three universities and a nonprofit corporation, to 
develop software relating to financial transactions 
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Table 1: Continued 
Institution 
Dartmouth College 
Dartmouth College 
DePaul University 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
2003 Homeland Security $ 1 8,000,000 
for the college's Institute for Security Technology Studies to develop 
ways to counter cybercrimes and cyberterrorism 
2003 Small Business Administration $993,500 
To be shared with a federal agency, for efforts to develop minority-run 
businesses 
2003 Library of Congress $600,000 
to train schoolteachers to use the library's online information resources 
in the classroom 
East Tennessee State University 1 993 Veterans Affairs $ 1 ,400,000 
for relocating the university's medical school 
East Tennessee State University 1 994 Veterans Affairs $ 1 ,750,000 
for relocating the university's medical school and renovating buildings 
at the medical center 
East Tennessee State University 1995 Veterans Affairs $3,000,000 
relocate university's medical school and renovate buildings at the 
medical center ---
East Tennessee State University 1996 Veterans Affairs $2,000,000 
relocate the university's medical school and renovate buildings 
East Tennessee State University 
Florida International University 
Florida International University 
George Mason University 
George Mason University 
George Washington University 
1997 Veterans Affairs $7,750,000 
relocate the university's medical school and renovate buildings at the 
medical center 
2000 Federal Emergency Management Agency $2,500,000 
windstorm demonstration project 
2002 Treasury $2,000,000 
for research on transfer pricing, the practice of companies' moving 
income outside the United States to put profits out of the reach of the 
Internal Revenue Service 
2002 Small Business Administration $ 1 ,000,000 
for a program to develop information-technology businesses 
2003 Homeland Security . $ 1 ,250,000 
To be shared with two universities and other local organizations, to 
establish the Response to Emergencies and Disasters Institute, which 
will provide terrorism prevention and response training for multiple 
types of first responders, including law en 
1 993 District of Columbia appropriation $2,780,000 
reimbursement for the cost of uncompensated care at its trauma center 
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Table 1 :  Continued 
Institution 
George Washington University 
George Washington University 
George Washington University 
George Washington University 
George Washington University 
George Washington University 
Georgetown University 
Georgetown University 
Georgetown University 
Howard University 
Indiana State University 
Indiana State University 
Indiana State University 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
1996 United States Information Agency $ 1 ,375,000 
Central and Eastern European Student Exchange Fellowship program 
1999 District of Columbia appropriation $ 1 ,000,000 
to help the Children's National Medical Center to construct new 
community-based clinics in low-income or underserved neighborhoods 
2002 District of Columbia appropriation $250,000 
to enroll more District of Columbia government employees in programs 
to improve municipal management 
2003 District of Columbia appropriation $250,000 
To be shared with the University of New Orleans, to help the District of 
Columbia with city security and emergency preparedness 
2003 Homeland Security $ 1 ,250,000 
To be shared with two universities and other local organizations, to 
establish the Response to Emergencies and Disasters Institute, which 
will provide terrorism prevention and response training for multiple 
types of first responders, including law en 
2003 Institute of Museum and Library Services $50,000 
for its collection of Eleanor Roosevelt's papers and related program 
development 
1993 District of Columbia appropriation $2,780,000 
reimbursement for the cost of uncompensated care at its trauma center 
1996 United States Information Agency $ 1 ,375,000 
Central and Eastern European Student Exchange Fellowship program 
1999 District of Columbia appropriation $3,000,000 
demonstration project on coordinating health care under Medicare 
1993 District of Columbia appropriation $2,780,000 
reimbursement for the cost of uncompensated care at its trauma center 
1992 Small Business Administration $ 1 ,500,000 
Center for Interdisciplinary Science Research and Education 
1993 Small Business Administration $ 1 ,395,000 
Center for Interdisciplinary Science Research and Education 
1997 Small Business Administration $ 1 ,000,000 
build a training center for small-business development 
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Table 1 :  Continued 
Institution 
Iowa State University 
Iowa State University 
Iowa State University 
Kent State University 
Loma Linda University 
Loma Linda University 
Loma Linda University 
Louisiana State University 
Louisiana State University 
Louisiana State University 
Loyola University Chicago 
Loyola University Chicago 
Mass. Institute of Technology 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
1990 General Services Administration $5,000,000 
to establish a Supercomputer Access Center 
199 1  General Services Administration $2,200,000 
Midwest Supercomputer Access Center 
2003 Small Business Administration $2,583, 100 
to develop a biologics facility in the university's research park that 
would study the conversion of bioengineered crops into 
pharmaceuticals and nutraceuticals 
2003 Institute of Museum and Library Services $2,000,000 
for an Institute for Library and Information Literacy Education 
1999 Federal Emergency Management Agency $30,000,000 
pilot project to retrofit the medical-center building to withstand 
earthquakes 
1999 Veterans Affairs 
research osteoporosis and wounds affecting bone 
$3,000,000 
2000 Federal Emergency Management Agency $6,000,000 
demonstration project to retrofit a building at the university's medical 
center to withstand earthquakes 
2002 District of Columbia appropriation $2,250,000 
for a project to test ways to safely immobilize and treat contaminated 
sediments at the bottom of the Anacostia River, in Washington, D.C. 
2002 District of Columbia appropriation $2,250,000 
for a project to test ways to safely immobilize and treat contaminated 
sediments at the bottom of the Anacostia River, in Washington, D.C. 
2003 District of Columbia appropriation $ 1 ,000,000 
for a project to test ways to safely immobilize and treat contaminated 
sediments at the bottom of the Anacostia River, in Washington, D.C. 
2003 Library of Congress $600,000 
to train schoolteachers to use the library's online information resources 
in the classroom 
2003 Library of Congress $600,000 
to train schoolteachers to use the library's online information resources 
in the classroom 
1994 Bureau of Mines $ 1 , 100,000 
center on respirable dust 
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Table 1: Continued 
Institution 
Michigan State University 
Michigan Technological Univ 
Michigan Technological Univ 
Michigan Technological Univ 
Mississippi State University 
Mississippi State University 
Montana State University 
Montana State University 
Montana State University 
Montana State University 
New Mexico State University 
New Mexico State University 
New Mexico State University 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
1993 White House Office of S&T Policy $ 1 ,000,000 
Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network 
1990 General Services Administration $5,000,000 
to build a center for applied metallurgical, minerals, and materials 
research 
199 1  General Services Administration $ 1 ,750,000 
for construction of a center for applied metallurgical, minerals, and 
materials research 
1994 Bureau of Mines $ 1 , 100,000 
center on respirable dust 
2003 Small Business Administration $ 1 ,987,000 
for the MAF/Tiger database project 
2003 Small Business Administration $ 1 ,987,000 
for the MAF/Tiger database project 
1995 Small Business Administration $250,000 
develop a center to assist small businesses 
1996 Treasury $2,500,000 
Northern Plains and Rockies Center for the Study of Western 
Hemispheric Trade in Montana 
2003 Small Business Administration $2,000,000 
for the Microdevice Fabrication Facility, which will work to create 
materials through nanofabrication, the manipulation of matter at the 
atomic scale 
2003 Small Business Administration $2,000,000 
for the Microdevice Fabrication Facility, which will work to create 
materials through nanofabrication, the manipulation of matter at the 
atomic scale 
1994 United States Information Agency $993,000 
U.S ./Mexico Conflict Resolution Center 
1995 United States Information Agency $400,000 
United States-Mexico Conflict Resolution Center 
1996 United States Information Agency $ 100,000 
educational and cultural exchange program on United States-Mexico 
conflict resolution 
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Table 1: Continued 
Institution 
New Mexico State University 
New York University 
New York University 
North Dakota State University 
North Dakota State University 
North Dakota State University 
North Dakota State University 
North Dakota State University 
North Dakota State University 
North Dakota State University 
Northern Arizona University 
Oklahoma State University 
Oregon State University 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
1997 United States Information Agency $ 100,000 
educational and cultural exchange program on United States-Mexico 
conflict resolution 
2003 General Services Administration $250,000 
To be shared with three universities and a nonprofit corporation, to 
develop software relating to financial transactions 
2003 Homeland Security $7,000,000 
for counterterrorism programs at the Center on Catastrophe 
Preparedness and Response, including training public-health 
professionals and research in biomedical science and environmental 
health 
1995 Small Business Administration $250,000 
center to assist small businesses 
2000 General Services Administration $275,000 
to develop a facility to store geographic and geo-physical information 
to promote the efficient use of natural resources 
2000 Treasury $725,000 
United States-Canada trade research 
2000 Treasury $725,000 
United States-Canada trade research 
2002 Office of National Drug Control Policy $2,000,000 
for neuroimaging technology for research on substance abuse 
2003 General Services Administration $300,000 
to establish for federal agencies an archive of electronic data that are 
important to the Upper Great Plains, such as the relationship between 
weather data and crop yields 
2003 Homeland Security $750,000 
for the Center for Agricultural Policy and Trade Studies to study the 
bilateral trade of agricultural commodities and products under the 
Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement, to help policy makers better gauge the 
impact of trade-policy decisions on agriculture 
199 1  General Services Administration $4,500,000 
Southwest Forestry Science Complex 
2002 Small Business Administration $ 100,000 
for a center for international-trade development 
1 993 Agency not listed $897,458 
research on using wood 
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Table 1 :  Continued 
Institution Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
Pennsylvania State University 1994 Bureau of Mines $662,500 
national center on mine-land reclamation 
Pennsylvania State University 1994 Bureau of Mines $ 1 , 100,000 
center on respirable dust 
Polytechnic University 1993 White House Office of S&T Policy $ 1 ,000,000 
Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network 
Polytechnic University 2002 Small Business Administration $400,000 
to create the National Center for e-Commerce, which will train students 
and help businesses in using the Web 
Polytechnic University 2003 General Services Administration $250,000 
To be shared with three universities and a nonprofit corporation, to 
develop software relating to financial transactions 
Portland State University 2003 Small Business Administration $993,500 
for the Northwest Center for Engineering, Science, and Technology 
Rutgers University at NewBruns 1990 Federal Communications Commission $30,000 
as a fee in return for which the FCC was to subscribe to the university's 
Wireless Information Network Laboratory 
Rutgers University at NewBruns 1992 Federal Communications Commission $30,000 
to support research at the Wireless Information Laboratory 
Rutgers University at NewBruns 1994 Federal Communications Commission $30,000 
for a subscription to the university's wireless information network 
Rutgers University at NewBruns 2003 Institute of Museum and Library Services $250,000 
to catalog, organize, and preserve collections at the Carey Library 
South Carolina State University 1995 Small Business Administration $500,000 
South Carolina Small Business Development Center Network 
Southern Illinois University 
Southern Illinois University 
1994 Bureau of Mines $662,500 
national center on mine-land reclamation 
2003 Library of Congress $200,000 
to develop a permanent commemoration of the Lewis and Clark 
Expedition at the Customs House Museum, in Cairo, Ill. 
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Table 1 :  Continued 
Institution 
Southern Illinois University 
SUNY Buffalo 
SUNY Buffalo 
SUNY Buffalo 
SUNY Buffalo 
Syracuse University 
Temple University 
Temple University 
Texas A&M at College Station 
Texas A&M at College Station 
Texas A&M at College Station 
Texas Tech University 
Texas Tech University 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
2003 Library of Congress $ 1 ,200,000 
to train schoolteachers to use the library's online information resources 
in the classroom 
1995 Small Business Administration $750,000 
demonstration to help small companies with technical improvement of 
products 
1998 Small Business Administration $ 1 ,500,000 
SUNY Institute for Entrepreneurship 
1999 Small Business Administration $ 1 ,500,000 
to operate an institute for small businesses and for work-force 
development 
2000 Small Business Administration $ 1 ,000,000 
to develop a facility and operate the Institute for Entrepreneurship for 
small businesses and for work-force development 
1995 Small Business Administration $750,000 
demonstration to help small companies with technical improvement of 
products 
2000 Institute of Museum and Library Services $250,000 
to support enhanced use of technology in delivering library services 
2001 Institute of Museum and Library Services $5 10,000 
to digitize resources in the library's urban-history and African­
American collections 
1991  General Services Administration $ 1 ,000,000 
Institute for National Drug Abatement Research at the Engineering 
Experiment Station 
199 5 Customs $5,000,000 
Center for the Study of Western Hemispheric Trade 
2000 Veterans Affairs $5,750,000 
to renovate and construct a cardiovascular institute at the Olin E. 
Teague Veterans' Center Integrated Clinical Facility, which is a 
teaching hospital for the university's College of Medicine 
200 1 Institute of Museum and Library Services $46 1 ,000 
for the Virtual Vietnam Archive Project 
2002 Institute of Museum and Library Services $500,000 
for the Vietnam Archive Center to create digital records of its 
collection 
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Table 1: Continued 
Institution 
Texas Tech University 
Tufts University 
Tufts University 
Tulane University 
University of Alabama at Tusc. 
University of Arizona 
University of Arizona 
University of Arizona 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
2003 Institute of Museum and Library Services $400,000 
to digitize its Vietnam Archive Center 
1992 Small Business Administration $750,000 
shared incubator facility and a science and business center 
1992 Small Business Administration $ 1 ,500,000 
to establish the New England Regional Biotechnology Transfer Center 
200 1 Institute of Museum and Library Services $680,000 
for the AMISTAD Research Center to expand electronic 
communications, educational programs, and community outreach 
1999 Veterans Affairs $ 100,000 
representing the value of land donated to the university for a children's 
center 
1994 Office of Personnel Management 
health promotion and disease prevention 
2000 State 
for an unspecified purpose 
$62,500 
$250,000 
2003 Treasury $500,000 
for a trust fund to support the operations of the Native Nations Institute 
for Leadership, Management, and Policy, which works to support 
American Indian nations 
University of Arkansas at Fay. 1994 Small Business Administration 
small-business incubator 
$ 1 ,000,000 
University of Arkansas at Fay. 1995 Small Business Administration 
Genesis Small Business Incubator Facility 
University of Arkansas at Fay. 1998 Small Business Administration 
Genesis Small Business Incubator Facility 
University of California at Davis 1 992 Agency not listed 
grape-importing facility 
University of Colorado at Boulder 1998 General Services Administration 
project on digital medical education 
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$ 1 ,000,000 
$ 1 ,000,000 
$ 1 ,609,000 
$ 1 ,000,000 
Table 1 : Continued 
Institution 
University of Colorado HSC 
University of Georgia 
University ofHawaii-Manoa 
University of Hawaii-Manoa 
University of Hawaii-Mano a 
University ofHawaii-Manoa 
University ofHawaii-Manoa 
University of Idaho 
University of Idaho 
University of Idaho 
University of Idaho 
University of Idaho 
University of ldaho 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
2003 General Services Administration $300,000 
for the digital telehealth program 
199 1  General Services Administration $ 1 ,000,000 
Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative Law 
1990 General Services Administration $ 1 ,000,000 
strategic-materials-research facility 
1992 Bureau of Mines $592,500 
Marine Minerals Technology Center 
1994 Bureau of Mines $537,500 
center on marine-minerals technology 
1994 Bureau of Mines $537,500 
center on marine-minerals technology 
2003 General Services Administration $250,000 
to help prepare for the celebration, in 2009, of the 50th anniversary of 
Hawaii's statehood 
199 1  Bureau of Mines $500,000 
to continue water-contamination research 
1995 Small Business Administration $250,000 
center to assist small businesses 
1999 Institute of Museum and Library Services $750,000 
Digital Geospatial and Numerical Data Library 
2001 Institute of Museum and Library Services $700,000 
for the Institute for the Historic Study of Jazz, to catalog, digitize, and 
develop an online database and to preserve archival material 
2002 Institute of Museum and Library Services $750,000 
for the Institute for the Historic Study of Jazz to catalog, digitize, and 
develop an online database and to preserve archival material 
2003 Institute of Museum and Library Services $400,000 
for digital archiving 
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Table 1: Continued 
Institution 
University of Iowa 
University of Kansas 
University of Kentucky 
University of Kentucky 
University of Kentucky 
University of Maine at Orono 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
1999 Small Business Administration $ 1 ,000,000 
Environmental Compliance Project 
1993 Small Business Administration $500,000 
small-business incubator program 
1992 Small Business Administration $4,500,000 
to assist in the construction of the Advanced Science and Technology 
Commercialization Center 
1993 Small Business Administration $4, 1 85,000 
Advanced Science and Technology Commercialization Center 
1996 United States Information Agency $ 1 ,375,000 
Central and Eastern European Student Exchange Fellowship program 
2003 Homeland Security $ 1 ,000,000 
for the university's Advanced Engineered Wood Composites Center to 
test engineered wood composites at Coast Guard facilities 
University of Maryland at ColPrk 1993 White House Office of S&T Policy $ 1 ,000,000 
University of Mass at Amherst 
University of Mass at Amherst 
University of Mass at Amherst 
Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network 
1991  Small Business Administration $500,000 
Center for Manufacturing Productivity 
1993 Small Business Administration $465,000 
Center for Manufacturing Productivity 
1993 Small Business Administration $465,000 
for a demonstration project to help small businesses comply with the 
Clean Air Act 
University of Med & Dent of NJ 1996 Veterans Affairs $500,000 
University of Miami 
University of Miami 
equipment at the Low Vision Center in Ophthalmology 
1992 United States Information Agency . $5,000,000 
Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between North and 
South 
1995 United States Information Agency $4,000,000 
North / South Center 
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Table 1: Continued 
Institution 
University of Miami 
University of Miami 
University of Miami 
University of Miami 
University of Miami 
University of Michigan 
University of Minnesota-TC 
University of Mississippi 
University of Mississippi 
University of Mississippi 
University of Mississippi 
University of Mississippi 
University of Missouri at Col. 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
1996 United States Information Agency $2,000,000 
operating the North-South Center 
1997 United States Information Agency $ 1 ,495,000 
North-South Center 
1999 United States Information Agency $ 1 ,750,000 
North-South Center 
2000 Institute of Museum and Library Services $750,000 
to consolidate and preserve archives and special collections at 
University's Library in Coral Gables, Fla. 
2003 State 
for its Dante B. Fascell North-South Center 
$500,000 
1993 White House Office of S&T Policy $ 1 ,000,000 
Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network 
1994 Bureau of Mines $ 1 , 100,000 
center on respirable dust 
1990 Bureau of Mines $600,000 
Marine Minerals Technology Center 
1992 Bureau of Mines $592,500 
Marine Minerals Technology Center 
1994 Bureau of Mines $537,500 
center on marine-minerals technology 
2002 Institute of Museum and Library Services $350,000 
for digitization at the National Library of the Accounting Profession 
2002 Institute of Museum and Library Services $850,000 
for educational and preservation programs at Rowan Oak, the home of 
William Faulkner 
1999 Federal Emergency Management Agency $400,000 
pilot program on training to respond to hazardous-materials accidents 
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Table 1 :  Continued 
Institution 
University of Missouri at Col. 
University of Missouri at Col. 
University of Montana 
University of Montana 
University of Montana 
University of Montana 
University of Montana 
University of Montana 
University of Montana 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
1999 Veterans Affairs $3,000,000 
to renovate space in a Veterans Health Administration hospital that will 
be leased to the university for medical research 
2000 Veterans Affairs $2,000,000 
to renovate space for research activities in a Veterans Health 
Administration hospital that is affiliated with the university's School of 
Medicine 
199 1  Small Business Administration $ 100,000 
for a planning study for a Value-Added Wood Products Development, 
Marketing, and Small Business Institute program 
1995 Small Business Administration $250,000 
to develop a center to assist small businesses 
1996 United States Information Agency $ 1 ,800,000 
Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs 
1997 United States Information Agency $ 1 ,800,000 
Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs 
1999 United States Information Agency $2,200,000 
Mike Mansfield Fellowship Program, which the university manages 
2000 State $2,200,000 
for the Mike Mansfield Fellowship Program, which makes awards to 
government officials for work and study in Japan and which the 
university manages 
2002 Small Business Administration $300,000 
for a resource center on economic development 
University of Nebraska at Lincoln 199.1 General Services Administration $4,500,000 
George W. Beadle Center for Genetic and Biomaterials Research 
University of Nebraska Med Ctr 1990 General Services Administration $5,000,000 
to expand the Eppley Institute for Research in Cancer and Allied 
Diseases 
University of Nevada at LV 2003 Small Business Administration $ 198,700 
for the Program for International Education and Training, which 
educates businesses about communicating effectively with people from 
other cultures 
University of Nevada at Reno 199 1  Federal Emergency Management Agency $750,000 
earthquake-engineering center 
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Table 1 :  Continued 
Institution 
University of Nevada at Reno 
University of New Orleans 
University of North Dakota 
University of North Dakota 
University of North Dakota 
University of Oregon 
University of Rochester 
University of South Car at Col. 
University of South Dakota 
University of South Florida 
University of Texas at Austin 
University of Texas at Austin 
University of Texas at El Paso 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
1992 Federal Emergency Management Center $2,500,000 
to build a laboratory for earthquake research 
2003 District of Columbia appropriation $250,000 
To be shared with George Washington University, to help the District 
of Columbia with city security and emergency preparedness 
1994 Bureau of Mines $662,500 
national center on mine-land reclamation 
1994 Bureau of Mines $662,500 
national center on mine-land reclamation 
2003 General Services Administration $ 1 ,750,000 
for the Government Services Rural Outreach Initiative to help rural 
citizens, particularly the elderly and Native Americans on remote 
reservations, to contact and transact business with government agencies 
more easily and efficiently 
2002 Institute of Museum and Library Services $50,000 
for the Museum of Natural History 
1995 Small Business Administration $750,000 
demonstration to help small companies with technical improvement of 
products 
1995 Small Business Administration $500,000 
South Carolina Small Business Development Center Network 
1995 Small Business Administration $250,000 
develop a center to assist small businesses 
2000 Federal Emergency Management Agency $ 1 ,000,000 
for windows and seawalls to ma¥ the university's St. Peterburg 
campus more resistant to a hurricane 
1991  General Services Administration 
for unspecified new construction 
1 995 Customs 
Center for the Study of Western Hemispheric Trade 
$ 1 ,750,000 
$5,000,000 
1 990 General Services Administration $4, 1 52,000 
to study and facilitate the development, transfer, and installation of 
strategic-materials technologies among American industries 
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Table 1: Continued 
Institution 
University of Vermont 
University of West Florida 
University of Wyoming 
Utah State University 
Utah State University 
Washington State University 
Washington State University 
West Virginia University 
West Virginia University 
West Virginia University 
West Virginia University 
West Virginia Unive�sity 
Yeshiva University 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
2001 Institute of Museum and Library Services $400,000 
for the Perkins Geology Museum to digitize its collection 
2002 Small Business Administration $ 1 ,000,000 
for a business incubator that helps companies establish a presence on 
the Internet 
199 5 Small Business Administration $250,000 
develop a center to assist small businesses 
1993 White House Office of S&T Policy $ 1 ,000,000 
Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network 
1993 White House Office of S&T Policy $ 1 ,000,000 
Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network 
199 1  None listed 
animal-disease-biotechnology facility 
1993 Small Business Administration 
to help build a business-incubator facility 
1993 Veterans Affairs 
demonstration project at Ruby Memorial Hospital 
1994 Bureau of Mines 
national center on mine-land reclamation 
$ 1 ,2 10,000 
$500,000 
$ 1 ,000,000 
$662,500 
1994 Bureau of Mines $ 1 , 1 00,000 
center on respirable dust 
1995 Veterans Affairs $762,500 
demonstration project involving Ruby Memorial Hospital 
2002 Veterans Affairs $2,000,000 
· for a project that provides health care to veterans through Ruby 
Memorial Hospital, one of the university's teaching hospitals 
1 999 National Archives and Records Administration $ 1 ,500,000 
Center for Jewish History 
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007. 
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Table 2: Earmarks not included in "Science and Engineering" categorization due to 
earmark purpose. 
Institution 
Barry University 
Colorado School of Mines 
Colorado State University 
Columbia University 
Florida A&M University 
Florida A&M University 
Year Earmarking Agency 
200 1 Housing and Urban Development 
for an intercultural community center 
1 999 Health and Human Services 
to augment activities 
1993 Defense 
for programs of major importance to the department 
Earmark Amount 
$930,000 
$ 1 ,000,000 
$5,000,000 
2003 Education $ 173 ,863 
To be shared with Hostos Community College of the City University of 
New York, for a distance-learning program to train minority students in 
foreign policy 
1 999 Interior 
Black Archives 
2000 Interior 
for a new building for storing archives 
$ 1 ,000,000 
$2,800,000 
Florida International University 2003 Housing and Urban Development $405,000 
for the College of Law to build facilities for a student legal clinic 
Fordham University 
Fordham University 
Fordham University 
Fordham University 
Fordham University 
Fordham University 
Georgetown University 
1998 Transportation $632,500 
parking facility partly open to the public 
1999 Transportation $862,500 
parking facility 
2000 Transportation $ 1 ,090,000 
for a parking facility, a small part of which will be available to the 
public 
2001 Transportation $ 1 , 1 3 1 ,  134 
for a parking facility, a small part of which will be available to the 
public 
2002 Transportation $ 1 ,092,500 
for a parking facility 
2003 Transportation $ 1 ,085,399 
for a parking facility 
1990 Defense $ 1 ,000,000 
for care provided to a military dependent at the university hospital 
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Table 2: Continued 
Institution 
Georgetown University 
Howard University 
Idaho State University 
Illinois Institute of Technology 
Illinois State University 
Illinois State University 
Year Earmarking Agency 
1993 Defense 
for programs of major importance to the department 
1995 Education 
law-school clinic 
Earmark Amount 
$ 10,000,000 
$4,500,000 
2003 Housing and Urban Development $324,000 
to build the L.E. and Thelma E. Stephens Performing Arts Center 
1993 Defense 
for programs of major importance to the department 
$5,000,000 
2003 Education $99,350 
to provide special-education devices, equipment, and materials for 
Peoria District No. 1 17 
2003 Education $100,000 
to provide special-education materials, equipment, and technological 
devices for Peoria District No. 1 50 
Indiana University at Bloomington 1990 Agriculture $ 1 50,000 
to study the feasibility of federal support for new facilities 
Indiana University at Bloomington 2001 Education $340,000 
for Project TEAM, a program that helps students from 
underrepresented minority groups prepare to become teachers 
Indiana University at Bloomington 2002 Education $675,000 
for Project TEAM, a program that helps students from 
underrepresented minority groups prepare to become teachers 
Indiana University at Bloomington 2002 Transportation $ 1 ,000,000 
Jackson State University 
Johns Hopkins University 
Kent State University 
Long Island University system 
for the campus bus service to purchase buses 
2002 Housing and Urban Development $250,000 
for renovations to the Center for the Study of the 20th Century African 
American 
1993 Defense $ 1 5,000,000 
for research, development, and other programs; Congress instructed the 
department to conduct a merit review of the earmark and to award as 
much of the amount that was set aside for the programs as appropriate 
2001 Labor 
for job training at the Ohio Employee Ownership Center 
200 1 Housing and Urban Development 
to restore the Tilles Center for the Performing Arts 
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$298,000 
$ 1 , 1 1 0,000 
Table 2: Continued 
Institution 
Louisiana State University 
Year Earmarking Agency 
1993 Defense 
for programs of major importance to the department 
Earmark Amount 
$4,000,000 
Louisiana State University HSC 2003 Transportation $250,000 
for an intermodal parking facility for the university's School of 
Medicine in Shreveport 
Medical C of Ohio 
Mississippi State University 
Morgan State University 
New Mexico State University 
New Mexico State University 
New Mexico State University 
1993 Defense 
for programs of major importance to the department 
2001 Transportation 
for a bus service expansion plan 
$ 1 ,000,000 
$ 100,000 
1999 NASA $ 1 ,600,000 
renovations and environmental remediation at the university's multi­
purpose facility 
2001 Transportation $250,000 
To be shared with a municipal agency, to purchase two buses to serve 
the university 
2002 Justice 
for an after-school program for at risk youth 
$750,000 
2002 Transportation $500,000 
for the City of Las Cruces to provide bus service to the university's  
campus 
North Carolina State University 2003 Transportation $2,000,000 
for a new transportation center 
North Dakota State University 1990 Agriculture 
for operating an international-trade center at Fargo 
North Dakota State University 1990 Agriculture 
Northeastern University 
for operating an international-trade center at Fargo 
1993 Defense 
for programs of major importance to the department 
$500,000 
$500,000 
$9,000,000 
Northern Illinois University 2000 Education $ 1 ,500,000 
Northwestern University 
for the Lake County Multi-University Center, which offers courses and 
degrees from each of the member colleges 
2000 Health and Human Services $3,398,000 
for a construction project 
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Table 2: Continued 
Institution 
Ohio University 
Oklahoma State University 
Oregon University System 
Southern Illinois University 
Southern Illinois University 
Stanford University 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
2001 Transportation $ 1 ,000,000 
to lengthen the runway at the university's airport 
2003 Transportation $3 ,000,000 
to build a multimodal transportation facility that will include a parking 
garage, a bus station, and spaces for bicycles 
2000 Education $ 1 ,000,000 
for improving educational programs and services for Native American 
students 
2000 Education $ 1 ,500,000 
for the Lake County Multi-University Center, which offers courses and 
degrees from each of the member colleges 
2001 Transportation $ 1 ,584,000 
for safety improvements at the university's airport 
1999 Housing and Urban Development $300,000 
to renovate a performing-arts facility 
Stevens Institute of Technology 2003 Education $472,906 
for innovative educational opportunities for its undergraduate and 
graduate students 
Texas A&M at College Station 1999 Transportation . $ 1 ,250,000 
to relocate the railroad line that runs through the campus and the towns 
of College Station and Bryant 
Texas A&M at College Station 2000 Transportation $2,370,000 
to relocate the railroad line that runs through the campus and the towns 
of College Station and Bryan 
Texas A&M at College Station 200 1 Transportation $2,458,987 
To be shared with a state agency, to relocate the railroad line that runs 
through the campus and the towns of College Station and Bryan 
Texas A&M at College Station 2002 Transportation $ 1 ,425,000 
To be shared with a state agency, to relocate the railroad line that runs 
through the campus and the towns of College Station and Bryan, Tex. 
Texas A&M at College Station 2003 Transportation $2,359,563 
To be shared with a state agency, to relocate the railroad line that runs 
through the campus and the towns of College Station and Bryan, Tex. 
Texas A&M at Kingsville 2002 Housing and Urban Development $ 100,000 
to build the Kingsville Center for Young Children 
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Table 2: Continued 
Institution Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
Texas Tech University 2002 Transportation $ 1 ,000,000 
for the university's bus service 
Texas Tech University 2003 Transportation $ 1 ,850,000 
for the university's bus service 
University of Alabama 200 1 Housing and Urban Development $1 ,000,000 
to renovate the Gorgas House, a residence built in 1 829 
University of Alaska at Fairbanks 1999 Housing and Urban Development $2,500,000 
toward the cost of a new wing for the university's museum 
University of Alaska at Fairbanks 1999 Housing and Urban Development $2,500,000 
toward the cost of a new wing for the university's museum 
University of Alaska at Fairbanks 2000 Housing and Urban Development $3,500,000 
for the university's  museum 
University of Alaska at Fairbanks 2000 Housing and Urban Development $3,500,000 
for the university's museum 
University of Alaska at Fairbanks 2001 Labor $ 1 ,250,000 
To be shared with nonprofit organizations in western Alaska, to 
conduct job-training programs 
University of Arkansas 1999 Transportation $500,000 
to help buy buses for the free, university-operated transit system that 
serves the campus and town 
University of Arkansas 2000 Transportation $500,000 
to help buy buses for the free, university-operated transit system that 
serves the campus and town 
University of California at Davis 2000 Transportation $625,000 
for a maintenance facility for Unitrans, a student-run bus service 
University of California at Davis 2001 Transportation $1 ,000,000 
for Unitrans, a student-run public bus service 
University of California at Davis 2002 Transportation $900,000 
University of Connecticut 
University of Georgia 
for the City of Davis to provide bus service to the university's campus 
1992 Energy $400,000 
for an unspecified purpose 
1990 Agriculture $ 1 50,000 
to study the feasibility of federal support for constructing new facilities 
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Table 2: Continued 
Institution 
University of Hartford 
University of Hartford 
University ofHawaii-Manoa 
University ofHawaii-Manoa 
University ofHawaii-Manoa 
University o(Hawaii-Manoa 
University ofHawaii-Manoa 
University ofHawaii-Manoa 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
2002 Housing and Urban Development $75,000 
for the Hartt School of Music's new performing-arts center 
2003 Education $397,400 
for equipment for its Hartt School's new Performing Arts Center 
1990 Education $750,000 
for the Gifted and Talented Program under the Native Hawaiian 
Education Act 
1990 Education $750,000 
for the Gifted and Talented Program under the Native Hawaiian 
Education Act 
1996 Commerce 
Hawaii Stock Management Plan 
1996 Commerce 
Hawaii Stock Management Plan 
1997 Commerce 
Hawaii Stock-Management plan 
1997 Commerce 
Hawaii Stock-Management plan 
$700,000 
$700,000 
$500,000 
$500,000 
University of Illinois at Chicago 2000 Education $ 1 ,500,000 
for the Lake County Multi-University Center, which offers courses and 
degrees from each of the member colleges 
University of Illinois at Spmgfld 2000 Education $ 1 ,500,000 
for the Lake County Multi-University Center, which offers courses and 
degrees from each of the member colleges 
University of Illinois at Urb-Chm 2000 Agriculture $900,000 
University of Kentucky 
University of Louisville 
for unspecified research 
2001 Justice $750,000 
for the College of Law for teleconferencing equipment to train 
prosecutors 
1999 Transportation $ 1 ,500,000 
for buses, to be owned by a local transit authority, to shuttle students 
between the campus and their jobs at a local employer 
University of Maryland at ColPrk 2000 Housing and Urban Development $500,000 
to renovate the James McGregor Bums Academy of Leadership 
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Table 2: Continued 
Institution Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
University of Maryland at ColPrk 2003 Education $496,750 
University of Miami 
University of Minnesota at TC 
University of Montana 
University of Nevada at Reno 
University of Nevada at Reno 
University of Nevada at Reno 
University of Nevada at Reno 
University of Nevada at Reno 
University of New Mexico 
U NC at Chapel Hill 
U NC at Chapel Hill 
University of North Dakota 
University of North Dakota 
for personnel, graduate-student stipends, and other expenses at its 
Maryland Institute for Minority Achievement and Urban Education 
1993 Defense 
for programs of major importance to the department 
1993 Defense 
for programs of major importance to the department 
2000 Justice 
to create a juvenile after-school program 
$2,000,000 
$2,000,000 
$ 1 ,000,000 
2000 Justice $ 1 ,000,000 
for the National Judicial College: training state, local, and tribal judges 
2001 Justice $3,000,000 
for the National Council of Juvenile and Family Courts, which provides 
continuing education in family and juvenile law 
2002 Justice $750,000 
for the National Judicial College, which provides continuing education 
for judges 
2003 Justice $ 1 ,425,000 
for the National Council of Juvenile and Family Courts to continue 
training people involved in the juvenile-court system 
2003 Justice $ 1 ,500,000 
to provide education and training to judges through its National Judicial 
College, focusing particularly on judicial proficiency, competence, 
skills, and productivity 
1994 Interior 
summer institute at the American Indian Law Center 
1998 Transportation 
buses 
$200,000 
$ 1 ,000,000 
1999 Education $ 1 ,200,000 
site on the World-Wide Web that pertains to professional development 
and that is maintained by the university 
2000 Defense $ 1 ,250,000 
for the Air Battle Captain Program, which trains helicopter pilots 
2000 Defense $ 1 ,250,000 
for the Air Battle Captain Program, which trains helicopter pilots 
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Table 2: Continued 
Institution 
University of North Dakota 
University of North Dakota 
University of North Dakota 
University of North Dakota 
University of North Dakota 
University of North Dakota 
University of North Dakota 
University of Pennsylvania 
University of Puerto Rico 
University of Puerto Rico 
University of Rhode Island 
University of Rhode Island 
University of Rhode Island 
University of Rhode Island 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
2001 Defense 
for the Air Battle Captain Program, which trains pilots 
2001 Defense 
for the Air Battle Captain Program, which trains pilots 
2002 Defense 
for the Air Battle Captain Program, which trains pilots 
2002 Defense 
for the Air Battle Captain Program, which trains pilots 
$ 1 ,250,000 
$ 1 ,250,000 
$ 1 ,000,000 
$ 1 ,000,000 
2003 Defense $ 1 ,000,000 
for the Air Battle Captain Program, which trains helicopter pilots in 
conjunction with the Reserve Officer Training Corps 
2003 Defense $ 1 ,000,000 
for the Air Battle Captain Program, which trains helicopter pilots in 
conjunction with the Reserve Officer Training Corps 
2003 Justice $ 150,000 
for its Native Americans Into Law program, which seeks to recruit and 
retain American Indian law students 
1993 Defense 
for programs of major importance to the department 
$7,500,000 
2000 Education $750,000 
for expansion of the "Hispanic Education Linkages Program" in New 
York City 
2000 Housing and Urban Development $250,000 
for the renovation of the university's theater 
1990 Agriculture $ 1 50,000 
to study the feasibility of federal support for constructing new facilities 
200 1 Education 
for the 2001 World Scholar-Athlete Games 
2003 Education 
to support the Scholar-Athlete Games 
2003 Education 
to support the Scholar-Athlete Games 
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$800,000 
$794,800 
$794,800 
Table 2: Continued 
Institution 
University of Saint Thomas 
University of South Dakota 
University of South Florida 
University of South Florida 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
1993 Defense $ 1 5,000,000 
for research, development, and other programs; Congress instructed the 
department to conduct a merit review of the earmark and to award as 
much of the amount that was set aside for the programs as it deemed 
appropriate 
2002 Interior 
to preserve the Old Women's Gym and an armory 
1993 Defense 
for programs of major importance to the department 
2002 Defense 
to establish a Reserve Officer Training Corps program 
$365,000 
$2,000,000 
$ 1 , 100,000 
University of South Florida 2003 Education $99,350 
for the Tampa Bay Consortium for the Development of Educational 
Leaders 
University of Utah 2002 Transportation $3,000,000 
for a project to extend a light-rail line through the university's campus 
to its medical center 
University of Utah 2003 Transportation $ 12,000,000 
for a project to extend a light-rail line through the university's campus 
to its medical center 
University of Wisconsin at Madn 1993 Defense $ 1 5,000,000 
for research, development, and other programs; Congress instructed the 
department to conduct a merit review of the earmark and to award as 
much of the amount that was set aside for the programs as it deemed 
appropriate 
Utah State University 1990 Agriculture $ 150,000 
to study the feasibility of federal support for constructing new facilities 
Utah State University 1990 Agriculture $ 150,000 
to study the feasibility of federal support for constructing new facilities 
Virginia Tech 
Washington State University 
Washington State University 
1994 Interior 
to start an Appalachian university consortium 
$250,000 
1990 Agriculture $ 150,000 to study the feasibility of federal support for constructing new facilities 
1993 Housing and Urban Development $200,000 
affordable-housing program 
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Table 2: Continued 
Institution 
Wayne State University 
West Virginia Sch of Ost Med 
West Virginia University 
Year Earmarking Agency Earmark Amount 
1999 Housing and Urban Development $ 100,000 
to renovate a theater 
2000 Housing and Urban Development $900,000 
to construct a multi-use museum and cultural-education center 
1999 Transportation $4,000,000 
to modernize the elevated transitway that serves the campus 
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007. 
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Table 3 :  List of institutions in this study. 
State 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Institution Name 
Auburn University Main Campus 
Samford University 
University of Alabama at Birmingham 
University of Alabama in Huntsville 
University of Alabama 
University of Alaska Fairbanks 
Arizona State University at the Tempe Campus 
Midwestern University 
Northcentral University 
Northern Arizona University 
University of Arizona 
University of Phoenix-Online Campus 
University of Arkansas at Little Rock 
University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences 
University of Arkansas Main Campus 
Alliant International University-San Diego 
Argosy University-Orange Campus 
Azusa Pacific University 
Biola University 
California Institute of Integral Studies 
California Institute of Technology 
City of Hope Graduate School of Biological Science 
Claremont Graduate University 
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Table 3: Continued. 
State 
California 
Institution Name 
Fielding Graduate University 
Golden Gate University-San Francisco 
Loma Linda University 
Pacifica Graduate Institute 
Pepperdine University 
San Diego State University 
Stanford University 
The Scripps Research Institute 
University of California-Berkeley 
University of California-Davis 
University of California-Irvine 
University of California-Los Angeles 
University of California-Riverside 
University of California-San Diego 
University of California-San Francisco 
University of California-Santa Barbara 
University of California-Santa Cruz 
University of La Verne 
University of San Diego 
University of San Francisco 
University of Southern California 
University of the Pacific 
Western University of Health Sciences 
247 
Table 3: Continued. 
State 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
District of Columbia 
Florida 
Institution Name 
Colorado School of Mines 
Colorado State University 
University of Colorado All Campuses 
University of Denver 
University of Northern Colorado 
University of Bridgeport 
University of Connecticut 
University of Hartford 
Yale University 
University of Delaware 
Wilmington College 
American University 
Catholic University of America 
George Washington University 
Georgetown University 
Howard University 
Argosy University-Sarasota Campus 
Barry University 
Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University 
Florida Atlantic University-Boca Raton 
Florida Institute of Technology-Melbourne 
Florida International University 
Florida State University 
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Table 3: Continued. 
State 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Institution Name 
Nova Southeastern University 
University of Central Florida 
University of Florida 
University of Miami 
University of South Florida 
University of West Florida 
Clark Atlanta University 
Emory University 
Georgia Institute of Technology-Main Campus 
Georgia Southern University 
Georgia State University 
Medical College of Georgia 
Morehouse School of Medicine 
University of Georgia 
University of Hawaii at Manoa 
Idaho State University 
University of Idaho 
DePaul University 
Illinois Institute of Technology 
Illinois State University 
Loyola University Chicago 
Midwestern University 
Northern Illinois University 
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Table 3 :  Continued. 
State 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Institution Name 
Northwestern University 
Rosalind Franklin University of Medicine and Science 
Rush University 
Southern Illinois University Carbondale 
Trinity International University 
University of Chicago 
University of Illinois at Chicago 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Ball State University 
Indiana State University 
Indiana University-Bloomington 
Purdue University-Main Campus 
University of Notre Dame 
Des Moines University-Osteopathic Medical Center 
Iowa State University 
University of Iowa 
Kansas State University 
University of Kansas All Campuses 
Wichita State University 
Spalding University 
University of Kentucky 
University of Louisville 
Louisiana State University & A&M & Hebert Laws Center 
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Table 3: Continued. 
State 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Institution Name 
Louisiana Tech University 
Tulane University of Louisiana 
University of Louisiana at Lafayette 
University of New Orleans 
University of Maine 
Johns Hopkins University 
Morgan State University 
University of Maryland-Baltimore 
University of Maryland-Baltimore County 
University of Maryland-College Park 
Boston College 
Boston University 
Brandeis University 
Clark University 
Harvard University 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Northeastern University 
Tufts University 
University of Massachusetts Medical School-Worcester 
University of Massachusetts-Amherst 
University of Massachusetts-Boston 
University of Massachusetts-Lowell 
Andrews University 
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Table 3: Continued. 
State 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Institution Name 
Central Michigan University 
Michigan State University 
Michigan Technological University 
Oakland University 
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor 
Wayne State University 
Western Michigan University 
Argosy University-Twin Cities Campus 
Capella University 
Mayo Graduate School 
Mayo Medical School 
Saint Mary's University of Minnesota 
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities 
University of St. Thomas 
Walden University 
Jackson State University 
Mississippi State University 
University of Mississippi All Campuses 
University of Southern Mississippi 
A T Still University of Health Sciences 
Kansas City University of Medicine and Biosciences 
Saint Louis University-Main Campus 
University of Missouri-Columbia 
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Table 3: Continued. 
State 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
Institution Name 
University of Missouri-Kansas City 
University of Missouri-Rolla 
University of Missouri-St. Louis 
Washington University in St. Louis 
Montana State University-Bozeman 
University of Montana-Missoula 
University of Nebraska at Lincoln 
University of Nebraska Medical Center 
University of Nevada-Las Vegas 
University of Nevada-Reno 
Antioch New England Graduate School-New Hampshire 
Dartmouth College 
University of New Hampshire-Main Campus 
Drew University 
New Jersey Institute of Technology 
Princeton University 
Rutgers University All Campuses 
Seton Hall University 
Stevens Institute of Technology 
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey 
New Mexico State University-Main Campus 
University of New Mexico-Main Campus 
Adelphi University 
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Table 3: Continued. 
State 
New York 
Institution Name 
Albany Medical College 
Clarkson University 
Columbia University in the City of New York 
Cornell University All Campuses 
CUNY Graduate School and University Center 
Fordham University 
Hofstra University 
Long Island University-C W Post Campus 
Mount Sinai School of Medicine 
New School University 
New York Medical College 
New York University 
Pace University-New York 
Polytechnic University 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 
Rockefeller University 
St. John's University-New York 
SUNY at Albany 
SUNY at Binghamton 
SUNY at Buffalo 
SUNY at Stony Brook 
SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry 
SUNY Health Science Center at Brooklyn 
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Table 3: Continued. 
State 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Institution Name 
SUNY Health Science Center at Syracuse 
Syracuse University 
Teachers College at Columbia University 
University of Roche.ster 
Yeshiva University 
Duke University 
East Carolina University 
North Carolina A & T State University 
North Carolina State University at Raleigh 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
University of North Carolina at Charlotte 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
Wake Forest University 
North Dakota State University-Main Campus 
University of North Dakota-Main Campus 
Bowling Green State University-Main Campus 
Case Western Reserve University 
Cleveland State University 
Kent State University-Main Campus 
Medical College of Ohio 
Miami University-Oxford 
Northeastern Ohio Universities College of Medicine 
Ohio State University-Main Campus 
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Table 3: Continued. 
State 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Institution Name 
Ohio University-Main Campus 
Union Institute & University 
University of Akron Main Campus 
University of Cincinnati-Main Campus 
University of Dayton 
University of Toledo 
Wright State University-Main Campus 
Oklahoma State University All Campuses 
Oral Roberts University 
University of Oklahoma All Campuses 
University of Tulsa 
George Fox University 
Oregon Health & Science University 
Oregon State University 
Pacific University 
Portland State University 
University of Oregon 
Carnegie Mellon University 
Drexel University 
Duquesne University 
Immaculata University 
Indiana University of Pennsylvania-Main Campus 
La Salle University 
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Table 3: Continued. 
State 
Pennsylvania 
Puerto Rico 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Institution Name 
Lake Erie College of Osteopathic Medicine 
Lehigh University 
Pennsylvania State University All Campuses 
Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine 
Temple University 
Thomas Jefferson University 
University of Pennsylvania 
University of Pittsburgh-Main Campus 
Widener University-Main Campus 
Carlos Albizu University 
Inter American University of Puerto Rico-Metro 
Ponce School of Medicine 
San Juan Bautista School of Medicine 
Universidad Central del Caribe 
University of Puerto Rico-Medical Sciences Campus 
University of Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras Campus 
Brown University 
University of Rhode Island 
Clemson University 
Medical University of South Carolina 
South Carolina State University 
University of South Carolina-Columbia 
South Dakota State University 
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Table 3: Continued. 
State 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Institution Name 
University of South Dakota 
East Tennessee State University 
Meharry Medical College 
Tennessee State University 
Trevecca Nazarene University 
University of Memphis 
University of Tennessee 
Vanderbilt University 
Baylor College of Medicine 
Baylor University 
Rice University 
Southern Methodist University 
Texas A & M University 
Texas A & M University System Health Science Center 
Texas A & M University-Kingsville 
Texas Christian University 
Texas Tech University 
Texas Woman's University 
University of Houston-University Park 
University of North Texas 
University ofNorth Texas-Health Sciences Center at Ft. Worth 
University of Texas at Arlington, The 
University of Texas at Austin, The 
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Table 3: Continued. 
State 
Texas 
Utah 
Virginia 
Vermont 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Institution Name 
University of Texas at Dallas, The 
University of Texas at El Paso, The 
University of Texas Health Science Center 
University of Texas Health Science-San Antonio 
University of Texas Medical Branch 
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas 
Brigham Young University 
University of Utah 
Utah State University 
College of William and Mary 
Eastern Virginia Medical School 
Edward Via Virginia College of Osteopathic Medicine 
George Mason University 
Old Dominion University 
Regent University 
University of Virginia-Main Campus 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 
University of Vermont and State Agricultural College 
University of Washington-Seattle Campus 
Washington State University 
West Virginia School of Osteopathic Medicine 
West Virginia University 
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Table 3 :  Continued. 
State 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
Institution Name 
Marquette University 
Medical College of Wisconsin 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
University of Wyoming 
Source: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 2006. 
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Table 4 :  Change in institutional rank by obligations and percentage of total obligations (all earmarks). 
A B C D E F G H I J 
1 University of Hawaii at Manoa 6 1  $62, 132,000 49 $ 167,877,000 0.0052 0.0067 29.58% 12  
2 University of Pittsburgh-Main Campus 17  $ 178, 148,000 12 $394,701 ,000 0.0 149 0.0 1 58 6.25% 5 
3 Loma Linda University 147 $ 13,435,000 146 $33,752,000 0.001 1 0.0014 20.48% 1 
4 University of Alabama 12 1  $25, 1 70,000 1 67 $2 1 ,323,000 0.0021 0.0009 -59.37% -46 
5 West Virginia University 92 $38,762,000 1 38 $36,639,000 0.0032 0.00 15 -54.67% -46 
6 University of Alaska Fairbanks 102 $32,425,000 97 $79,395,000 0.0027 0.0032 17 .43% 5 
7 Louisiana State Univ & A&M & Hebert Laws 55 $66,974,000 60 $ 136,850,000 0.0056 0.0055 -2.01% -5 Ctr 
N 8 University of South Florida 1 36 $ 17,574,000 98 $77,720,000 0.0015  0.003 1 1 12.08% 38 
9 Georgetown University 88 $39,328,000 93 $84,4 10,000 0.0033 0.0034 2.93% -5 
10  Texas A & M University 37 $93,733,000 67 $ 1 1 8,297,000 0.0078 0.0047 -39.48% -30 
1 1  Pennsylvania State University-Main Campus 1 8  $ 176,023,000 1 9  $345,920,000 0.0 147 0.0 139 -5.76% - 1  
12 University of Mississippi Main Campus 148 $ 12,974,000 1 13 $58,223,000 0.001 1 0.0023 1 1 5 .2 1% 35  
1 3  University of Missouri-Columbia 70 $5 1 ,943,000 70 $ 1 1 1 ,795,000 0.0043 0.0045 3 .22% 0 
14 University of New Hampshire-Main Campus 1 1 1 $29, 126,000 1 1 8 $49, 1 86,000 0.0024 0.0020 - 19.0 1% -7 
1 5  University of  Alabama in Huntsville 133 $ 17,972,000 1 59 $27,470,000 0.0015  0.001 1 -26.70% -26 
16  Michigan State University 39 $91 ,675,000 54 $ 1 55,587,000 0.0077 0.0062 - 18 .6 1% - 1 5  
17  University of  Alabama at Birmingham 43 $88,978,000 28 $253,617,000 0.0074 0.0 102 36.69% 1 5  
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B :  Institution; C :  Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D :  Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003. 
Table 4: Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
1 8  Auburn University Main Campus 1 07 $30,45 1 ,000 106 $68,046,000 0.0025 0.0027 7. 1 6% 1 
1 9  Iowa State University 73 $5 1 ,250,000 83 $95,8 1 1 ,000 0.0043 0.0038 - 10.35% - 10  
20 Mississippi State University 103 $3 1 ,995,000 107 $67,977,000 0.0027 0.0027 1 .89% -4 
2 1  Dartmouth College 84 $42,506,000 72 $ 1 1 0,238,000 0.0035 0.0044 24.37% 12  
22 Medical University of South Carolina 1 1 6 $26,545,000 7 1  $ 1 1 1 ,003,000 0.0022 0.0044 100.54% 45 
23 University of Minnesota-Twin Cities 10  $2 12, 127,000 20 $345,802,000 0.0 177 0.0 138 -2 1 .82% - 10  
24 University of Florida 30 $ 109,862,000 40 $ 195 ,296,000 0.0092 0.0078 - 14.75% - 10  
N 25 University of Michigan-Ann Arbor 5 $233,782,000 3 $520,754,000 0.0 195 0.0209 6.82% 2 
N 
26 Montana State University-Bozeman 1 30 $ 1 8,844,000 1 10 $62,09 1 ,000 0.0016 0.0025 58.02% 20 
27 Washington State University 95 $38, 1 02,000 108 $66,950,000 0.0032 0.0027 - 1 5 .73% - 13  
28 University of New Mexico-Main Campus 82 $43,387,000 86 $93,757,000 0.0036 0.0038 3 .63% -4 
29 Oregon State University 59 $62,960,000 84 $95,758,000 0.0053 0.0038 -27.06% -25 
30 University of Nebraska at Lincoln 94 $38,3 14,000 109 $63,799,000 0.0032 0.0026 -20. 14% - 15  
3 1  Cornell University-Endowed Colleges 7 $21 8,542,000 2 1  $334, 108,000 0.0 1 82 0.0 134 -26.68% -14 
32 University of North Dakota-Main Campus 127 $20,880,000 1 55 $29, 140,000 0.0017  0.00 12 -33.07% -28 
33 Rutgers University-New Brunswick 52 $72,384,000 58 $140,721 ,000 0.0060 0.0056 -6.77% -6 
34 Clemson University 122 $23,390,000 129 $43,7 16,000 0.0020 0.00 18  - 10.37% -7 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all eannarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 4: Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
35 North Carolina State University at Raleigh 48 $77,955,000 76 $ 10 1 ,444,000 0.0065 0.0041 -37.59% -28 
36 New Mexico State University-Main Campus 75 $50,270,000 1 12 $61 ,503,000 0.0042 0.0025 -41 .33% -37 
37 North Dakota State University-Main Campus 141  $ 1 5,767,000 1 36 $38,092,000 0.0013  0.00 15  1 5.86% 5 
38 University of Wisconsin-Madison 6 $222, 1 63,000 8 $434,927,000 0.0 1 85 0.0 174 -6. 12% -2 
39 University of Arizona 26 $ 122,6 10,000 39 $207, 1 32,000 0.0 102 0.0083 - 1 8.98% - 1 3  
40 Oklahoma State University-Main Campus 93 $38,472,000 1 1 5 $52,859,000 0.0032 0.0021 -34. 1 1% -22 
4 1  University of  Connecticut 7 1  $5 1 ,502,000 65 $ 1 19,729,000 0.0043 0.0048 1 1 .49% 6 
N 
42 Georgia Institute of Technology-Main Campus 5 1  $73,257,000 56 $ 144,324,000 0.0061 0.0058 -5.52% -5 
43 University of Texas at Austin, The 27 $ 12 1 ,429,000 25 $274,827,000 0.0 10 1  0.0 1 10  8.54% 2 
44 Oregon Health & Science University 68 $54,061 ,000 45 $ 176,3 19,000 0.0045 0.0071 56.4 1% 23 
45 Texas Tech University 1 67 $8,767,000 153 $30,584,000 0.0007 0.0012 67.30% 14 
46 Carnegie Mellon University 54 $67,580,000 68 $ 1 1 6,405,000 0.0056 0.0047 - 17.40% - 14 
47 Northwestern University 46 $84,1 89,000 33 $21 3,558,000 0.0070 0.0086 2 1 .65% 1 3  
48 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 24 $ 147,492,000 26 $264, 1 78,000 0.0 123 0.0 106 - 14. 1 0% -2 
49 University of Kentucky 66 $57,722,000 62 $ 129,790,000 0.0048 0.0052 7.83% 4 
50 University of Iowa 34 $98,9 13,000 4 1  $ 188,861 ,000 0.0083 0.0076 -8.43% -7 
5 1  Florida State University 9 1  $38,788,000 95 $79,963,000 0.0032 0.0032 - 1 . 14% -4 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 4 :  Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
52 University of South Carolina-Columbia 125 $22,2 10,000 140 $36, 1 56,000 0.0019  0.0014 -2 1 .93% - 15  
53  Kansas State University 1 12 $28,327,000 125 $45,53 1 ,000 0.0024 0.00 18 -22.92% - 13  
54 University of Idaho 13 1 $ 1 8,430,000 130 $42,6 10,000 0.001 5  0.0017  10.88% 1 
55 Ohio State University-Main Campus 3 1  $ 109,413 ,000 32 $2 14,200,000 0.0091 0.0086 -6. 1 1% - 1  
56  University of  Southern Mississippi 1 92 $5,703,000 1 64 $25,080,000 0.0005 0.0010 1 10.90% 28 
57 University of Washington-Seattle Campus 2 $280,054,000 2 $63 1 , 144,000 0.0234 0.0253 8.08% 0 
58 University of Maryland-College Park 40 $90,648,000 5 1  $ 1 57,668,000 0.0076 0.0063 -1 6.59% -1 1 
N 59 San Diego State University 144 $ 14,661 ,000 1 37 $37,526,000 0.0012 0.00 15  22.75% 7 
60 Purdue University-Main Campus 4 1  $89,8 1 7,000 63 $ 126,788,000 0.0075 0.005 1 -32.30% -22 
6 1  University of Miami 50 $75,487,000 59 $138,941 ,000 0.0063 0.0056 - 1 1 .73% -9 
62 University of New Orleans 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
63 Polytechnic University 195 $5,457,000 220 $7, 1 60,000 0.0005 0.0003 -37.08% -25 
64 University of Nevada-Las Vegas 1 87 $6,6 16,000 173 $ 1 8,263,000 0.0006 0.0007 32.38% 14  
65 University of Georgia 57 $64,375,000 78 $ 100,293,000 0.0054 0.0040 -25 .29% -2 1 
66 University of Louisville 1 70 $8,550,000 1 16 $52,843,000 0.0007 0.0021 1 96.39% 54 
67 University of Utah 47 $82, 1 05,000 43 $ 1 82, 199,000 0.0069 0.0073 6.42% 4 
68 Illinois Institute of Technology 1 84 $6,989,000 201 $ 10,9 10,000 0.0006 0.0004 -25. 14% - 17  
Key to column headings: A :  Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B :  Institution; C :  Rank of  institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D :  Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change betw�n 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003. 
Table 4: Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
69 Indiana University-Bloomington 33 $ 10 1 , 1 56,000 46 $ 174,268,000 0.0084 0.007 - 17.38% - 13  
70 Boston University 45 $85,250,000 1 7  $347, 1 52,000 0.0071 0.01 39 95.29% 28 
7 1  Drexel University 149 $ 12,792,000 126 $45,328,000 0.001 1 0.0018  69.93% 23 
72 Tulane University of Louisiana 10 1  $34,068,000 9 1  $88,066,000 0.0028 0.0035 23 .97% 10  
73 Stevens Institute of Technology 239 $2,093,000 1 79 $ 16,476,000 0.0002 0.0007 277.5 1% 60 
74 George Mason University 166 $8,957,000 1 50 $32,5 14,000 0.0007 0.0013  74.08% 16  
75 University of Tennessee, The 99 $35,446,000 1 1 1  $61 ,999,000 0.0030 0.0025 - 16. 1 2% -12 
N 76 Johns Hopkins University 1 $660,675,000 1 $ 1 , 137,366,000 0.0552 0.0455 - 1 7.44% 0 
77 University of Arkansas Main Campus 1 1 5 $26,850,000 1 54 $29,554,000 0.0022 0.0012 -47.2 1% -39 
78 University of Nevada-Reno 142 $ 1 5 ,657,000 1 14 $56,806,000 0.001 3  0.0023 73.99% 28 
79 University of Montana-Missoula, The 1 77 $7,380,000 1 63 $25,343,000 0.0006 0.0010  64.68% 14 
80 University of Massachusetts-Amherst 96 $37,443,000 94 $81 ,9 15 ,000 0.003 1 0.0033 4.92% 2 
8 1  Massachusetts Institute of Technology 3 $275,279,000 23 $291 ,879,000 0.0230 0.0 1 17  -49. 1 5% -20 
82 University of Texas Health Science Center 97 $36,322,000 77 $ 10 1 ,305,000 0.0030 0.0041 33.75% 20 
83 Colorado State University 65 $59,2 17,000 66 $ 1 19,497,000 0.0049 0.0048 -3.23% - 1  
84 SUNY at Buffalo 78 $48,052,000 100 $73,935,000 0.0040 0.0030 -26.2 1% -22 
85 Utah State University 63 $60,349,000 90 $90,670,000 0.0050 0.0036 -27.95% -27 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003. 
Table 4 :  Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
86 University of Missouri-Rolla 200 $4,814,000 188 $ 14,2 14,000 0.0004 0.0006 4 1 .60% 12 
87 University of Pennsylvania 14 $ 193,366,000 4 $495,264,000 0.0 16 1  0.0 1 98 22.83% 10 
88 University of Maine 15 1 $ 12,079,000 148 $33,252,000 0.0010  0.0013  32.02% 3 
89 University of Rochester 25 $ 132,965,000 30 $228,985,000 0.0 1 1 1  0.0092 - 17.4 1% -5 
90 Florida International University 2 16  $3,608,000 156 $28,5 1 1 ,000 0.0003 0.001 1 278.96% 60 
9 1  Harvard University 1 3  $ 198,3 10,000 14 $384,89 1 ,000 0.0 166 0.0 1 54 -6.92% - 1  
92 New York University 32 $ 102,009,000 47 $ 173,449,000 0.0085 0.0069 - 18 .46% - 15  
N 93 University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey 85 $42,45 1 ,000 57 $ 14 1 ,8 17,000 0.0035 0.0057 60.2 1% 28 °' °' 94 University of California-Davis 35 $96,998,000 34 $212,7 1 8,000 0.008 1 0.0085 5 . 1 7% 1 
95 Arizona State University at the Tempe Campus 1 1 3 $28,3 17,000 103 $72,483,000 0.0024 0.0029 22.75% 10  
96  Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 77 $48, 196,000 104 $71 ,843,000 0.0040 0.0029 -28.5 1% -27 
97 University of Rhode Island 1 19 $25,378,000 1 35 $38,776,000 0.0021 0.0016  -26.73% - 16  
98 University of Notre Dame 132 $ 1 8,034,000 127 $44,0 1 7,000 0.0015  0.0018 1 7.05% 5 
99 University of Central Florida 1 8 1  $7,229,000 133 $41 ,486,000 0.0006 0.0017  1 75 .2 1% 48 
100 Tufts University 79 $47,324,000 10 1  $73,2 1 8,000 0.0040 0.0029 -25.80% -22 
101  University of Delaware 108 $29,746,000 102 $73,043,000 0.0025 0.0029 17.76% 6 
102 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 20 $ 1 5 1 ,949,000 1 8  $346,008,000 0.0 127 0.0 1 39 9.20% 2 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003. 
Table 4: Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
103 University of Colorado at Boulder 19  $ 167,427,000 1 5  $367,867,000 0.0 140 0.0 147 5.37% 4 
104 Wichita State University 237 $2,224,000 2 12  $8,328,000 0.0002 0.0003 79.58% 25 
105 Howard University 120 $25,204,000 145 $33,805,000 0.002 1 0.00 14 -35 .68% -25 
106 Jackson State University 188 $6,478,000 174 $ 1 8, 107,000 0.0005 0.0007 34.05% 14 
107 Columbia University in the City ofNew York 12 $202, 128,000 9 $42 1 ,760,000 0.0 169 0.0 169 0.07% 3 
108 University of California-Santa Barbara 72 $5 1 ,433,000 80 $99,070,000 0.0043 0.0040 -7.63% -8 
109 Indiana University of Pennsylvania-Main Campus 270 $524,000 263 $ 1 ,26 1 ,000 0.0000 0.0001 1 5 .4 1% 7 
N 1 10 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 126 $2 1 ,624,000 142 $35,255,000 0.00 18  0.00 14 -2 1 .8 1% - 16  
1 1 1  Southern Illinois University Carbondale 178 $7,353,000 206 $9,948,000 0.0006 0.0004 -35 . 12% -28 
1 12 University of California-San Francisco 1 1  $209,638,000 13  $393,078,000 0.0 175 0.0 1 57 -10.08% -2 
1 1 3 New Jersey Institute of Technology 189 $6,274,000 194 $ 12,765,000 0.0005 0.0005 -2.43% -5 
1 14 University of California-Riverside 139 $ 16,832,000 1 3 1  $42,3 17,000 0.00 14 0.00 17  20.57% 8 
1 1 5 Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University 152 $ 1 1 ,988,000 1 57 $28,0 12,000 0.00 10 0.001 1 12.06% -5 
1 16 Wayne State University 8 1  $44,365,000 8 1  $98,738,000 0.0037 0.0040 6.73% 0 
1 17 Florida Atlantic University-Boca Raton 179 $7,268,000 204 $ 10,399,000 0.0006 0.0004 -3 1 .38% -25 
1 18 University of West Florida, The 238 $2,094,000 24 1 $3,829,000 0.0002 0.0002 -1 1 . 1 6% 3 
1 19 University of Southern California 2 1  $ 1 5 1 ,454,000 24 $279,442,000 0.0 126 0.0 1 12 -1 1 .52% -3 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C:  Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 4: Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
1 20 Syracuse University 138  $ 17,039,000 1 62 $25,896,000 0.0014 0.00 10  -27. 1 2% -24 
1 2 1  University of Oklahoma Norman Campus 1 05 $30,787,000 96 $79,954,000 0.0026 0.0032 24.54% 9 
122 University of Vermont and State Agricultural Coll 98 $36,3 19,000 89 $91 , 1 1 6,000 0.0030 0.0036 20.3 1 %  9 
123 University of Kansas Main Campus 83 $43 , 128,000 82 $97,653,000 0.0036 0.0039 8.59% 1 
124 George Washington University 123 $22,976,000 1 05 $70,820,000 0.00 19  0.0028 47.82% 1 8  
1 25 Lehigh University 146 $ 13,636,000 1 84 $ 15 ,799,000 0.00 1 1 0.0006 -44.44% -38 
1 26 University of Houston-University Park 1 24 $22,78 1 ,000 143 $35 , 174,000 0.00 19  0.00 14 -25 .95% - 19  
N 
1 27 Northeastern University 145 $ 14,6 14,000 1 58 $27,973,000 0.0012  0.00 1 1 -8.2 1 %  - 13  
128 East Tennessee State University 248 $ 1 , 1 74,000 230 $6,026,000 0.0001 0.0002 146. 1 6% 1 8  
129 Stanford University 4 $270,056,000 6 $467, 1 53,000 0.0225 0.0 1 87 - 1 7.04% -2 
1 30 South Carolina State University 198 $4,957,000 22 1 $7,027,000 0.0004 0.0003 -32.02% -23 
1 3 1  Brown University 86 $40,877,000 85 $94,196,000 0.0034 0.0038 1 0.5 1%  1 
1 32 University of Oregon 1 09 $29,605,000 1 34 $41 ,362,000 0.0025 0.00 1 7  -33 .00% -25 
1 33 Medical College of Wisconsin 1 1 8 $25,402,000 79 $99,976,000 0.0021 0.0040 88.75% 39 
1 34 University of St. Thomas 275 $240,000 276 $408,000 0.0000 0.0000 - 1 8.47% - 1  
1 35 University of Texas Southwestern Med Ctr (Dallas) 58 $63,950,000 44 $ 1 82, 142,000 0.0053 0.0073 36.59% 14  
1 36 Wake Forest University 87 $40,480,000 64 $ 122,656,000 0.0034 0.0049 45.3 1 %  23 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 4 :  Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
1 37 University of Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras Campus 1 56 $ 10,757,000 141  $35,35 1 ,000 0.0009 0.0014 57.60% 1 5  
1 38 Indiana State University 257 $950,000 264 $ 1 ,215 ,000 0.0001 0.0000 -38.67% -7 
1 39 University of Texas at El Paso 158 $ 10,257,000 1 68 $ 19,672,000 0.0009 0.0008 -8.02% - 10  
140 University of South Dakota 232 $2,685,000 202 $10,72 1 ,000 0.0002 0.0004 9 1 .49% 30 
141  Northern Arizona University 182 $7, 100,000 1 72 $ 1 8,723,000 0.0006 0.0007 26.46% 10  
142 Northern Illinois University 203 $4,599,000 237 $4,086,000 0.0004 0.0002 -57.39% -34 
143 University of California-San Diego 9 $214,975,000 7 $466,450,000 0.0 179 0.0 1 87 4.06% 2 
N 144 South Dakota State University 159 $9,856,000 1 83 $ 15 ,904,000 0.0008 0.0006 -22.62% -24 
145 University of Missouri-St. Louis 2 1 8  $3,478,000 247 $3,446,000 0.0003 0.0001 -52.48% -29 
146 Louisiana Tech University 1 57 $ 10,7 18,000 252 $2,620,000 0.0009 0.0001 -88.28% -95 
147 University of Virginia-Main Campus 44 $86,007,000 42 $ 185,567,000 0.0072 0.0074 3 .47% 2 
148 Portland State University 2 17  $3,55 1 ,000 226 $6,454,000 0.0003 0.0003 - 12.84% -9 
149 Western Michigan University 193 $5,53 1 ,000 198 $ 1 1 ,884,000 0.0005 0.0005 3 .04% -5 
1 50 Case Western Reserve University 36 $94,254,000 38 $207,734,000 0.0079 0.0083 5 .70% -2 
1 5 1  University of Maryland-Baltimore 67 $54,644,000 6 1  $ 136,203,000 0.0046 0.0055 19.53% 6 
1 52 Ohio University-Main Campus 2 14 $3,9 16,000 203 $ 10,637,000 0.0003 0.0004 30.26% 1 1  
1 53 University of California-Berkeley 1 6  $ 185 ,232,000 29 $245,570,000 0.0 1 55 0.0098 -36.42% - 1 3  
Key to column headings: A :  Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B :  Institution; C :  Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1992; D :  Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003. 
Table 4: Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
1 54 Clark Atlanta University 1 10 $29,449,000 2 1 1 $8,646,000 0.0025 0.0003 -85 .92% - 10 1  
1 55 Idaho State University 252 $ 1 , 1 20,000 23 1 $5,497,000 0.000 1 0.0002 135.37% 2 1  
1 56 Temple University 1 14 $27,472,000 122 $46,544,000 0.0023 0.0019  - 1 8.75% -8 
1 57 Loyola University Chicago 1 62 $9,266,000 1 52 $32,271 ,000 0.0008 0.0013  67.02% 10  
1 58 University of Dayton 106 $30,5 15 ,000 12 1  $46,599,000 0.0025 0.0019  -26.77% - 1 5  
1 59 Morgan State University 220 $3,294,000 193 $ 12,836,000 0.0003 0.0005 86.88% 27 
160 University of San Francisco 244 $ 1 ,504,000 272 $694,000 0.0001 0.0000 -77.87% -28 
N 1 6 1  Rush University 260 $752,000 120 $46,697,000 0.0001 0.0019  2878.0% 140 
1 62 Boston College 1 97 $5,004,000 1 77 $ 16,598,000 0.0004 0.0007 59.07% 20 
1 63 West Virginia School of Osteopathic Medicine 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
1 64 University of California-Los Angeles 8 $2 15,75 1 ,000 5 $475,65 1 ,000 0.0 1 80 0.0 190 5 .73% 3 
1 65 University of Toledo 205 $4,538,000 200 $ 1 1 ,277,000 0.0004 0.0005 19. 1 7% 5 
1 66 University of Wyoming 140 $ 16,340,000 1 6 1  $26,807,000 0.0014 0.00 1 1 -2 1 .32% -2 1 
1 67 Yeshiva University 49 $77,808,000 52 $ 1 56,637,000 0.0065 0.0063 -3.46% -3 
1 68 University of California-Santa Cruz 129 $ 19, 1 64,000 1 19 $48, 141 ,000 0.0016  0.0019  20.47% 10  
169 University of San Diego 249 $ 1 , 148,000 268 $ 1 ,067,000 0.0001 0.0000 -55.43% - 19  
1 70 Thomas Jefferson University 100 $34,9 14,000 92 $87,1 86,000 0.0029 0.0035 19.76% 8 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 4: Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
1 7 1  Barry University 265 $65 1 ,000 240 $3,896,000 0.0001 0.0002 1 87.00% 25 
1 72 Rice University 1 17 $25,987,000 1 17 $5 1 ,472,000 0.0022 0.0021 -5.0 1% 0 
1 73 Wright State University-Main Campus 160 $9,649,000 1 85 $15 ,455,000 0.0008 0.0006 -23 . 19% -25 
1 74 Fordham University 246 $ 1 ,372,000 271 $805,000 0.0001 0.0000 -7 1 .86% -25 
1 75 University of Cincinnati-Main Campus 64 $59,65 1 ,000 69 $ 1 12,4 17,000 0.0050 0.0045 -9.62% -5 
1 76 Kent State University-Main Campus 186 $6,702,000 1 97 $ 12,287,000 0.0006 0.0005 -12.08% - 1 1 
1 77 Immaculata University 285 $0 283 $84,000 0.0000 0.0000 NIA 2 
N 1 78 Marquette University 227 $2,975,000 2 17  $7,772,000 0.0002 0.0003 25.28% 10  
1 79· University of California-Irvine 56 $66,369,000 55 $ 1 5 1 ,085,000 0.0055 0.0060 9 . 17% 1 
1 80 SUNY at Albany 134 $ 17,853,000 1 8 1  $ 16, 1 92,000 0.00 15  0.0006 -56.5 1% -47 
1 8 1  Virginia Commonwealth University 76 $48,580,000 88 $91 ,372,000 0.0041 0.0037 -9.80% - 12  
1 82 Morehouse School of Medicine 1 69 $8,563,000 144 $34,887,000 0.0007 0.0014 95.38% 25 
1 83 University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 1 80 $7,260,000 178 $ 16,527,000 0.0006 0.0007 9. 1 7% 2 
184 Old Dominion University 1 85 $6,869,000 1 75 $ 17,546,000 0.0006 0.0007 22.50% 10  
1 85 Brandeis University 128 $ 19,302,000 1 5 1  $32,462,000 0.00 16 0.0013  - 19.35% -23 
1 86 Central Michigan University 269 $548,000 244 $3,75 1 ,000 0.0000 0.0002 228.26% 25 
1 87 University of Maryland-Baltimore County 208 $4,437,000 1 39 $36,529,000 0.0004 0.0015  294.82% 69 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1992-2003; B: Institution; C:  Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J :  Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 4: Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
1 88 University of Akron Main Campus 202 $4,724,000 2 18  $7,698,000 0.0004 0.0003 -2 1 .85% - 16  
1 89 University of Illinois at Chicago 74 $50,798,000 53 $ 156, 138,000 0.0042 0.0063 47.40% 2 1  
1 90 University of Texas Medical Branch, The 104 $3 1 ,505,000 36 $208,286,000 0.0026 0.0083 2 1 7.05% 68 
1 9 1  Meharry Medical College 1 50 $ 12,464,000 1 60 $27,3 1 8,000 0.0010 0.001 1 5 . 1 1% - 10  
1 92 University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences 1 55 $1 1 ,744,000 209 $8,883,000 0.0010  0.0004 -63 .73% -54 
1 93 Northeastern Ohio Universities College of Medicine 254 $ 1 ,043,000 250 $3,075,000 0.0001 0.0001 4 1 .39% 4 
194 Yale University 1 5  $ 190,388,000 16  $349,560,000 0.0 159 0.0 140 - 1 1 .95% - 1  
N 1 95 Princeton University 60 $62,373,000 73 $ 107,933,000 0.0052 0.0043 - 17.0 1% - 13  
N 1 96 University of Nebraska Medical Center 1 54 $ 1 1 ,747,000 124 $46,476,000 0.0010  0.0019  89.74% 30 
1 97 North Carolina A & T State University 153 $ 1 1 ,866,000 1 69 $ 19,644,000 0.0010  0.0008 -20.6 1% - 16  
198 University of Missouri-Kansas City 190 $6,079,000 187 $ 14,8 10,000 0.0005 0.0006 16.83% 3 
199 University of Texas at Dallas, The 199 $4,860,000 199 $ 1 1 ,327,000 0.0004 0.0005 1 1 .77% 0 
200 College of William and Mary 172 $8, 1 88,000 1 86 $ 14,983,000 0.0007 0.0006 - 12.25% -14 
201 University of North Carolina at Greensboro 1 74 $7,868,000 232 $5,170,000 0.0007 0.0002 -68.49% -58 
202 DePaul University 26 1 $744,000 239 $3,9 10,000 0.0001 0.0002 1 52.03% 22 
203 Ball State University 268 $55 1 ,000 242 $3,820,000 0.0000 0.0002 232.48% 26 
204 University of Tulsa 222 $3, 1 7 1 ,000 234 $4,5 1 1 ,000 0.0003 0.0002 -3 1 .78% - 12  
Key to column headings: A :  Rank of  institutions by all earmarks received, 1992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of  institution by total S&E obligations, 1992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003. 
Table 4: Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
205 Tennessee State University 1 63 $9, 1 60,000 1 76 $ 17,279,000 0.0008 0.0007 -9.54% - 1 3  
206 University of Texas Health Science-San Antonio 80 $45,700,000 87 $91 ,787,000 0.0038 0.0037 -3.68% -7 
207 Vanderbilt University 38 $93,0 10,000 27 $263,8 12,000 0.0078 0.0 106 36.02% 1 1  
208 SUNY Coll of Environmental Science and Forestry 266 $61 8,000 246 $3,536,000 0.0001 0.0001 1 74.39% 20 
209 Georgia State University 175 $7,529,000 170 $ 19,252,000 0.0006 0.0008 22.63% 5 
2 10  Saint Louis University-Main Campus 137 $ 17,206,000 132 $41 ,983 ,000 0.00 14 0.00 17  17.01% 5 
2 1 1  SUNY at Stony Brook 62 $61 ,976,000 74 $ 107,534,000 0.0052 0.0043 -1 6.79% - 12  
N 212  Emory University 53 $68,1 64,000 3 1  $2 14,970,000 0.0057 0.0086 5 1 .24% 22 
2 13  Michigan Technological University 1 76 $7,427,000 195 $ 12,602,000 0.0006 0.0005 -1 8.63% - 19  
2 14 Duke University 22 $ 1 5 1 ,087,000 1 1  $412,069,000 0.0 126 0.0 165 30.79% 1 1  
2 14 Medical College of Georgia 171  $8,413 ,000 149 $32,642,000 0.0007 0.00 13 86.07% 22 
214  City of  Hope Graduate School of Biological Science 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
2 17  New York Medical College 143 $ 14,776,000 1 66 $22, 1 1 8,000 0.00 12 0.0009 -28.2 1% -23 
2 1 8  Southern Methodist University 204 $4,547,000 190 $13 ,26 1 ,000 0.0004 0.0005 39.86% 14 
219 University of Northern Colorado 242 $1 ,764,000 259 $ 1 ,7 19,000 0.0001 0.0001 -53 .27% - 17  
220 University of Texas at Arlington, The 2 12 $4,03 1 ,000 205 $ 10,325,000 0.0003 0.0004 22.84% 7 
221 Nova Southeastern University 262 $735,000 257 $ 1 ,973,000 0.0001 0.0001 28.73% 5 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J : Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 4 :  Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
222 Des Moines University-Osteopathic Medical Center 285 $0 288 $0 0 0 NIA -3 
223 Washington University in St. Louis 23 $ 148,036,000 10  $41 9,0 14,000 0.0 124 0.0 1 68 35.74% 1 3  
224 University of Chicago 28 $ 1 1 8,03 1 ,000 37 $208, 1 39,000 0.0099 0.0083 - 15 .43% -9 
225 Oakland University 224 $3,041 ,000 223 $6,73 1 ,000 0.0003 0.0003 6. 1 5% 
226 Hofstra University 245 $ 1 ,401 ,000 192 $ 12,977,000 0.0001 0.0005 344.2 1% 53  
227 East Carolina University 1 96 $5,239,000 2 1 6  $7,864,000 0.0004 0.0003 -28.01 %  -20 
228 Texas A & M University-Kingsville 259 $783,000 245 $3,649,000 0.0001 0.0001 1 23.49% 14 
N 229 Colorado School of Mines 1 9 1  $5,964,000 189 $ 14, 197,000 0.0005 0.0006 14. 1 6% 2 
230 Cleveland State University 200 $4,8 14,000 227 $6,252,000 0.0004 0.0003 -37.72% -27 
23 1 Eastern Virginia Medical School 168 $8,742,000 229 $6,029,000 0.0007 0.0002 -66.93% -6 1 
232 Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine 280 $ 104,000 279 $232,000 0.0000 0.0000 6.98% 
233 Mount Sinai School of Medicine 69 $52,529,000 48 $ 170,932,000 0.0044 0.0068 56.05% 2 1  
234 Illinois State University 223 $3,079,000 243 $3,80 1 ,000 0.0003 0.0002 -40.80% -20 
235 Clark University 229 $2,894,000 254 $2,403,000 0.0002 0.0001 -60. 1 8% -25 
236 University of Denver 183 $6,996,000 2 1 0  $8,8 1 8,000 0.0006 0.0004 -39.55% -27 
237 Adelphi University 264 $652,000 280 $201 ,000 0.000 1 0.0000 -85 .22% - 1 6  
238 Widener University-Main Campus 278 $ 1 14,000 282 $ 1 1 6,000 0.0000 0.0000 -5 1 .20% -4 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C:  Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 4: Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
239 Clarkson University 207 $4,498,000 235 $4,497,000 0.0004 0.0002 -52.05% -28 
240 Bowling Green State University-Main Campus 23 1 $2,720,000 225 $6,475,000 0.0002 0.0003 14. 1 6% 6 
241 University of Massachusetts-Boston 209 $4, 126,000 2 19  $7,452,000 0.0003 0.0003 - 13 .39% - 10  
242 Georgia Southern University 258 $943,000 262 $ 1 ,309,000 0.0001 0.0001 -33 .43% -4 
243 Medical College of Ohio 1 73 $7,924,000 19 1  $ 13 ,025,000 0.0007 0.0005 -2 1 . 1 7% - 18  
244 University of Memphis 2 1 1 $4,094,000 214  $8, 148,000 0.0003 0.0003 -4.56% -3 
245 University of North Texas 230 $2,830,000 1 80 $ 16,4 16,000 0.0002 0.0007 1 78. 1 8% 50 
N 
246 University of Massachusetts-Lowell 206 $4,5 13,000 2 1 5  $7,870,000 0.0004 0.0003 - 16.37% -9 
247 Baylor University 272 $377,000 274 $56 1 ,000 0.0000 0.0000 -28.64% -2 
248 Long Island University-C W Post Campus 247 $ 1 ,2 18,000 25 1 $2,842,000 0.0001 0.0001 1 1 .90% -4 
249 University of Louisiana at Lafayette 234 $2,443,000 238 $3,952,000 0.0002 0.0002 -22.42% -4 
250 Brigham Young University 1 94 $5,485,000 207 $9,398,000 0.0005 0.0004 - 1 7.83% - 13  
25 1 SUNY Health Science Center at Syracuse 165 $9,079,000 1 7 1  $ 19,091 ,000 0.0008 0.0008 0.84% -6 
252 Baylor College of Medicine 42 $89,304,000 22 $297,252,000 0.0075 0.0 1 19  59.63% 20 
253 Lake Erie College of Osteopathic Medicine 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
253 University ofNorth Texas-Hlth Sci Ctr (Ft. Worth) 226 $2,981 ,000 288 $0 0.0002 0.0000 - 100.0% -62 
255 Golden Gate University-San Francisco 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I :  Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003. 
Table 4: Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
256 University of the Pacific 249 $ 1 , 148,000 266 $ 1 , 1 12,000 0.0001 0.0000 -53 .55% - 1 7  
257 Drew University 276 $ 1 86,000 275 $5 17,000 0.0000 0.0000 33.30% 
258 University of Hartford 253 $ 1 ,095,000 269 $925,000 0.0001 0.0000 -59.49% - 16  
259 SUNY Health Science Center at Brooklyn 1 35 $ 17,747,000 1 65 $23,01 1 ,000 0.00 15  0.0009 -37.82% -30 
260 Alliant International University-San Diego 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
261 University of North Carolina at Charlotte 228 $2,9 10,000 1 82 $ 16, 1 86,000 0.0002 0.0006 1 66.74% 46 
262 New School University 274 $321 ,000 260 $ 1 ,423,000 0.0000 0.0001 1 12.59% 14  
N 263 Pace University-New York 267 $570,000 241 $3,879,000 0.0000 0.0002 226.36% 26 
264 SUNY at Binghamton 2 1 5  $3,792,000 208 $9, 1 05,000 0.0003 0.0004 1 5. 1 5% 7 
265 Seton Hall University 241 $ 1 ,789,000 256 $2,021 ,000 0.0001 0.0001 -45 .82% - 1 5  
265 St. John's University-New York 256 $ 1 ,014,000 288 $0 0.0001 0.0000 - 100.0% -32 
267 Miami University-Oxford 210  $4,099,000 236 $4,491 ,000 0.0003 0.0002 -47.46% -26 
268 La Salle University 285 $0 277 $39 1 ,000 0.0000 0.0000 NIA 8 
269 American University 233 $2,459,000 258 $ 1 ,754,000 0.0002 0.0001 -65 .79% -25 
270 Spalding University 285 $0 286 $36,000 0.0000 0.0000 NIA - 1  
27 1 The Scripps Research Institute 279 $ 108,000 35  $209,937,000 0.0000 0.0084 93 120% 244 
271 California Institute of Technology 29 $ 109,877,000 50 $ 164,054,000 0.0092 0.0066 -28.40% -2 1 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all eannarks received, 1992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003. 
Table 4: Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
27 1 University of Massachusetts Medical Sch Worcester 90 $38,955,000 75 $ 102,594,000 0.0033 0.0041 26.30% 1 5  
271 Rockefeller University 89 $39,28 1 ,000 99 $75, 1 56,000 0.0033 0.0030 -8.25% - 10  
271 University of Arkansas at Little Rock 225 $3,0 19,000 123 $46,522,000 0.0003 0.0019  639.00% 102 
271 Texas A & M University System Health Science Ctr 285 $0 128 $43,998,000 0.0000 0.0018  NIA 1 57 
271 University of Puerto Rico-Med Sciences Campus 1 6 1  $9,508,000 147 $33,729,000 0.0008 0.0014 70. 12% 14  
271  Albany Medical College 164 $9,085,000 196 $ 12,488,000 0.0008 0.0005 -34.08% -32 
271 Universidad Central del Caribe 25 1 $ 1 , 142,000 2 1 3  $8,234,000 0.0001 0.0003 245 .77% 38 
N 271 Catholic University of America 2 13  $3,933,000 222 $6,765,000 0.0003 0.0003 - 17.5 1 % -9 
-.l 
-.l 271 Ponce School of Medicine 236 $2,356,000 224 $6,625,000 0.0002 0.0003 34.85% 1 2  
271 Teachers College at Columbia University 235 $2,377,000 228 $6, 145,000 0.0002 0.0002 23 .98% 7 
27 1 Florida Institute of Technology-Melbourne 240 $ 1 ,897,000 233 $4,600,000 0.0002 0.0002 1 6.29% 7 
271 Texas Christian University 221 $3, 194,000 248 $3,352,000 0.0003 0.0001 -49.67% -27 
271 CUNY Graduate School and University Center 2 19  $3,346,000 249 $3, 129,000 0.0003 0.0001 -55 . 1 5% -30 
271 Duquesne University 263 $667,000 253 $2,580,000 0.0001 0.0001 85.50% 10  
271 Inter American University of Puerto Rico-Metro 243 $ 1 ,572,000 255 $2,359,000 0.0001 0.0001 -28.03% - 12  
271 Texas Woman's University 255 $ 1 ,029,000 261 $ 1 ,368,000 0.0001 0.0001 -36.24% -6 
271 Andrews University 283 $ 19,000 265 $ 1 , 135 ,000 0.0000 0.0000 2765% 1 8  
Key to column headings: A :  Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1992-2003; B :  Institution; C :  Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D :  Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 4: Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
271 Claremont Graduate University 284 $ 10,000 267 $ 1 ,071 ,000 0.0000 0.0000 5036% 17  
27 1 Midwestern University 27 1 $382,000 270 $846,000 0.0000 0.0000 6.2 1% 
271 Pepperdine University 277 $ 143,000 273 $570,000 0.0000 0.0000 9 1 . 1 6% 4 
271 Carlos Albizu University 285 $0 278 $379,000 0.0000 0.0000 NIA 7 
271 Pacific University 28 1 $64,000 28 1 $ 130,000 0.0000 0.0000 -2.59% 0 
271 Western University of Health Sciences 285 $0 284 $70,000 0.0000 0.0000 NIA 1 
271 Wilmington College 285 $0 285 $50,000 0.0000 0.0000 NIA 0 
N 271 Saint Mary's University of Minnesota 273 $324,000 287 $25,000 0.0000 0.0000 -96.30% - 14  
27 1 A T Still University of Health Sciences 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
271 Antioch New England Graduate School (NH) 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
27 1 Argosy University-Orange Campus 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
271 Argosy University-Sarasota Campus 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
271 Argosy University-Twin Cities Campus 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
27 1 Azusa Pacific University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
271 Biola University 282 $20,000 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 - 1 00.0% -6 
27 1 California Institute of Integral Studies 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
27 1 Capella University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 4: Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
271 Edward Via Virginia Coll of Osteopathic Medicine 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
27 1 Fielding Graduate University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
271 George Fox University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
271 Kansas City University of Medicine and Biosciences 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
271 Mayo Graduate School 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
271 Mayo Medical School 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
27 1 Midwestern University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
N 271 Northcentral University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
271 Oral Roberts University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
271 Pacifica Graduate Institute 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
27 1 Regent University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
271 Rosalind Franklin University of Med and Science 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
271 Samford University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
271 San Juan Bautista School of Medicine 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
271 Trevecca Nazarene University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
27 1 Trinity International University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
271 Union Institute & University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003. 
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Table 4: Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
271 University of Bridgeport 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
27 1 University of La Verne 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
271 University of Phoenix-Online Campus 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
271 Walden University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I : Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007 
Table 5: Change in institutional rank by obligations and percentage of total obligations (including only Science and 
Engineering earmarks}. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
1 University of Hawaii at Manoa 6 1  $62, 1 32,000 49 $ 167,877,000 0.0052 0.0067 29.58% 12  
2 University of Pittsburgh-Main Campus 1 7  $ 178, 148,000 12 $394,701 ,000 0.0 149 0.0 1 58 6.25% 5 
3 University of Alabama, The 1 2 1  $25, 1 70,000 1 67 $21 ,323,000 0.0021 0.0009 -59.37% -46 
4 West Virginia University 92 $38,762,000 138 $36,639,000 0.0032 0.001 5  -54.67% -46 
5 Loma Linda University 147 $13 ,435,000 146 $33,752,000 0.001 1 0.0014 20.48% 1 
6 University of Alaska Fairbanks 1 02 $32,425,000 97 $79,395,000 0.0027 0.0032 1 7.43% 5 
7 Louisiana St Univ & A&M & Hebert Laws Ctr 55 $66,974,000 60 $ 136,850,000 0.0056 0.0055 -2.0 1% -5 
N 
8 University of South Florida 1 36 $ 17,574,000 98 $77,720,000 0.0015  0.003 1 1 12.08% 38 
9 Pennsylvania State University-Main Campus 1 8  $ 176,023,000 1 9  $345,920,000 0.0 147 0.0 1 39 -5.76% - 1  
1 0  Georgetown University 88 $39,328,000 93 $84,410,000 0.0033 0.0034 2.93% -5 
1 1  University of Mississippi Main Campus 148 $ 12,974,000 1 1 3 $58,223,000 0.001 1 0.0023 1 15 .2 1  % 35 
12 University of Missouri-Columbia 70 $5 1 ,943,000 70 $ 1 1 1 ,795,000 0.0043 0.0045 3.22% 0 
1 3  Texas A & M University 37 $93,733,000 67 $ 1 1 8,297,000 0.0078 0.0047 -39.48% -30 
14  University of New Hampshire-Main Campus 1 1 1  $29, 126,000 1 1 8 $49,1 86,000 0.0024 0.0020 - 19.0 1% -7 
1 5  University of Alabama in Huntsville 133 $ 17,972,000 1 59 $27,470,000 0.00 15  0.001 1 -26.70% -26 
1 6  Michigan State University 39 $91 ,675,000 54 $ 155,587,000 0.0077 0.0062 - 18.6 1% - 15  
1 7  University of Alabama at Birmingham 43 $88,978,000 28 $253,6 17,000 0.0074 0.0 102 36.69% 1 5  
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D :  Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I :  Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 5 :  Continued. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
1 8  Auburn University Main Campus 107 $30,45 1 ,000 106 $68,046,000 0.0025 0.0027 7. 16% 
19 Iowa State University 73 $5 1 ,250,000 83 $95,8 1 1 ,000 0.0043 0.0038 - 10.35% - 10  
20 Mississippi State University 103 $3 1 ,995,000 107 $67,977,000 0.0027 0.0027 1 .89% -4 
2 1  Medical University o f  South Carolina 1 16 $26,545,000 7 1  $ 1 1 1 ,003,000 0.0022 0.0044 100.54% 45 
22 University of Florida 30 $ 109,862,000 40 $ 195,296,000 0.0092 0.0078 - 14.75% - 10  
23  University of  Michigan-Ann Arbor 5 $233,782,000 3 $520,754,000 0.0 195 0.0209 6.82% 2 
24 University of Minnesota-Twin Cities 1 0  $2 12, 127,000 20 $345,802,000 0.0 177 0.0 138 -2 1 .82% - 10  
N 
25 Washington State University 95 $38, 102,000 108 $66,950,000 0.0032 0.0027 - 15 .73% - 1 3  
N 26 University of New Mexico-Main Campus 82 $43,387,000 86 $93,757,000 0.0036 0.0038 3 .63% -4 
27 Oregon State University 59 $62,960,000 84 $95,758,000 0.0053 0.0038 -27.06% -25 
28 Montana State University-Bozeman 130 $ 1 8,844,000 1 10 $62,09 1 ,000 0.00 16 0.0025 58.02% 20 
29 University of Nebraska at Lincoln 94 $38,3 14,000 109 $63,799,000 0.0032 0.0026 -20 . 14% - 1 5  
30  Cornell University-Endowed Colleges 7 $2 1 8,542,000 21  $334, 108,000 0.0 182 0.0 134 -26.68% - 14 
3 1  Rutgers University-New Brunswick 52 $72,384,000 58 $ 140,72 1 ,000 0.0060 0.0056 -6.77% -6 
32 Dartmouth College 84 $42,506,000 72 $ 1 10,238,000 0.0035 0.0044 24.37% 12 
33  Clemson University 122 $23,390,000 129 $43 ,7 1 6,000 0.0020 0.00 18  - 10.37% -7 
34 North Carolina State University at Raleigh 48 $77,955,000 76 $ 10 1 ,444,000 0.0065 0.004 1 -37.59% -28 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 5: Continued. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
35 New Mexico State University-Main Campus 75 $50,270,000 1 12 $61 ,503,000 0.0042 0.0025 -41 .33% -37 
36 University of North Dakota-Main Campus 127 $20,880,000 1 55 $29, 140,000 0.0017  0.0012 -33 .07% -28 
37 North Dakota State University-Main Campus 141  $ 15 ,767,000 1 36 $38,092,000 0.0013  0.00 15  1 5 .86% 5 
38 University of Arizona 26 $122,6 10,000 39 $207 , 132,000 0.0 102 0.0083 - 1 8.98% - 13  
39  Georgia Institute of  Technology-Main Campus 5 1  $73,257,000 56 $ 144,324,000 0.0061 0.0058 -5.52% -5 
40 University of Connecticut 7 1  $5 1 ,502,000 65 $ 1 19,729,000 0.0043 0.0048 1 1 .49% 6 
4 1  Oklahoma State University-Main Campus 93 $38,472,000 1 1 5 $52,859,000 0.0032 0.0021 -34. 1 1% -22 
N 
42 Oregon Health & Science University 68 $54,061 ,000 45 $ 176,3 19,000 0.0045 0.0071 56.41% 23 
43 Carnegie Mellon University 54 $67,580,000 68 $ 1 1 6,405,000 0.0056 0.0047 - 17.40% -14 
44 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 24 $ 147,492,000 26 $264,1 78,000 0.0 123 0.0106 - 14. 10% -2 
45 University of Texas at Austin, The 21 $12 1 ,429,000 25 $274,827,000 0.0 10 1  0.0 1 10  8 .54% 2 
46 University of Iowa 34 $98,9 1 3,000 41  $ 188,86 1 ,000 0.0083 0.0076 -8.43% -7 
47 Northwestern University 46 $84, 1 89,000 33 $21 3,558,000 0.0070 0.0086 2 1 .65% 1 3  
48 Florida State University 9 1  $38,788,000 95 $79,963,000 0.0032 0.0032 - 1 . 14% -4 
49 Texas Tech University 1 67 $8,767,000 1 53 $30,584,000 0.0007 0.0012  67.30% 14  
50 University of South Carolina-Columbia 125 $22,2 10,000 140 $36, 1 56,000 0.0019  0.0014 -2 1 .93% - 1 5  
5 1  University of Wisconsin-Madison 6 $222, 1 63,000 8 $434,927,000 0.0 1 85 0.0 174 -6. 1 2% -2 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 5 :  Continued. 
A B C D E F G ff I J 
52 Kansas State University 1 12 $28,327,000 125 $45,53 1 ,000 0.0024 0.0018  -22.92% - 13  
53  Ohio State University-Main Campus 3 1  $ 109,4 13 ,000 32 $214,200,000 0.009 1 0.0086 -6. 1 1% - 1  
54 University of Southern Mississippi 192 $5,703,000 164 $25,080,000 0.0005 0.0010  1 10.90% 28 
55 University of Washington-Seattle Campus 2 $280,054,000 2 $63 1 , 144,000 0.0234 0.0253 8.08% 0 
56 San Diego State University 144 $ 14,66 1 ,000 1 37 $37,526,000 0.0012 0.0015  22.75% 7 
57 Purdue University-Main Campus 4 1  $89,8 1 7,000 63 $ 126,788,000 0.0075 0.005 1 -32.30% -22 
58 University of New Orleans 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
N 
59 University of Idaho 1 3 1  $ 1 8,430,000 130 $42,6 10,000 0.0015  0.0017  10.88% 1 
60 University of Maryland-College Park 40 $90,648,000 5 1  $ 157,668,000 0.0076 0.0063 - 1 6.59% - 1 1 
6 1  University ofNevada-Las Vegas 1 87 $6,6 16,000 173 $ 18,263,000 0.0006 0.0007 32.38% 14  
62 University of Kentucky 66 $57,722,000 62 $ 129,790,000 0.0048 0.0052 7.83% 4 
63 University of Georgia 57 $64,375,000 78 $ 100,293,000 0.0054 0.0040 -25 .29% -2 1 
64 Polytechnic University 195 $5,457,000 220 $7, 1 60,000 0.0005 0.0003 -37.08% -25 
65 University of Louisville 1 70 $8,550,000 1 1 6 $52,843,000 0.0007 0.002 1 1 96.39% 54 
66 Boston University 45 $85,250,000 1 7  $347, 1 52,000 0.0071 0.0 1 39 95 .29% 28 
67 Indiana University-Bloomington 33 $ 10 1 , 1 56,000 46 $ 174,268,000 0.0084 0.0070 - 1 7.38% - 13  
68 Drexel University 149 $ 12,792,000 126 $45,328,000 0.001 1 0.0018  69.93% 23 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, I 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between I 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003 . 
... 
Table 5: Continued. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
69 Tulane University of Louisiana 10 1  $34,068,000 9 1  $88,066,000 0.0028 0.0035 23.97% 10  
70 Illinois Institute of Technology 1 84 $6,989,000 201 $ 10,9 10,000 0.0006 0.0004 -25. 14% - 1 7  
7 1  Stevens Institute of Technology 239 $2,093,000 179 $ 16,476,000 0.0002 0.0007 277.5 1%  60 
72 University of Tennessee, The 99 $35,446,000 1 1 1  $61 ,999,000 0.0030 0.0025 - 16. 12% - 12  
73 George Mason University 1 66 $8,957,000 1 50 $32,5 14,000 0.0007 0.0013  74.08% 1 6  
74 University of Texas Health Science Center, The 97 $36,322,000 77 $ 10 1 ,305,000 0.0030 0.0041 33.75% 20 
75 University of Massachusetts-Amherst 96 $37,443,000 94 $8 1 ,9 1 5 ,000 0.003 1 0.0033 4.92% 2 
N 
76 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 3 $275,279,000 23 $29 1 ,879,000 0.0230 0.0 1 1 7  -49. 1 5% -20 
77 University of Arkansas Main Campus 1 1 5 $26,850,000 1 54 $29,554,000 · 0.0022 0.0012 -47.2 1% -39 
78 University of Miami 50 $75,487,000 59 $138,941 ,000 0.0063 0.0056 - 1 1 .73% -9 
79 University of Utah 47 $82, 105,000 43 $ 1 82, 199,000 0.0069 0.0073 6.42% 4 
80 University of Missouri-Rolla 200 $4,8 14,000 1 88 $ 14,2 14,000 0.0004 0.0006 41 .60% 12  
8 1  Utah State University 63 $60,349,000 90 $90,670,000 0.0050 0.0036 -27.95% -27 
82 University of Rochester 25 $ 132,965,000 30 $228,985,000 0.0 1 1 1  0.0092 -17.4 1% -5 
83 University of Maine 1 5 1 $ 12,079,000 148 $33,252,000 0.0010 0.001 3  32.02% 3 
84 Colorado State University 65 $59,2 17,000 66 $ 1 19,497,000 0.0049 0.0048 -3.23% - 1  
85 Harvard University 1 3  $ 198,3 10,000 14  $384,891 ,000 0.0 166 0.0 1 54 -6.92% - 1  
Key to column headings: A :  Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B :  Institution; C :  Rank o f  institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D :  Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 5 :  Continued. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
86 SUNY at Buffalo 78 $48,052,000 100 $73,935,000 0.0040 0.003 -26.2 1% -22 
87 University of Nevada-Reno 142 $ 15 ,657,000 1 14 $56,806,000 0.0013  0.0023 73.99% 28 
88 University of Montana-Missoula, The 1 77 $7,380,000 1 63 $25,343,000 0.0006 0.00 10 64.68% 14 
89 University of Med and Dentistry of New Jersey 85 $42,45 1 ,000 57 $ 14 1 ,8 17,000 0.0035 0.0057 60.2 1% 28 
90 Florida International University 2 1 6  $3,608,000 1 56 $28,5 1 1 ,000 0.0003 0.001 1 278.96% 60 
91  Johns Hopkins University 1 $660,675,000 1 $ 1 , 137,366,000 0.0552 0.0455 - 17.44% 0 
92 Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univ 77 $48, 196,000 104 $71 ,843,000 0.0040 0.0029 -28.5 1% -27 
N 
93 University of Notre Dame 132 $ 1 8,034,000 127 $44,0 1 7,000 0.0015  0.0018  1 7.05% 5 
94 University of Pennsylvania 14 $193,366,000 4 $495,264,000 0.0 16 1  0.0 198 22.83% 10  
95 Arizona State University at the Tempe Campus 1 1 3 $28,3 1 7,000 1 03 $72,483,000 0.0024 0.0029 22.75% 1 0  
96 University of Rhode Island 1 19 $25,378,000 135 $38,776,000 0.002 1 0.00 16  -26.73% - 16  
97 University of California-Davis 35 $96,998,000 34 $212,71 8,000 0.0081 0.0085 5 . 1 7% 1 
98 New York University 32 $ 102,009,000 47 $ 173,449,000 0.0085 0.0069 - 18 .46% - 15  
99 University of Central Florida 1 8 1  $7,229,000 133  $41 ,486,000 0.0006 0.0017  175 .2 1% 48 
100 University of Delaware 108 $29,746,000 102 $73,043,000 0.0025 0.0029 1 7.76% 6 
101  Wichita State University 237 $2,224,000 2 12 $8,328,000 0.0002 0.0003 79.58% 25 
102 Jackson State University 1 88 $6,478,000 1 74 $ 1 8, 1 07,000 0.0005 0.0007 34.05% 14 
Key to  column headings: A :  Rank of  institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B :  Institution; C: Rank of  institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 5 :  Continued. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
103 Tufts University 79 $47,324,000 10 1  $73,2 1 8,000 0.0040 0.0029 -25.80% -22 
104 Columbia University in the City ofNew York 12  $202,128,000 9 $42 1 ,760,000 0.0 169 0.0 1 69 0.07% 3 
1 05 University of California-Santa Barbara 72 $5 1 ,433,000 80 $99,070,000 0.0043 0.0040 -7.63% -8 
1 06 University of Colorado at Boulder 1 9  $ 167,427,000 1 5  $367,867,000 0.0140 0.0 147 5.37% 4 
1 07 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 20 $ 1 5 1 ,949,000 1 8  $346,008,000 0.0127 0.0 1 39 9.20% 2 
108 Indiana University of Pennsylvania-Main Campus 270 $524,000 263 $ 1 ,261 ,000 0.0000 0.0001 1 5.4 1% 7 
109 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 126 $21 ,624,000 142 $35,255,000 0.00 18 0.0014 -2 1 .8 1% - 16  
N 
1 10 University of California�San Francisco 1 1  $209,638,000 1 3  $393,078,000 0.0 175 0.0 1 57 - 10.08% -2 
1 1 1 New Jersey Institute of Technology 1 89 $6,274,000 1 94 $ 12,765,000 0.0005 0.0005 -2.43% -5 
1 12 University of California-Riverside 1 39 $ 16,832,000 1 3 1  $42,3 1 7,000 0.0014 0.0017  20.57% 8 
1 13 Florida Atlantic University-Boca Raton 179 $7,268,000 204 $ 10,399,000 0.0006 0.0004 -3 1 .38% -25 
1 14 Wayne State University 8 1  $44,365,000 8 1  $98,738,000 0.0037 0.0040 6.73% 0 
1 1 5 University of Southern California 2 1  $ 1 5 1 ,454,000 24 $279,442,000 0.0 126 0.0 1 12 - 1 1 .52% -3 
1 1 6 University of Oklahoma Norman Campus 105 $30,787,000 96 $79,954,000 0.0026 0.0032 24.54% 9 
1 1 7 University of Vermont and State Agricultural Coll 98 $36,3 19,000 89 $91 , 1 1 6,000 0.0030 0.0036 20.3 1% 9 
1 1 8 Syracuse University 138 $ 17,039,000 162 $25,896,000 0.0014 0.0010  -27. 12% -24 
1 19 University of West Florida 238 $2,094,000 241 $3,829,000 0.0002 0.0002 - 1 1 . 1 6% -3 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 5 :  Continued. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
120 University of Kansas Main Campus 83 $43, 128,000 82 $97,653,000 0.0036 0.0039 8.59% 1 
12 1  Lehigh University 146 $ 13 ,636,000 1 84 $ 1 5,799,000 0.001 1 0.0006 -44.44% -38 
122 University of Houston-University Park 124 $22,78 1 ,000 143 $35, 174,000 0.0019  0.0014 -25 .95% - 19  
123 Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University 1 52 $ 1 1 ,988,000 1 57 $28,0 12,000 0.0010 0.001 1 12.06% -5 
124 Brown University 86 $40,877,000 85 $94, 196,000 0.0034 0.0038 10.5 1% 1 
125 Medical College of Wisconsin 1 1 8 $25,402,000 79 $99,976,000 0.0021 0.0040 88.75% 39 
126 Stanford University 4 $270,056,000 6 $467, 1 53,000 0.0225 0.0 187 - 17.04% -2 
N 
127 Howard University 120 $25,204,000 145 $33,805,000 0.0021 0.00 14 -35 .68% -25 
00 
00 128 University of Texas Southwestern Med Ctr (Dallas) 58 $63,950,000 44 $ 1 82, 142,000 0.0053 0.0073 36.59% 14 
129 South Carolina State University 1 98 $4,957,000 22 1 $7,027,000 0.0004 0.0003 -32.02% -23 
1 30 Southern Illinois University Carbondale 1 78 $7,353,000 206 $9,948,000 0.0006 0.0004 -35 . 12% -28 
1 3 1  Wake Forest University 87 $40,480,000 64 $ 122,656,000 0.0034 0.0049 45.3 1% 23 
1 32 University of Oregon 109 $29,605,000 1 34 $41 ,362,000 0.0025 0.0017  -33.00% -25 
1 33 University of Texas at El Paso, The 1 58 $ 10,257,000 1 68 $ 19,672,000 0.0009 0.0008 -8.02% - 10  
134 University of South Dakota 232 $2,685,000 202 $ 10,72 1 ,000 0.0002 0.0004 91 .49% 30 
1 35 Northern Arizona University 1 82 $7, 100,000 172 $ 1 8,723,000 0.0006 0.0007 26.46% 10  
1 36 University of Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras Campus 1 56 $ 10,757,000 14 1  $35,35 1 ,000 0.0009 0.0014 57.60% 1 5  
Key to column headings: A :  Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1992-2003; B :  Institution; C :  Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D :  Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 5 :  Continued. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
137 University of California-San Diego 9 $2 14,975,000 7 $466,450,000 0.0 179 0.0 1 87 4.06% 2 
138 South Dakota State University 1 59 $9,856,000 183 $ 1 5 ,904,000 0.0008 0.0006 -22.62% -24 
1 39 University of Missouri-St. Louis 2 1 8  $3,478,000 247 $3,446,000 0.0003 0.0001 -52.48% -29 
140 Louisiana Tech University 157 $ 10,7 1 8,000 252 $2,620,000 0.0009 0.0001 -88 .28% -95 
141  University of Virginia-Main Campus 44 $86,007,000 42 $ 185,567,000 0.0072 0.0074 3 .47% 2 
142 Western Michigan University 1 93 $5,53 1 ,000 198 $ 1 1 ,884,000 0.0005 0.0005 3 .04% -5 
143 Northern Illinois University 203 $4,599,000 237 $4,086,000 0.0004 0.0002 -57.39% -34 
N 
144 Portland State University 2 1 7  $3,55 1 ,000 226 $6,454,000 0.0003 0.0003 - 12.84% -9 
145 George Washington University 123 $22,976,000 105 $70,820,000 0.0019  0.0028 47.82% 1 8  
146 Case W estem Reserve University 36 $94,254,000 38 $207,734,000 0.0079 0.0083 5 .70% -2 
147 University of Maryland-Baltimore 67 $54,644,000 6 1  $ 136,203,000 0.0046 0.0055 1 9.53% 6 
148 University of California-Berkeley 16  $ 1 85,232,000 29 $245,570,000 0.0 155 0.0098 -36.42% - 13  
149 Clark Atlanta University 1 10 $29,449,000 2 1 1 $8,646,000 0.0025 0.0003 -85 .92% - 10 1  
1 50 Indiana State University 257 $950,000 264 $ 1 ,2 15 ,000 0.0001 0.0000 -38.67% -7 
1 5 1  Idaho State University 252 $ 1 , 120,000 23 1 $5,497,000 0.0001 0.0002 1 35.37% 2 1  
1 52 Ohio University-Main Campus 2 14 $3,9 16,000 203 $ 10,637,000 0.0003 0.0004 30.26% 1 1  
1 53 University of Dayton 106 $30,5 15 ,000 12 1  $46,599,000 0.0025 0.0019  -26.77% - 1 5  
Key to column headings: A :  Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B :  Institution; C :  Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1992; D :  Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 5 :  Continued. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
1 54 Temple University 1 14 $27,472,000 122 $46,544,000 0.0023 0.0019  - 1 8.75% -8 
155  University of San Francisco 244 $ 1 ,504,000 272 $694,000 0.0001 0.0000 -77.87% -28 
1 56 Loyola University Chicago 162 $9,266,000 1 52 $32,27 1 ,000 0.0008 0.0013  67.02% 10  
1 57 Rush University 260 $752,000 120 $46,697,000 0.0001 0.0019  2878% 140 
1 58 Northeastern University 145 $ 14,6 14,000 1 58 $27,973,000 0.0012 0.00 1 1  -8.2 1% - 13  
1 59 University of California-Los Angeles 8 $215 ,75 1 ,000 5 $475,65 1 ,000 0.0 1 80 0.01 90 5.73% 3 
160 Morgan State University 220 $3,294,000 193 $ 12,836,000 0.0003 0.0005 86.88% 27 
N 
1 6 1  University of  Toledo 205 $4,538,000 200 $ 1 1 ,277,000 0.0004 0.0005 1 9. 1 7% 5 
1 62 University of Wyoming 140 $ 1 6,340,000 1 6 1  $26,807,000 0.0014 0.001 1 -2 1 .32% -2 1 
1 63 West Virginia School of Osteopathic Medicine 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
164 University of California-Santa Cruz 129 $ 1 9, 1 64,000 1 19 $48, 141 ,000 0.0016  0.0019 20.47% 10  
165 University of San Diego 249 $ 1 , 148,000 268 $ 1 ,067,000 0.0001 0.0000 -55 .43% - 19  
1 66 Thomas Jefferson University 100 $34,9 14,000 92 $87,1 86,000 0.0029 0.0035 1 9.76% 8 
1 67 Rice University 1 1 7 $25,987,000 1 1 7 $5 1 ,472,000 0.0022 0.0021 -5.0 1% 0 
1 68 Wright State University-Main Campus 160 $9,649,000 1 85 $ 15,455,000 0.0008 0.0006 -23 . 19% -25 
169 University of Cincinnati-Main Campus 64 $59,65 1 ,000 69 $ 1 12,4 17,000 0.0050 0.0045 -9.62% -5 
1 70 Immaculata University 285 $0 283 $84,000 0.0000 0.0000 NIA 2 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 5 :  Continued. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
1 7 1  Marquette University 227 $2,975,000 217  $7,772,000 0.0002 0.0003 25 .28% 1 0  
172 University of California-Irvine 56 $66,369,000 55 $ 1 5 1 ,085,000 0.0055 0.0060 9. 17% 
173 SUNY at Albany 134 $ 17,853,000 18 1  $ 16, 192,000 0.00 15  0.0006 -56.5 1% -47 
174 Virginia Commonwealth University 76 $48,580,000 88 $91 ,372,000 0.0041 0.0037 -9.80% -12  
175 Morehouse School of Medicine 1 69 $8,563,000 144 $34,887,000 0.0007 0.00 14 95.38% 25 
1 76 University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 1 80 $7,260,000 1 78 $1 6,527,000 0.0006 0.0007 9. 1 7% 2 
177 Old Dominion University 185 $6,869,000 175 $ 17,546,000 0.0006 0.0007 22.50% 1 0  
N 
178 Yeshiva University 49 $77,808,000 52 $ 156,637,000 0.0065 0.0063 -3.46% -3 
1 79 Brandeis University 128 $ 19,302,000 1 5 1  $32,462,000 0.00 16 0.00 13  - 19.35% -23 
1 80 Barry University 265 $65 1 ,000 240 $3,896,000 0.0001 0.0002 1 87.00% 25 
1 8 1  Central Michigan University 269 $548,000 244 $3,75 1 ,000 0.0000 0.0002 228.26% 25 
182 University of Maryland-Baltimore County 208 $4,437,000 139 $36,529,000 0.0004 0.00 15  294.82% 69 
183 University of Akron Main Campus 202 $4,724,000 2 1 8  $7,698,000 0.0004 0.0003 -2 1 .85% - 16  
184 University of Texas Medical Branch, The 1 04 $3 1 ,505,000 36 $208,286,000 0.0026 0.0083 21 7.05% 68 
1 85 Meharry Medical College 1 50 $ 12,464,000 1 60 $27,3 1 8,000 0.00 10 0.001 1 5 . 1 1 % - 10  
186 University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences 155 $ 1 1 ,744,000 209 $8,883,000 0.00 10 0.0004 -63 .73% -54 
187 Boston College 197 $5,004,000 177 $ 16,598,000 0.0004 0.0007 59.07% 20 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 5 :  Continued. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
1 88 Northeastern Ohio Universities College of Medicine 254 $ 1 ,043,000 250 $3,075,000 0.0001 0.0001 4 1 .39% 4 
1 89 Yale University 1 5  $ 190,388,000 16  $349,560,000 0.0 159 0.0 140 - 1 1 .95% -1 
1 90 Princeton University 60 $62,373,000 73 $ 107,933,000 0.0052 0.0043 - 17.0 1% - 13  
1 9 1  University of Nebraska Medical Center 1 54 $ 1 1 ,747,000 124 $46,476,000 0.00 10 0.00 19 89.74% 30 
1 92 North Carolina A & T State University 1 53 $ 1 1 ,866,000 169 $ 19,644,000 0.00 10 0.0008 -20.6 1% -16 
1 93 University of Missouri-Kansas City 1 90 $6,079,000 187 $ 14,8 10,000 0.0005 0.0006 16.83% 3 
1 94 University of Texas at Dallas, The 1 99 $4,860,000 199 $ 1 1 ,327,000 0.0004 0.0005 1 1 .77% 0 
N 
195 University of North Carolina at Greensboro 174 $7,868,000 232 $5, 1 70,000 0.0007 0.0002 -68.49% -58 
N 1 96 Ball State University 268 $55 1 ,000 242 $3,820,000 0.0000 0.0002 232.48% 26 
1 97 University of Tulsa 222 $3, 1 7 1 ,000 234 $4,5 1 1 ,000 0.0003 0.0002 -3 1 .78% - 12  
1 98 Tennessee State University 1 63 $9, 160,000 176 $ 17,279,000 0.0008 0.0007 -9.54% - 13  
1 99 University of Texas Health Science-San Antonio 80 $45,700,000 87 $91 ,787,000 0.0038 0.0037 -3.68% -7 
200 College of William and Mary 1 72 $8, 1 88,000 186 $ 14,983,000 0.0007 0.0006 -12.25% - 14 
201 Vanderbilt University 38 $93,0 10,000 27 $263,8 12,000 0.0078 0.0 106 36.02% 1 1  
202 SUNY College of Environmental Sci and Forestry 266 $618 ,000 246 $3,536,000 0.0001 0.0001 174.39% 20 
203 Georgia State University 1 75 $7,529,000 170 $ 19,252,000 0.0006 0.0008 22.63% 5 
204 Saint Louis University-Main Campus 1 37 $ 17,206,000 132 $41 ,983,000 0.00 14 0.00 17 17.0 1% 5 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003. 
Table 5 :  Continued. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
205 SUNY at Stony Brook 62 $61 ,976,000 74 $ 107,534,000 0.0052 0.0043 - 16.79% - 12  
206 Emory University 53 $68,1 64,000 3 1  $214,970,000 0.0057 0.0086 5 1 .24% 22 
207 Kent State University-Main Campus 186 $6,702,000 197 $ 12,287,000 0.0006 0.0005 - 12.08% - 1 1 
208 DePaul University 261 $744,000 239 $3,9 10,000 0.0001 0.0002 1 52.03% 22 
209 University of Illinois at Chicago 74 $50,798,000 53 $ 1 56, 1 38,000 0.0042 0.0063 47.40% 2 1  
2 10  Duke University 22 $ 1 5 1 ,087,000 1 1  $412,069,000 0.0 126 0.0 1 65 30.79% 1 1  
2 10 Medical College of Georgia 17 1  $8,4 13,000 149 $32,642,000 0.0007 0.0013  86.07% 22 
N 
210  City of  Hope Graduate School of Biological Science 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
2 13  New York Medical College 143 $ 14,776,000 166 $22, 1 1 8,000 0.0012 0.0009 -28.2 1% -23 
2 14  Southern Methodist University 204 $4,547,000 190 $ 13,261 ,000 0.0004 0.0005 39.86% 14  
2 15  University of Northern Colorado 242 $ 1 ,764,000 259 $ 1 ,7 19,000 0.0001 0.0001 -53 .27% - 17  
2 16  University of Texas at Arlington, The 2 12  $4,03 1 ,000 205 $ 10,325,000 0.0003 0.0004 22.84% 7 
2 17  Nova Southeastern University 262 $735,000 257 $ 1 ,973,000 0.0001 0.0001 28.73% 5 
2 1 8  Des Moines University-Osteopathic Medical Center 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
2 1 9  Washington University in St. Louis 23 $ 148,036,000 10  $419,0 14,000 0.0 124 0.0 168 35.74% 13  
220 University of Chicago 28 $ 1 1 8,03 1 ,000 37 $208, 139,000 0.0099 0.0083 - 15 .43% -9 
221 Oakland University 224 $3,041 ,000 223 $6,73 1 ,000 0.0003 0.0003 6. 1 5% 1 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between I 992 and 2003; J :  Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 5 :  Continued. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
222 Hofstra University 245 $ 1 ,401 ,000 192 $ 12,977,000 0.0001 0.0005 344.2 1% 53 
223 East Carolina University 196 $5,239,000 2 1 6  $7,864,000 0.0004 0.0003 -28.0 1% -20 
224 Michigan Technological University 176 $7,427,000 195 $ 12,602,000 0.0006 0.0005 - 1 8.63% - 19  
225 Cleveland State University 200 $4,8 14,000 227 $6,252,000 0.0004 0.0003 -37.72% -27 
226 Texas A & M University-Kingsville 259 $783,000 245 $3,649,000 0.0001 0.000 1 123 .49% 14 
227 Eastern Virginia Medical School 1 68 $8,742,000 229 $6,029,000 0.0007 0.0002 -66.93% -6 1 
228 Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine 280 $ 104,000 279 $232,000 0.0000 0.0000 6.98% 
N 
229 Mount Sinai School of Medicine 69 $52,529,000 48 $ 170,932,000 0.0044 0.0068 56.05% 2 1  
230 University of Denver 1 83 $6,996,000 210  $8,8 18,000 0.0006 0.0004 -39.55% -27 
23 1 Adelphi University 264 $652,000 280 $20 1 ,000 0.0001 0.0000 -85 .22% - 16  
232 Illinois State University 223 $3,079,000 243 $3,801 ,000 0.0003 0.0002 -40.80% -20 
233 Widener University-Main Campus 278 $ 1 14,000 282 $ 1 16,000 0.0000 0.0000 -5 1 .20% -4 
234 Clarkson University 207 $4,498,000 235 $4,497,000 0.0004 0.0002 -52.05% -28 
235 Bowling Green State University-Main Campus 23 1 $2,720,000 225 $6,475,000 0.0002 0.0003 14. 1 6% 6 
236 University of Massachusetts-Boston 209 $4, 126,000 2 19  $7,452,000 0.0003 0.0003 - 1 3.39% - 10  
237 Colorado School of Mines 19 1  $5,964,000 189 $ 14, 197,000 0.0005 0.0006 14. 1 6% 2 
238 East Tennessee State University 248 $ 1 , 1 74,000 230 $6,026,000 0.0001 0.0002 146. 16% 18  
Key to column headings: A :  Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1992-2003; B :  Institution; C :  Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1992; D :  Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003. 
Table 5 :  Continued. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
239 Georgia Southern University 258 $943,000 262 $ 1 ,309,000 0.0001 0.0001 -33 .43% -4 
240 University of Memphis 2 1 1 $4,094,000 214  $8, 148,000 0.0003 0.0003 -4.56% -3 
241 University of North Texas 230 $2,830,000 1 80 $ 16,4 1 6,000 0.0002 0.0007 178. 1 8% 50 
242 University of Massachusetts-Lowell 206 $4,5 13 ,000 2 1 5  $7,870,000 0.0004 0.0003 - 1 6.37% -9 
243 Baylor University 272 $377,000 274 $561 ,000 0.0000 0.0000 -28.64% -2 
244 University of Louisiana at Lafayette 234 $2,443,000 238 $3,952,000 0.0002 0.0002 -22.42% -4 
245 Clark University 229 $2,894,000 254 $2,403,000 0.0002 0.0001 -60. 1 8% -25 
N 
246 Brigham Young University 1 94 $5,485,000 207 $9,398,000 0.0005 0.0004 - 1 7.83% - 13  
247 SUNY Health Science Center at Syracuse 1 65 $9,079,000 1 7 1  $ 19,091 ,000 0.0008 0.0008 0.84% -6 
248 Baylor College of Medicine 42 $89,304,000 22 $297,252,000 0.0075 0.0 1 19  59.63% 20 
249 Lake Erie College of Osteopathic Medicine 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
249 University of North Texas-Hlth Sci Ctr (Ft. Worth) 226 $2,98 1 ,000 288 $0 0.0002 0.0000 - 100.0% -62 
25 1 University of St. Thomas 275 $240,000 276 $408,000 0.0000 0.0000 - 1 8.47% - 1  
25 1 Golden Gate University-San Francisco 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
253 University of the Pacific 249 $ 1 , 148,000 266 $ 1 , 1 12,000 0.0001 0.0000 -53 .55% - 17  
254 Drew University 276 $ 186,000 275 $5 1 7,000 0.0000 0.0000 33.30% 1 
255 SUNY Health Science Center at Brooklyn 135 $ 17,747,000 1 65 $23,0 1 1 ,000 0.0015  0.0009 -37.82% -30 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I :  Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 5 :  Continued. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
256 Alliant International University-San Diego 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
257 Fordham University 246 $ 1 ,372,000 27 1 $805,000 0.0001 0.0000 -7 1 .86% -25 
258 University of North Carolina at Charlotte 228 $2,9 10,000 182 $ 16, 1 86,000 0.0002 0.0006 166.74% 46 
259 Medical College of Ohio 173 $7,924,000 19 1  $ 13 ,025,000 0.0007 0.0005 -2 1 . 1 7% - 18  
260 New School University 274 $32 1 ,000 260 $ 1 ,423,000 0.0000 0.000 1 1 12.59% 14 
26 1 Pace University-New York 267 $570,000 24 1 $3,879,000 0.0000 0.0002 226.36% 26 
262 SUNY at Binghamton 2 1 5  $3,792,000 208 $9, 105,000 0.0003 0.0004 1 5 . 1 5% 7 
263 Seton Hall University 24 1 $ 1 ,789,000 256 $2,02 1 ,000 0.0001 0.0001 -45 .82% - 1 5  
263 St. John's University-New York 256 $ 1 ,014,000 288 $0 0.0001 0.0000 - 100.0% -32 
265 Miami University-Oxford 2 10  $4,099,000 236 $4,491 ,000 0.0003 0.0002 -47.46% -26 
266 La Salle University 285 $0 277 $39 1 ,000 0.0000 0.0000 NIA 8 
267 Spalding University 285 $0 286 $36,000 0.0000 0.0000 NIA - 1  
268 Long Island University-C W Post Campus 247 $ 1 ,2 1 8,000 25 1 $2,842,000 0.000 1 0.0001 1 1 .90% -4 
268 University of Hartford 253 $ 1 ,095,000 269 $925,000 0.000 1 0.0000 -59.49% - 16  
268 American University 233 $2,459,000 258 $1 ,754,000 0.0002 0.0001 -65 .79% -25 
268 The Scripps Research Institute 279 $ 108,000 35 $209,937,000 0.0000 0.0084 . 93 120% 244 
268 California Institute of Technology 29 $ 109,877,000 50 $ 1 64,054,000 0.0092 0.0066 -28.40% -2 1 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1992 and 2003. 
Table 5: Continued. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
268 University of Massachusetts Medical Sch Worcester 90 $38,955,000 75 $ 102,594,000 0.0033 0.0041 26.30% 1 5  
268 Rockefeller University 89 $39,281 ,000 99 $75, 1 56,000 0.0033 0.0030 -8.25% - 10  
268 University of  Arkansas at Little Rock 225 $3,0 19,000 123 $46,522,000 0.0003 0.0019 639.0% 102 
268 Texas A & M University System Health Science Ctr 285 $0 128 $43,998,000 0.0000 0.00 18  NIA 1 57 
268 University of Puerto Rico-Medical Sciences Campus 1 6 1  $9,508,000 147 $33,729,000 0.0008 0.0014 70. 12% 14 
268 Albany Medical College 1 64 $9,085,000 196 $ 12,488,000 0.0008 0.0005 -34.08% -32 
268 Universidad Central del Caribe 25 1 $ 1 , 142,000 2 13  $8,234,000 0.0001 0.0003 245 .77% 38 
268 Catholic University of America 2 1 3  $3,933,000 222 $6,765,000 0.0003 0.0003 - 17.5 1 % -9 
268 Ponce School of Medicine 236 $2,356,000 224 $6,625,000 0.0002 0.0003 34.85% 12 
268 Teachers College at Columbia University 235 $2,377,000 228 $6, 145,000 0.0002 0.0002 23.98% 7 
268 Florida Institute of Technology-Melbourne 240 $ 1 ,897,000 233 $4,600,000 0.0002 0.0002 1 6.29% 7 
268 Texas Christian University 22 1 $3, 194,000 248 $3,352,000 0.0003 0.0001 -49.67% -27 
268 CUNY Graduate School and University Center 2 19  $3,346,000 249 $3, 129,000 0.0003 0.0001 -55 . 1 5% -30 
268 Duquesne University 263 $667,000 253 $2,580,000 0.0001 0.0001 85.50% 10  
268 Inter American University of Puerto Rico-Metro 243 $ 1 ,572,000 255 $2,359,000 0.0001 0.0001 -28.03% - 12  
268 Texas Woman's University 255 $ 1 ,029,000 261 $ 1 ,368,000 0.0001 0.0001 -36.24% -6 
268 Andrews University 283 $ 19,000 265 $ 1 , 1 35 ,000 0.0000 0.0000 2764% 1 8  
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B :  Institution; C :  Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D :  Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F:  Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I :  Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 5 :  Continued. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
268 Claremont Graduate University 284 $ 10,000 267 $ 1 ,071 ,000 0.0000 0.0000 5036% 1 7  
268 Midwestern University 27 1 $382,000 270 $846,000 0.0000 0.0000 6.2 1% 1 
268 Pepperdine University 277 $ 143,000 273 $570,000 0.0000 0.0000 9 1 . 1 6% 4 
268 Carlos Albizu University 285 $0 278 $379,000 0.0000 0.0000 NIA 7 
268 Pacific University 28 1 $64,000 281 $ 130,000 0.0000 0.0000 -2.59% 0 
268 Western University of Health Sciences 285 $0 284 $70,000 0.0000 0.0000 NIA 1 
268 Wilmington College 285 $0 285 $50,000 0.0000 0.0000 NIA 0 
268 Saint Mary's University of Minnesota 273 $324,000 287 $25,000 0.0000 0.0000 -96.30% -14 
268 A T Still University of Health Sciences 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Antioch New England Graduate School (NH) 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Argosy University-Orange Campus 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Argosy University-Sarasota Campus 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Argosy University-Twin Cities Campus 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Azusa Pacific University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Biola University 282 $20,000 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 - 1 00.0% -6 
268 California Institute of Integral Studies 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Capella University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Table 5 :  Continued. 
A B C D E F G H I J 
268 Edward Via Virginia Coll of Osteopathic Medicine 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Fielding Graduate University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 George Fox University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Kansas City University of Medicine and Biosciences 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Mayo Graduate School 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Mayo Medical School 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Midwestern University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
N 
268 Northcentral University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
'° '° 268 Oral Roberts University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Pacifica Graduate Institute 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Regent University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Rosalind Franklin University of Med and Science 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Samford University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 San Juan Bautista School of Medicine 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Trevecca Nazarene University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Trinity International University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Union Institute & University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
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Table 5 :  Continued 
A B C D E F G H I J 
268 University of Bridgeport 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 University of La Verne 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 University of Phoenix-Online Campus 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
268 Walden University 285 $0 288 $0 0.0000 0.0000 NIA -3 
Key to column headings: A: Rank of institutions by all earmarks received, 1 992-2003; B: Institution; C: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 1 992; D: Total institutional S&E 
obligations, 1 992; E: Rank of institution by total S&E obligations, 2003; F: Total institutional S&E obligations, 2003; G: Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 1 992; H: 
Percent of total S&E obligations for all institutions, 2003; I: Percent change between 1 992 and 2003; J: Change in S&E obligation ranking, between 1 992 and 2003. 
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007 
Table 6 :  Effect of earmark ranking on rank of total science and engineering obligations, 
using all earmarks 
Total Earmarks Rank Total Earmarks Rank Total Earmarks Rank 
Ranks Included on Total 1992 on Total 2003 on Total Obligations 
Obligations Rank Obligations Rank Rank Change 
All 0.70 13 •
•• 
0.682 1 ••• 0.0 192 
(0.46 17) (0.43 17) (0.0036) 
1 - 20 0.0414 -0. 1399 0. 1 8 12 
(0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0024) 
1 - 50 -0.6 168 -0.63 1 5  0.0 146 
(0.0432) (0.0437) (0.000 1) 
1 - 100 0.3266 # 0.2 1 1 7  0. 1 149 
(0.0257) (0.0 126) (0.0253) 
101 - Last 0.8377 
... 
0.7920 ••• 0.0457 
(0.3209) (0.2719) (0.0070) 
Numbers in parentheses are the R2 values. Statistical significance notation is as follows, #: p � 0 . 10; 
* :  p � 0.05 ; ** :  p � 0.0 1 ;  *** :  p � 0.00 1 .  
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007. 
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Table 7: Effect of earmark ranking on rank of total science and engineering obligations, 
using only science and engineering earmarks 
Total Earmarks Rank Total Earmarks Rank Total Earmarks Rank 
Ranks Included on Total 1992 on Total 2003 on Total Obligations 
Obligations Rank Obligations Rank Rank Change 
All 0.7 1 69 ... 0.6979 ... 0.0 190 
(0.4750) (0.4450) (0.0034) 
1 - 20 0.0805 -0.0496 0. 1301 
(0.000 1) (0.0000) (0.0013) 
1 - 50 -0.5268 -0.5724 0.0456 
(0.0342) (0.0389) (0.0013) 
1 - 100 0.2902 0. 1 748 0 . 1 154 
(0.0204) (0.0086) (0.0256) 
101  - Last 0.89 19  ... 0.8468 ... 0.045 1 
(0.353 1) (0.3016) (0.0066) 
Numbers in parentheses are the R2 values. Statistical significance notation is as follows, #: p � 0. 10; 
* :  p � 0.05 ; ** :  p � 0.0 1 ;  *** :  p � 0.00 1 .  
Source: Chronicle o f  Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007. 
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Table 8: Percentage earmarks received are of science and engineering obligations using 
all earmarks, by year. 
Year Total S&E Obligations Total Earmarks Percent 
1992 $ 1 2,729,720,000.00 $ 684,000,000.00 5 .37% 
1993 $ 1 2,724,675,000.00 $ 763,000,000.00 6.00% 
1994 $ 13 ,739,27 1 ,000.00 $ 650,800,000.00 4.74% 
1995 $ 14,364,042,000.00 $ 600,000,000.00 4. 1 8% 
1996 $ 14,337,90 1 ,000.00 $ 296,000,000.00 2.06% 
1997 $ 15 ,08 1 ,369,000.00 $ 440,000,000.00 2.92% 
1998 $ 1 6,03 1 ,984,000.00 $ 528,000,000.00 3 .29% 
1999 $ 1 8,057,927,000.00 $ 797,000,000.00 4.4 1% 
2000 $ 19,879, 1 55,000.00 $ 1 ,044,000,000.00 5 .25% 
2001 $ 22,488,2 1 9,000.00 $ 1 ,n6s,ooo,ooo.oo 7.42% 
2002 $ 24,393,846,000.00 $ 1 ,837,000,000.00 7.53% 
2003 $ 26,653,898,000.00 $ 2,012,000,000.00 7.55% 
Source: Brainard and Borrego 2003 ; National Science Foundation 2007. 
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Table 9: Effect of earmark ranking on peer-reviewed funding ranking, using all earmarks. 
Including All Institutions Excluding Non-Recipients 
Year Effect Strength (R2) Effect Strength (R2) 
1992 0.687 0.45 14 0.452 0.2094 
1993 0.7 1 8  0.4897 0.40 1 0. 1 394 
1994 0.704 0.4692 0.55 1 0.2210  
1995 0.705 0.4695 0.560 0.2376 
1996 0.680 0.4383 0.446 0 . 1 309 
1997 0.68 1 0.4400 0.406 0. 1287 
1998 0.676 0.4298 0.593 0.2504 
1999 0.690 0.4534 0.453 0. 1 778 
2000 0.701 0.47 15 0.603 0.3 130 
2001 0.699 0.47 13 0.590 0.3040 
2002 0.679 0.4474 0.523 0.2486 
2003 0.680 0.445 1 0.62 1 0.3528 
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007. 
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Table 10: Effect of earmark ranking on peer-reviewed funding ranking, usmg only 
science and engineering earmarks. 
Including All Institutions Excluding Non-Recipients 
Year Effect Strength (R2) Effect Strength (R2) 
1992 0.702 0.4647 0.457 0.2348 
1993 0.733 0.50 16  0.349 0. 1 145 
1994 0.7 13 0.4741 0.539 0.2076 
1995 0.720 0.4823 0.535 0.2409 
1996 0.695 0.4509 0.4 18  0. 12 10  
1997 0.696 0.4533 0.376 0. 1 152 
1998 0.690 0.4406 0.589 0.2384 
1999 0.704 0.4649 0.442 0. 1 602 
2000 0.7 15 0.4798 0.600 0.2989 
200 1 0.7 13 0.4824 0.574 0.2887 
2002 0.695 0.4605 0.5 19  0.2385 
2003 0.696 0.4596 0.623 0.3487 
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education 2007; National Science Foundation 2007. 
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VITA 
Andy Dunsmore has served as Director of Development for the Department of 
Neurosurgery at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland since September 
2006. In this role, he is the Department's chief development and alumni officer and is 
responsible for all departmental fundraising activities. 
Prior to assuming this role at Johns Hopkins University, Dunsmore served as 
Director of Development and Alumni Affairs for the University of Tennessee College of 
Social Work from September 2002 through August 2006. In this role, Dunsmore was the 
College of Social Work's chief development and alumni officer and was responsible for 
leading the college's fundraising and alumni relations efforts. Dunsmore was also a 
graduate student in political science at the University of Tennessee during his time as a 
member of the University of Tennessee development staff. He began his graduate studies 
in August 2000. 
Dunsmore completed a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science at the 
University of Tennessee in 1990. Prior to returning to the University for graduate studies 
in 2000, he served from 1995 to 1999 as Associate Director of Medical Development at 
Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis, Missouri. In this role, he 
provided the staff leadership for a $50 million capital campaign for a cancer center on the 
Washington University Medical Center campus that occurred as a component of a $400 
million capital campaign for the entire School of Medicine. The School of Medicine's 
$400 million capital campaign was a part of a University-wide effort that had a $1 billion 
goal. At Washington University School of Medicine, Dunsmore also managed a portfolio 
307 
of about 150 major gift prospects, some of whom were not prospects for the cancer center 
campaign, and traveled extensively to the Northeast corridor of the United States to 
identify, cultivate, and solicit major and planned giving prospects and conduct various 
alumni and donor events. 
Prior to his service at Washington University in St. Louis, Dunsmore served from 
1992 through 1995 in a number of alumni and development roles at Hiwassee College in 
Madisonville, Tennessee. His service there included a stint as chief development officer 
for the college and was marked by great success in securing major gifts for the college's 
endowment and capital needs, in establishing annual giving and alumni affairs programs, 
and in editing a magazine and other publications. 
Dunsmore has served as a member of several non-profit boards and has been 
active in professional associations and the University of Tennessee National Alumni 
Association. 
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